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Abstract 
 
This research engages with a global migration-development agenda that aims to leverage 
remittances for development by incorporating remittance flows and households into global 
financial circuits. Previous analyses of what I call the ‘remittances-financial inclusion nexus’ have 
proved vital in deconstructing the assumptions behind, and shedding light on, the negative 
impacts of initiatives that aim to construct and expand financial markets on the back of 
remittances. However, what is striking in most of this critical literature is the ways in which 
financialisation is treated as an explanation in and of itself, which fails to account for the efforts 
and controversies that lie behind such market-led development projects. Moreover, surprisingly 
little is said about the extent to which attempts to incorporate remittance flows into global finance 
may actually be possible, and how and why these may be accepted and/or resisted by members 
of remittance households in home countries. In response, this research develops a geographies of 
remittance marketisation analytical framework, which allows for an exploration of the grounded 
ways in which remittance markets are constructed, the extent to which remittance flows and 
households can be (re)configured and incorporated into global finance, and why such processes 
are always fragile, contested and in need of constant renegotiations. This thesis is based on 10 
months of fieldwork undertaken in Dakar and Thiès (Senegal) and Accra and Tamale (Ghana), 
which generated 188 semi-structured and ethnographic interviews with institutional and private 
sector actors and remittance recipients, as well as in-field observations and document analysis. 
 
The research finds that the construction, stabilisation and expansion of remittance markets are 
not natural nor uncontested processes. Remittances do not have an inherent financial worth that 
can be easily unlocked and transformed into new development finance. Building markets that 
enable remittance money transfers to be tapped into by state and private sector actors requires 
extensive financial, material, technological, legal, and discursive constructions and, importantly, 
behavioural engineering. Furthermore, the thesis demonstrates that remittance and other related 
financial practices and behaviours cannot simply be ‘nudged’, even providing the right behavioral 
stimuli, information and incentives, but rather rest upon relational and collective, albeit 
sometimes unequal, decision-making processes between migrant(s), receiver(s), and main 
recipient(s), as well as other people situated down the ‘remittance distribution chain’. The extent 
to which remittances can be integrated into financial circuits and put to use in the manner 
advocated by proponents of the remittances-financial inclusion agenda is mediated by a wide 
range of factors, including the dynamics of everyday economic realities, gendered power 
dynamics and norms, inter-women hierarchies, kinship relations and household context. The 
research also shows that processes of financial subject formation constitute practical 
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accomplishments that are always contested, uncertain and in the making. It advances the 
understanding of members of remittance households as ‘reluctant’ and ‘dissenting’ subjects of 
remittance marketisation as well as subjects that ‘deny’ marketisation through discourses and 
acts of refusal. Overall, this thesis contributes a nuanced theoretical and empirical understanding 
of uneven geographies of financial incorporation in the Global South. This is significant for policy 
makers who propose and advance a remittances-financial inclusion agenda as it identifies the 
risks, contradictions and limits of such marketising projects.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Remittance flows and households: New frontiers of financial 
incorporation? 
 
(…) it is hoped that the financial incorporation of migrant labourers and their households might be 
analysed in future from a range of critical perspectives, on different scales, and through close 
examination of different cases. (Cross, 2015:316) 
 
In August 2019, the Financial Times (FT) dedicated a 7-part series to global remittances1, noting 
that remittances have caught up with, and even surpassed, foreign direct investment as the 
largest flow of capital into developing and emerging economies.2 In 2018, USD 529 billion-worth 
of remittances were sent by migrant workers to underdeveloped countries, representing three 
and a half times the size the total of development aid money (USD 144 billion) (KNOMAD, 2019). 
In 2019, remittance flows are likely to reach USD 550 billion (ibid). Dilip Ratha, lead economist 
in Macro Economics and Fiscal Management at the World Bank and the head of KNOMAD3, 
advances that “in five years, remittances will likely become larger than development assistance 
and FDI combined” (Barne and Pirlea, 2019). While remittances are depicted as an essential 
source of funds for many of the planet’s poorest, international financial and development 
organisations argue that their economic impacts could be harnessed if some of that money was 
channeled into more “productive investment” (Johnson, 2019). One key approach to bringing this 
about is to integrate Remittance Recipients (RR) in home countries into the formal financial 
system via banks and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), allowing them to not only build up savings 
but also access credit and insurance. “The rationale [is] simple: how can we make these 
remittances count more?”, says Pedro de Vasconcelos, senior technical specialist for the 
                                                     
1 See https://www.ft.com/cash-trails. 
2 Since foreign direct investment (FDI) has declined in recent years, remittances reached close to the level of FDI flows 
in 2018. Excluding China, remittance flows to developing and emerging economies have been significantly larger than 
FDI flows since at least 2015 (KNOMAD, 2019).  
3 The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) is an initiative of the World Bank that 
describes itself as "a global hub of knowledge and policy expertise on migration and development issues” (see 
KNOMAD website: https://www.knomad.org/about-us). 
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International Fund for Agricultural Development’s Financing Facility for Remittances in one of 
the pieces of the FT series (ibid).  
 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development is not the only organisation that is “trying 
to empower [remittance recipients]” (ibid). Since the 1980s, a broad coalition of actors has aimed 
to turn remittances into a resource that can and should be leveraged for development gains 
(Datta, 2017; Page and Mercer, 2019). Through concerted political and discursive efforts, 
remittances have shifted from being almost ’invisible’ to constituting one of the most effective 
tools to bring about positive development outcomes at different scales, ranging from the 
household to the national (Bakker, 2015a; Kunz, 2011). Migrants, in turn, have become key 
transnational agents, or even heroes, of development (Faist, 2008). 
 
However, while the initial focus was on maximising the productive use of remittances for 
development up until the early 2000s (towards investment and savings rather than 
consumption), it is the “payment system aspects” of remittances that have attracted most policy 
attention in recent years (Bank of International Settlements and World Bank, 2007:iii, in Cross, 
2015). More specifically, priority has been given to the promotion of greater competition amongst 
money transfer intermediaries and greater formalisation of remittance transfers on the one hand, 
and the establishment of stronger links between remittances and the financial inclusion agenda 
on the other. ‘Productive’ uses of remittances have become synonymous with the circulation and 
uses of remittances within global financial circuits. Importantly, these links between remittances, 
financial inclusion and development have attracted heightened levels of interest from not only 
the international development community but also the commercial and financial sectors (Cross, 
2015). In June 2019 for instance, Facebook announced its plan to launch a new crypto-currency, 
Libra, alongside a payment app, Calibra, with the aim of providing fast, secure and global money 
transfer to the one billion people that are still ‘unbanked’ but have mobile phones and access to 
the internet (O’Dwyer, 2019a; Greeley, 2019). While Facebook advances that Libra’s business 
model will be based on charging fees to users rather than monetising data, the proclaimed 
willingness to “help advance financial inclusion”, combined with the heterogenous range of global 
investors behind Facebook’s new initiative, seem to suggest that bigger plans are in the pipeline 
(Libra, 2019:2). In fact, the company’s partners include a dozen tech firms, telecommunication 
companies (including Vodafone), microlenders (Kiva) as well as payments companies 
(Mastercard, PayPal and Visa).4  
                                                     
4 Critical observers have speculated that what is at stake here is the creation of an integrated “superapp”, where users 
can not only send and receive money, but also have access to credit (through credit scoring based on transactional and 
social media data) and other financial products, message friends, pay utilities and shop online (O’Dwyer, 2019b). 
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In response, the research developed in this thesis critically investigates efforts to integrate 
remittances into global finance, and responses by RR to such market-led development projects in 
Senegal and Ghana, for several key reasons. First, about one in five of the African population 
(21%) – approximately 260 million people – say they depend at least “a little bit” on 
remittances sent from abroad (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al, 2019). This does not even 
account for the significance of domestic remittances in these countries’ economies. 
Remittances, therefore, constitute a major geographical political economy issue, and 
remittance-related policy agendas, which have a major impact on the lives of millions of 
people worldwide, deserve continued critical attention. Second, remittances are not 
development money but derive directly from the fruits of migrants’ labour in host countries. The 
cross-border movements of workers and the counter-flows of a fraction of their income thus 
benefit capital in two ways: it provides a precarious and cheap source of labour in the Global 
North; and it lowers the cost of reproducing the next generation of workers in the Global South, 
where living costs are much lower and to which states in the Global North do not contribute a 
penny. Thus, despite providing collective livelihood strategies for migrant workers and their 
families, transnational families and the underlying social practices of money remitting/receiving 
nevertheless constitute a key mechanism in “perpetuating the cheap social reproduction of the 
current and future working class” (Ferguson and McNally, 2014:13). They are, therefore, part and 
parcel of the modus operandi of global capitalism. Investigating development policies and 
initiatives – aimed at leveraging the financial potential of remittances and constituting new power 
relations between mainstream global finance and populations that occupy its very fringe (Aitken, 
2015) – and the ways in which they materialise in practice, is crucial to understanding the 
accumulation dynamics of contemporary financialised capitalism. Third, while the elusive, and 
even detrimental, effects of microfinance and financial inclusion have long been discussed (see 
for instance Mader, 2016a; 2018; Rankin; 2013; Roy, 2010; Soederberg, 2014), recent studies 
have also raised concerns about how successful this agenda is, even on its own terms (Bernards, 
2019). Critical engagement between this scholarship and the literature on migration and 
remittances is necessary to understand not only whether this global remittance agenda works, 
but also what it “works at and how” (Mader, 2015:19). This is especially important with regard 
to debates around the formation of migrants and members of remittance households in home 
countries as transnational financial subjects (Zapata, 2013; 2018). 
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1.2. Rationale for research and key arguments 
This thesis is motivated by a major gap in remittance research, namely that we still do not fully 
understand how the financial incorporation of remittance flows and households unfolds in 
practice, and how such market-making processes are experienced, accepted and/or contested by 
members of remittance households in home countries. One major reason for this, as argued in 
this thesis, is that much of the critical literature on remittances and financial inclusion has treated 
financialisation in empirically and theoretically imprecise ways (Christophers, 2015a; Ouma, 
2015a). What several scholars have called the ‘financialisation of remittances’ has come to 
describe a multitude of phenomena, ranging from processes of securitisation (Hudson, 2008), 
financial mass democratisation (Kunz, 2012) and finance-led capital accumulation (Cross, 2015), 
to “invitation to live by finance” (Martin, 2002:9; see Datta, 2012; Zapata, 2013). However, the 
securitisation of remittances has not yet materialised despite a real enthusiasm in the early 2000s 
from institutional actors such as the World Bank. Relatedly, the advancement of financial 
inclusion, and the remittance-linked financial inclusion agenda in particular, has been much less 
rapid in most developing and emerging economies than is often perceived and noted by both 
proponents and critiques of the agenda (Bernards, 2019). Moreover, while the aforementioned 
studies have proved essential in understanding the disciplinary role of the agenda and exploring 
the potential and actual impacts of the creation and expansion of markets on the back of 
remittances, surprisingly little has been said about the grounded work, investments and 
controversies behind the construction of such market-led projects. The integration of remittance 
flows and households into global finance has been depicted almost as a frictionless project, 
reflecting one of the latest spatial fixes of capitalism (Harvey, 2003). While similar concerns can 
be raised with regard to the construction of financial(ised) remittance subjects, it is important to 
note that recent studies have started to show how the everyday actions and subjectivities of 
migrants and remittance households in home countries cannot be easily shaped by governments’ 
and other institutional actors’ policies and programmes (Zapata, 2013, 2018). Overall, the 
existing literature on financial inclusion of/and remittances have left us with an understanding 
and usage of financialisation as “an explanation in and of itself” (Fields, 2018:119), rather than a 
practical accomplishment that is always in the making. I argue that this runs the risk of 
overestimating financial institutions’ current interest in remittances (from which new financial 
assets can be created) on the one hand, and the performative power of financial discourses, 
products and services in creating and shaping new financial subjectivities on the other. It also 
risks underestimating the chaotic, fragile and contested accomplishment of such development 
projects. 
 
 15 
Crucially, these limits in the literature reflect recent broader concerns over the lack of 
constructive engagement between the scholarship on the international political economy of 
global finance and financialisation and the work on finance and market formation inspired by 
science and technology studies (STS) (Ouma, 2015a). Drawing upon the work of scholars, and 
geographers especially, that have recently taken up the task of bringing STS-inspired and political 
economy approaches to markets and global finance into a productive dialogue (Bernards, 2019; 
Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn, 2019; Fields, 2018; McKenzie, 201; Ouma, 2015b, 2016), I 
propose to analyse not only how the construction of remittance markets and the financial 
incorporation of remittance flows and households into global finance sustain processes of capital 
accumulation, but also how these are made possible and experienced in practice. In order to do 
so, I posit the geographies of remittance marketisation as an analytical framework that builds 
upon and extends the geographies of marketisation approach developed by Berndt and Boeckler 
(2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013).  
 
This approach allows for an exploration of the construction, stabilisation and expansion of 
remittance markets not as natural but contested and contingent projects that require constant 
renegotiations. It highlights that remittances do not have an inherent financial worth that can be 
easily tapped into, but rather require not only extensive financial, material, technological, legal 
and discursive constructions, but also, and importantly, behavioural engineering. Understanding 
the successes and failures of such grounded efforts and investments to shape and ‘nudge’ 
remittance flows requires, in turn, opening up the ‘black box’ of remittance households and 
locating RRs’ socio-economic and financial arrangements, practices and subjectivities within 
broader relations of kin, kith and gender. This line of inquiry is notably inspired by concerns over 
the treatment of the household as a black box within not only structural analyses of the global 
political economy (Montgomerie, 2016; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2017) but also part of 
the literature on migration and remittances (Erdal, 2012).  
 
Challenging the conceptualisation of remittance households in home countries as simply passive, 
remittance-receiving entities in need of interventions, this research also considers the ways in 
which members of remittance households have responded to attempts to incorporate them into 
mainstream financial circuits. By doing so, it advances an understanding of everyday 
financialisation not as inevitable but prone to “resistance from without and contradiction from 
within” (Fields, 2017:588). Finally, it contributes to a growing body of work that aims to decentre 
research on financial subject formation beyond Anglo-American economies (Lai, 2017), and the 
Global North more generally (Gonzalez, 2015; Kutz, 2018; Wilkis, 2015).  
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1.3. Research questions 
In undertaking this research, I focus the inquiry on three questions. 
 
1. How do remittance markets come into being concretely in Senegal and Ghana? To 
answer this question, I am concerned with identifying the various human and non-human 
elements that contribute to the financial incorporation of remittance flows and 
households. I also examine how remittance markets are spatially constituted. 
 
2. To what extent can remittance flows be incorporated into global financial circuits? 
To answer this question, I seek to identify the main factors that influence the allocation 
and use of remittances and how decisions are negotiated between migrants and members 
of remittance households in home countries. I also explore the role that remittances play 
in broader financial and money-management arrangements and strategies. 
 
3. How do members of remittance households respond to processes of financial 
subject formation? To answer this question, I explore the extent to which remittance 
marketisation programmes can ‘nudge’ the behaviours and subjectivities of members of 
remittance households. I also explore causes of acceptance and/or resistance, and the 
limitations to, and strategies of adaptation of, marketising projects that aim to link 
remittance flows and households to global finance. 
 
1.4. Methodology and evidence base 
This research adopts a constructionist approach that is informed by what Ouma (2015b:78) calls 
a “critical ethnography of marketisation”. It pays specific attention to the ways in which 
remittances, agencies and market encounters are formatted in practice, how remittance markets 
are stabilised but also how they are constantly in the making and prone to resistance and 
processes of destabilisation by various actors. 
 
This study is based on fieldwork undertaken between June 2016 and December 2017 in Senegal 
and Ghana, drawing upon semi-structured and ethnographic interviews with institutional and 
private sector actors and remittance recipients, as well as in-field observations and document 
analysis. It responds to the need for greater empirical and theoretical knowledge on the 
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incorporation of remittance flows and households into global finance in West Africa, given the 
dramatic increase of programmes that aim to harness remittances for financial inclusion in the 
region, and the scarcity of critical studies on such development initiatives (with the exception of 
Cross, 2013, 2015). More specifically, this research provides an analysis of the ways in which 
the marketisation of remittance flows and households unfolds in two developing 
economies with contrasting degrees of financial penetration and trajectories. Importantly, 
fieldwork was carried out not only in the two capital cities (Dakar and Accra) but also in and 
outside ‘secondary’ cities (Thiès in Senegal and Tamale in Ghana). While logistically and 
practically challenging, it was necessary to carry out research in the outskirts of towns like Thiès 
and Tamale in order to understand the differentiated strategies put in place by financial and 
commercial institutions to reach so-called ‘unbanked’ and ‘underbanked’ populations in peri-
urban and rural areas. As far as international and domestic remittances are concerned, the ‘last 
mile’, i.e. access to a financial ‘touch point’ at which a RR can withdraw cash sent, remains a key 
challenge that global financial and development organisations have sought to overcome by 
offering new technological and digital solutions. While the marketisation of remittance flows and 
households in Senegal is explored via a branchless banking strategy led by MFIs, the branchless 
banking model led by Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) – or Mobile Money (MM) – is the main 
analytical focus in Ghana (see Chapter 4).  
 
The research focuses on two distinct sets of actors: institutional and private sector actors 
one the one hand, and members of remittance households in home countries on the other. 
First, it examines the strategies and grounded efforts by which institutional and private sectors 
actors aim to marketise remittance flows and households, drawing upon document analysis, 
semi-structured and ethnographic interviews with government officials, international financial 
and development organisations, banks, Fintechs, MFIs and MNOs, as well as in-field observations 
in Dakar and Thiès (Senegal) and Accra and Tamale (Ghana). By doing so, it allows for an 
exploration of how the messy work of making remittance markets plays out not only politically 
and discursively but also in practice (Ouma, 2015b). Second, the study explores the ways in which 
members of remittance households have experienced and responded to these market-making 
efforts in both countries, drawing upon semi-structured in-depth interviews and in-field 
observations with members of remittance households in Thiès (Senegal) and Accra and Tamale 
(Ghana). The main aim of this part of the research is to empirically examine, rather than infer as 
it is often the case in the literature on everyday financialisation (Pellandini-Simanyi et al, 2015), 
whether/how new financial products and services transform and/or draw upon existing socio-
economic and cultural arrangements, practices and subjectivities. 81 and 92 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with institutional and private sectors actors and members of 
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remittance households respectively. In addition, ethnographic interviews were carried out with 
15 different private sector actors. Overall, 188 semi-structured and ethnographic interviews 
were conducted in the two countries. Taken together, my research employs multiple case studies, 
methods and sources to understand the uneven financial incorporation of remittance flows and 
households in Senegal and Ghana. 
 
1.5. Thesis structure 
This thesis is developed across six chapters. Chapter 2 frames the study, by reviewing major 
streams of literature on remittances, financial inclusion and financialisation in the context of 
development. It builds upon previous studies by deconstructing the assumptions behind, and 
calling into question, policies and initiatives that aim to construct and expand financial markets 
on the back of remittances. At the same time, however, it outlines their limitations in theorising 
the grounded efforts and controversies behind these attempts to incorporate remittance 
flows and households in global financial circuits. To advance these studies, it posits the 
geography of remittance marketisation as an analytical framework, which allows accounting for 
the intricate ways in which remittance markets are constructed in practice in Senegal and Ghana 
and the fragility and contingency of the outcomes of such market-making processes, especially 
with regard to the configuration of remittance market subjects. 
 
Chapter 3 presents my methodological approach and framework detailing how I went about 
researching the marketisation of remittance flows and households, and building the empirical 
evidence base upon which my analysis is based. I explain how I developed a methodological 
approach to address my research questions through the use of multiple methods, case studies 
and sources. I then provide a detailed analysis of the data collection process, which consisted of 
the review and analysis of key policies, programs and activities targeting members of remittance 
households for financial inclusion, semi-structured interviews with institutional and private 
sector actors and members of remittance households, as well as ethnographic interviews and in-
field observations across Dakar and Thiès in Senegal, and Accra and Tamale in Ghana. After 
explaining how I analysed, interpreted and presented the data, I discuss issues around 
positionality and power relations in relation to the research process through the concept of ‘triple 
subjectivity’ (the researcher/research assistants/research participants relationship). 
 
The first of the three core analytical chapters, Chapter 4 presents my theoretical and empirical 
analysis of the differentiated ways in which remittance markets are realised in Senegal and 
Ghana. I begin by outlining the remittance landscapes in both countries, focusing on the 
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similarities and differences with regard to market-making strategies, actors and remittance-
linked financial products and services. Then, rather than leaving finance and the concrete 
formation of remittance markets black-boxed, I pay attention to the extensive financial, material, 
technological, legal, discursive and behavioural engineering that is required for such markets to 
come into being concretely. To do so, I draw upon Berndt and Boeckler’s (2009, 2012) 
geographies of marketisation approach and focus on the practical accomplishment of three key 
market framings: (1) the conversion of remittances into commodities; (2) the formatting of 
agencies among different remittance market actors; and (3) the formatting of market encounters 
between remittances, financial institutions and global investors. Divergent from previous studies, 
this shows that the construction and expansion of remittance markets in countries such as 
Senegal and Ghana are not natural or uncontested projects but always fragile, contested and in 
the making. 
 
The second analysis chapter, Chapter 5, examines the extent to which remittance flows can be 
incorporated into global financial circuits. I begin by providing a conceptualisation of the 
‘remittance household’ in order to focus on the variegated remitter-receiver-recipient 
configurations that underpin practices of remittance sending, receiving and distributing, and to 
shed light on the unwaged work and reproductive and emotional labour that contributes to the 
‘(re)production of life’. By investigating the ways in which decisions are made and by whom with 
regard to the allocation and use of remittances, I show that remittances cannot be easily ‘nudged’ 
towards certain financial purposes and circuits in the manner advocated by proponents of 
remittance marketisation. This is notably due to a wide range of factors, including debt, gendered 
power dynamics and norms, inter-women hierarchies, kinship relations and household context. 
The chapter concludes by situating remittance practices within broader financial and money-
management arrangements and strategies of remittance households. It demonstrates the 
significance of the role played by remittances in alternative financial arrangements and practices. 
 
The third analysis chapter, Chapter 6, discusses how members of remittance households 
respond to processes of financial incorporation and subject formation. More specifically, it 
provides new insights on the ways in which remittance-linked socio-economic and financial 
circuits, practices and subjectivities interact with, are subsumed by, or counter various attempts 
to absorb and replace them. Conceptualising processes of financial subject formation as a 
practical accomplishment that is constantly in the making, I advance the understanding of 
members of remittance households as “quasi-subjects” (Berndt and Wirth, 2019) of remittance 
marketisation. They constitute ‘reluctant’ and ‘dissenting’ subjects of remittance marketisation 
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as well as subjects that ‘deny’ marketisation through individual and collective discourses and acts 
of refusal.  
 
In conclusion, Chapter 7 revisits the core research questions which motivated this research and 
sets out the key findings of this research in response to each question. In summary, the new 
contributions to knowledge relate to the extension of the geographies of marketisation approach 
to remittances, the novel exploration of the ways in which remittance markets are created and 
contested in two countries and four cities in the Global South, and a set of foundations upon which 
a radical and transformative development agenda on remittances and financial inclusion should 
be built. The chapter concludes by suggesting several lines of enquiries to extend this research. 
These include the increasing prevalence of digital financial inclusion in the Global South, the 
relationship between digital financial inclusion and race/gender as well as international 
comparative analyses on the different ways in which the remittances-financial inclusion nexus 
manifests itself. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Theorising the financial incorporation of remittance 
flows and households:  
Financial inclusion, financialisation and marketisation 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, remittances have been at the centre of what de Haas (2012:8) terms a “neo-
optimistic” migration-development nexus, which positions migrants as key development agents, 
and their remittances as a significant source of development finance. Correspondingly, a wide 
range of policy initiatives have been proposed and implemented by a broad coalition of actors, 
including International Financial Institutions (IFIs), development organisations, regional 
development banks, private sector actors and governments in the Global North and the Global 
South, to ‘harness’ the developmental impact of remittances. While the focus of this remittances-
for-development agenda was initially on maximising the productive use of remittances (whereby 
these financial flows are targeted towards investment instead of consumption), it is the 
promotion of greater competition amongst money transfer intermediaries, greater formalisation 
of remittance transfers and stronger links between remittances and other financial products and 
services that have attracted most policy attention in recent years (Cross, 2015). This, in turn, has 
led many observers to critically engage with work on remittances and the literature on 
financialisation, with analyses ranging from the financialisation of the remittance marketplace to 
the financialisation of remitting subjects (Cross, 2015; Datta, 2012, 2017; Hudson, 2008; Kunz, 
2011, 2012; Zapata, 2013, 2018). These analyses of what I call the ‘remittances-financial inclusion 
nexus’, and of the financial inclusion agenda more generally, have proved vital in deconstructing 
the assumptions behind, and shedding light on, the negative impacts of initiatives that aim to 
transform development into a program of financial market expansion. 
 
However, what is striking in most of the critical literature on the remittances-financial inclusion 
nexus is the ways in which financialisation is treated as “an explanation in and of itself” (Fields, 
2018:119), which fails to account for the efforts and controversies that lie behind such market-
led development projects. In other words, the above approaches fall short of demonstrating how 
remittance markets “come into being practically” (Ouma, 2015b:3). By neglecting the grounded 
operations of remittance market-making, the socio-spatial expansion of remittance markets 
appears to be a natural and uncontested process. Moreover, surprisingly little is said about the 
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extent to which attempts to incorporate remittance flows into global finance may actually be 
possible, and how and why these may be accepted, subverted and/or resisted by members of 
remittance households in home countries (although see Zapata, 2013, 2018).  
 
In this chapter, I expand on the core arguments outlined above in greater detail and review the 
conceptual, analytical and empirical strengths and limitations of existing research on remittances, 
financial inclusion and financialisation in the context of development in order to set out the 
geographies of remittance marketisation as an analytical framework. This framework enables an 
account of the grounded ways in which remittance markets are constructed (RQ1), the extent to 
which remittance flows (RQ2) and households (RQ3) can be (re)configured and incorporated into 
global financial circuits, and why such processes are always fragile, contested and in need of 
constant renegotiations. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. First, I critically assess the efforts 
behind the creation of the remittances-for-development agenda, a development project that aims 
to leverage remittances for development. Second, I examine the transformation of the 
remittances-for-development agenda into what I call the ‘remittances-financial inclusion nexus’. 
While acknowledging the analytical value of existing critiques of this agenda, and of financial 
inclusion more generally, I identify several conceptual and empirical limitations. Third, I draw 
upon, and extend, the geographies of marketisation approach developed by Berndt and Boeckler 
(2009, 2010, 2011, 2012), and outline why and how such an approach is well suited to 
overcoming these limitations.  
 
2.2. The remittances-for-development agenda  
Over the past 40 years, a broad coalition of actors have made concerted efforts to leverage 
remittances for development gains. I argue that existing critiques of this remittances-for-
development have revolved around three main dimensions: (1) the political and discursive 
transformation of migrants into development agents, (2) the making of remittances as a resource 
to be capitalised on, and (3) economistic and gendered characteristics of interventions designed 
to render remittances (more) productive. 
 
2.2.1. Migrants as ‘development heroes’: Neoliberalism in hiding 
The debate about the impacts of migration on development has swung back and forth, from being 
perceived as a problem for economic development – ‘brain drain’ – to being a solution – ‘capital 
gain’ (Glick Schiller and Faist, 2010; de Haas, 2012). Those shifts in the migration-development 
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nexus reflect broader societal and ideological shifts that have occurred since World War II (de 
Haas, 2012). Briefly, three phases of the migration-development nexus are recognised. In the 
1950s and 1960s, optimistic views saw migration as vital to filling the labour gaps in the Global 
North while remittances and migrants’ return were thought to be key factors that would enable 
economic take-off in the Global South (Faist, 2008). This view clearly drew upon 
developmentalist modernisation theories of a natural equilibrium between labour and capital 
creating ‘balanced growth’ provided that markets were left unfettered (Gamlen, 2014). In 
contrast, the second phase (1970s to the 1980s) emphasised the highly detrimental impact of 
migration on development processes in countries of origin. Dominated by the Marxist-inspired 
dependency and world system theories, emigration was perceived as both a direct consequence 
of underdevelopment and, in turn, a source of further poverty and underdevelopment between 
the Global North and the Global South, mostly due to the emigration of highly-skilled workers 
from the latter to the former (Bastia, 2013; Faist, 2008). Moreover, remittances, far from resulting 
in economic development, were found to be wasted on ‘conspicuous consumption’ (Chami et al, 
2005; Sofranko and Idris), and exacerbate inequalities (Croll and Ping, 1997; Gamlen, 2014).  
 
The claim that migration is both caused by, and results in, development failure in the country of 
origin has given way to a new “mantra” (Kapur, 2004), addressed notably by the ‘New Economics 
of Labour Migration’ (NELM) approach, whereby (1) remittances are deemed to bring about 
positive outcomes at different levels, ranging from the household to the national and (2) migrants 
are considered as key transnational agents, or even heroes, of development (Faist, 2008). Before 
I explore what is new about this reversal, it is important to understand the reasons behind the 
emergence of this neo-optimism (de Haas, 2012). As Geiger and Pécoud (2013:373) argue:  
 
The question is not so much whether migration will foster development, or whether political 
initiatives in this field will last or not. Instead, the question lies in the implicit assumptions behind 
the interest in the ‘migration-development nexus’, and in what they tell us of the determinants of 
both development and migration policy. 
 
Many critical observers have pointed out that the optimistic view of the migration-development 
nexus has been driven by the interests of migrant-receiving states in the Global North (Glick 
Schiller, 2010; Glick Schiller and Faist, 2010; Kabbanji, 2013; Piper, 2009). The product of a 
political and scientific construction, the recent framing that underpins the links between 
development and migration reflects the ways in which powerful states in the Global North have 
exerted their influence upon countries in the Global South in order to manage migration (i.e. 
control it) whilst trying to maximise its benefits (Geiger and Pécoud, 2013:369; see also Delgado 
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Wise et al, 2013; Gamlen, 2014; de Haas, 2012; Pina-Delgado, 2013). In fact, Geiger and Pécoud 
(2013:373) argue that the aim to “make migration work for development” has been subordinated 
to security objectives, more often than not conflated with strong and restrictive immigration 
policies. For instance, while Skeldon (2012) and Datta (2009) note that the emphasis put on 
circular migration can be compared to guest worker programmes during the post-war period, 
others argue the recent optimism around remittances, the diaspora and the image of migrants as 
agents for development reflects the hope of countries in the Global North that development may 
slow migration flows (Newland, 2007).   
 
Another important element of this “hidden agenda” is the close ties it develops with neoliberal 
development policymaking (Gamlen, 2014:590, see also Castles and Delgado Wise, 2008; Datta, 
2009; de Haas, 2012; Delgado Wise and Marquez Covarrubias, 2009; Glick Schiller, 2010). Here, 
the neo-optimism about migration, and migrants in particular, is explained by the withdrawal of 
the state in different parts of the world (de Haas, 2012; Bastia, 2013). In the context of the 
privatisation of social services following structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, a 
significant transfer of responsibility for development has occurred from state to society and 
specifically migrants (Bastia, 2013; Datta et al., 2007; Datta and Guermond, forthcoming; Glick 
Schiller, 2010; Raghuram, 2009). This third articulation of the migration-development nexus, 
therefore, has coincided with neoliberal ideologies that shift attention away from structural 
development constraints and the responsibility of migrant-sending states to pursue political and 
socio-economic reforms (Datta et al, 2007; Kapur, 2004; Mercer et al, 2008). In other words, this 
renewed celebration of migration-led development has constituted “an attempt to deliver 
neoliberalism with a human face” (Delgado Wise and Covarrubias Marquez, 2009:87). 
 
At the core of the ‘neo-optimism’ is, therefore, a positive thinking about the impact of emigration 
on the countries of origin and an overwhelming focus on remittances which have increasingly 
come to be seen as one of the most important tools to finance development (Datta, 2009). In the 
following, I delve more deeply into various contested attempts to make remittances a resource to 
be capitalised on; and ensure that they are channelled into (more) productive investments. 
 
2.2.2. The transformation of remittances into a financial resource  
Remittances were transformed in the 1980s and 1990s into both a national product resulting 
from the export of labour and a foreign entity that arrives as gifts (Hernandez and Coutin, 2006). 
Taken together, these two characteristics have transformed remittances into a significant 
financial resource to be tapped for migrant-sending countries’ national development. What 
Hernandez and Coutin (2006:189) refer to as the “nationalization of migrant labour” is 
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underpinned by three distinct but interrelated discursive and political moves undertaken by both 
states and international financial institutions: (1) the management of migrant labour by states as 
export; (2) the claim that the labour of migrants is ‘owned’ by migrant-sending nations, and (3) 
the emphasis on the original investment efforts of states in migrant workers (in the form of 
education, shelter and so on). This has legitimised the claim of migrant-sending states to get a 
return on investment in the form of remittances. In parallel, remittances have been discursively 
constructed as foreign in origin, entering the nation as gifts that do not require prior exchange 
and negotiations (ibid). Accounts of the volume of remittances being put in comparison with 
levels of Official Development Aid (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have become very 
common in mainstream and even critical literatures (Bakker, 2015b) (see Figure 2.1). These 
comparisons have not only served to increase the development legitimacy of remittances but also 
assumed that remittances simply arrive and, “much as a river irrigates land”, represent currencies 
that naturally “flow” into communities (Hernandez and Coutin, 2006:190, see also Massey and 
Parrado, 1994:18).  
 
 
Figure 2. 1 - Remittance flows to low-and middle-income countries compared to FDI, ODA and 
private debt and portfolio equity, 1990-2019 
 
(Source : https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/Figure1.1.PNG) 
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Importantly, particular accounting practices have been deployed in order for remittances to be 
considered as national incomes and foreign currencies that can be capitalised for development. 
In fact, Bakker (2015b:32) demonstrates that the supposed dramatic increase in remittances 
flows over the past two decades is mostly due to better reporting, i.e. better data-collecting 
procedures and improved measurement practices. Multiple institutions, including the WB and the 
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), have played a pivotal role in producing measurement tools 
and calculative practices to construct remittances as a financial flow. Bakker (2015b) argues that 
this was purposively done to support the central political claims of the remittances-for-
development agenda, namely that remittances constitute the world’s most effective tool to 
alleviate poverty and maybe the biggest source of development finance. In other words, now that 
this significant amount of money had been ‘discovered’5 and had grabbed the attention of states, 
development organisations and financial institutions, remittances are deemed to play a crucial 
role in the development of countries of origin. These concrete practices and procedures of 
accounting have allowed particular representations and constructions of remittances which, in 
turn, made them highly visible and attractive to neoliberal development policy makers. 
International efforts were made to improve statistics measuring the flow of remittances and to 
create particular graphic representations of these flows (Bakker, 2015b; Raghuram, 2009). 
Priority has been given to the transformation of remittance data into tables, graphs and charts 
that could systematically show the continued growth and the significance of the amount of money 
that remittances represent (Carling, 2014). The use of particular indicators such as annual growth 
rates or aggregate volumes has been particularly striking (Hernandez and Coutin, 2006; Bakker, 
2015b). These accounts often go alongside the allegedly better stability, and even counter-
cyclicality, of remittances in period of crisis as opposed to other resource flows (Ratha, 2012). As 
a result, the representation of remittances as stable, homogeneous remittance flows, with major 
emphasis on their aggregate volume, has been widely reproduced (Bakker, 2015b).  
 
Yet, remittance scholars have demonstrated that these ‘dominant’ characteristics and 
representations are either false or based on inaccurate and unreliable data (for a detailed critical 
investigation of these claims, see Bakker (2015a, 2015b) and Kunz (2012)). Moreover, by making 
remittances commensurate and presenting them graphically as aggregate volumes, those 
accounting procedures and visual representations have contributed to “shap[ing], simply by 
measuring it, the reality they measure” (Callon, 1998 in Hernandez and Coutin, 2006:193). In fact, 
Hernandez and Coutin (2006:192) refer to “discounting procedures” to highlight that such 
                                                     
5 Kunz (2011:52) argues that, from the perspective of international organisations such as the Multilateral Investment 
Fund, because “remittances were sent in small amounts and through informal channels –  i.e. not accounted for and 
controlled by the formal financial system and financial statistics – they were ‘missing’ , i.e. they did not exist”. 
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remittance calculations and portrayals are made possible “by pre-defining the regime of value 
within which remittances circulate and by not counting certain other transactions associated with 
remitting”. To become the basis upon which new development policies and markets can be built, 
remittances have had to be disentangled from their association with the political and socio-
economic realities of their production and embedded within a different and more positive set of 
connections. While migrant workers, especially undocumented workers, generally constitute the 
“most cost-free workers” in capitalist economies in the Global North (Ferguson and McNally, 
2014:13), remittances are deemed cost-free incomes in home countries in the Global South, 
disentangled from any cumbersome realities. The WB, for instance, reports remittances as 
“unrequited transfers”, or transfers that are neither repayment or need to be repaid (Hernandez 
and Coutin, 2006). Through such discounting procedures, states, central banks and IFIs have 
embedded remittances within a particular ‘regime of value’ that they privilege (Appadurai, 1986); 
a regime of value within which remittances are aggregate, commensurate, stable and, most 
importantly, cost-free funds that can be capitalised on. By disembedding them from other 
‘regimes of value’ within which they circulate and within which acts of remitting bear costs (such 
as for instance interests on loans that allow migrant workers to move in the first place), 
remittances come to constitute the “ideal neoliberal currency” (Hernandez and Coutin, 
2006:201).  
 
2.2.3. Remittances and productive investments: Economistic and gendered 
constructions 
A significant focus of the academic and policy literature on remittances and migration has been 
on the economic impacts of remittances on the countries of origin at local and national levels, 
mostly including analyses of whether remittances are spent on consumption or investment. Early 
research has tended to focus on the ways in which remittances negatively impact communities of 
origin. In fact, remittance recipients have regularly been criticised for carelessly consuming, or 
even wasting, remittances on unnecessary and luxurious consumables (Abbots, 2014; Chami et 
al, 2005; Sofranko and Idris, 1999). One of the first to examine how remittances were used, Lipton 
(1980:11) was critical of the fact that “everyday needs often absorb 90% or more of a village’s 
remittances” (see also in Sikder and Ballis, 2013). Others blamed remittances for discouraging 
work effort/ethic among recipient communities (Brown et al, 2014). In fact, Durand and 
colleagues (1996) remarked that words such as ‘addiction’, ‘syndrome’ and ‘dependence’ were 
often used in reference to remittances. Remittances, it was argued, were fostering dependency 
rather than autonomy (ibid).6 In turn, global policies and initiatives disseminated by international 
                                                     
6 It is important to recognise that these views still exist (see for instance Acosta, 2007; Justino and Shemyakina, 2012).   
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organisations and relayed by states both in the Global North and the Global South consistently 
sought to encourage a more ‘productive’ use of remittances away from consumption by (1) 
providing investment opportunities to migrants (Levitt, 2001; Kunz, 2011; Robinson, 2004); (2) 
establishing fund-matched programs for hometown associations’ development initiatives (Kunz, 
2011; see also Hernandez and Coutin, 2006); (3) taxing remittance transfers (Mohapatra, 2010); 
(4) developing small and medium enterprises schemes by, for instance, offering tax breaks on 
imports of capital goods (Gamlen, 2005); and (5) promoting the establishment of micro-
businesses for those who ‘stay behind’ through the provision of numerous kinds of financial 
products and services, including microloans and financial literacy programs (Kunz, 2011). Many 
critical observers have responded to these accounts by unpacking various sets of economistic, 
gendered assumptions about the role of remittances, migrants and remittance recipients in 
development. A brief overview of these debates is important to understand the extent to which 
remittance flows can be nudged and incorporated into mainstream financial circuits (see Chapter 
5 for a grounded exploration of how these processes play out in Senegal and Ghana). 
 
2.2.3.1. Remittances and economistic assumptions 
In her extensive analysis of the Global Remittance Trend (GRT), Kunz (2011:42) argues that the 
aforementioned initiatives and discourses have constituted the mainstreaming of a “money-
based discourse” within the international community since the 2000s, which depict remittances 
purely in their economic form as a sum of money. The problem with this narrow financial 
understanding of remittances are manifold. First, it constructs a narrative around remittances 
that abstracts them from the social, emotional, political, financial, and cultural practices and 
realities in which remittances, migrants and their families are embedded (Åkesson, 2011; Carling, 
2014; Horst et al, 2014; Levitt, 2001). Remittances are not solely a sum of money sent home by 
migrant workers; they are inherently based on social relations, processes and transactions that 
carry different meanings, expectations and functions, ranging from obligations and sacrifice to 
gifts and help (Carling, 2014; Erdal, 2012; Goldring, 2004; Levitt, 2012). Considering remittances 
in purely economistic terms creates a very partial understanding of what they are and 
invisibilises the social relations on which they are based (Cross, 2015; Datta, 2009; Datta et al, 
2007). Second, this view assumes an almost necessarily positive representation of remittances. 
As Kunz (2008:1396) remarks, remittances are often portrayed as “powerful” and “beautiful” in 
official documents of international organisations such as the WB. This depiction of remittances 
leads to a romanticised idea of the social bonds that remittances supposedly enhance between 
migrants and remittance recipients. It also neglects the variegated effects remittances have on 
the country of origin, the community and/or the household, siblings, distant relatives and people 
who are not related, despite rich grounded literature emphasising the contingency of the 
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remittance-development frame and the disparate impact of remittances depending on lived 
realities of gender, class, ethnicity and geography (Bracking, 2003; McKay, 2007; Parrenas, 
2005).7  
 
To this money-based approach on remittances, many remittance scholars propose a strand of 
sociological, ethnographic and anthropological research which provides an alternative approach 
to understanding and conceptualising remittances (A kesson, 2014; Carling, 2014; Datta, 2008; 
Erdal, 2012; Goldring, 2004; Kunz, 2008, 2011; Levitt, 2011, 2012). This alternative literature has 
focused not only on remittances per se but also on the relevant phenomenon and processes that 
are taking place alongside them, hence providing a more holistic contextualisation of money 
transfers. These accounts have tended to emphasise the social, cultural, emotional as well as 
political nature of practices of remittance sending and receiving. Following Carling’s (2014) 
analysis, acts of transferring remittances are compound transactions of financial flows, ideas, 
meanings, gifts, values, norms and knowledge. Early work on the social nature of remittances can 
be attributed to Levitt’s (2001, 2012) research on “social remittances” (see also Levitt and Lamba-
Nieves, 2011). Levitt (2001) argues that migrants carry (and continue to receive) ideas, norms, 
practices and behaviours with them when they migrate, which in turn shape (1) what they do and 
who they do it with in the countries they move to, as well as (2) what they send back to non-
migrants and their sending communities in general. For instance, Goldring (2004) highlights the 
importance of considering the political and social elements to remittances as different types of 
remittances contribute to various aspects of development. As a result, she offers a typology of 
remittances by distinguishing three types of remittance, i.e. family, collective and entrepreneurial 
remittances. Importantly, Goldring (2004) shows that each type of remittance has specific 
characteristics and requires specific interventions; remittances are not and do not mean the same 
thing in different places and over time (see also Erdal, 2012).8 There is, therefore, a need to 
disaggregate them in order to fully understand how they can be used, what for, when and by whom 
                                                     
7 While this research does not directly focus on the impacts of remittances on development, it is important to note that 
the effects of remittances on poverty, inequality and economic growth at the household, national and global levels have 
been highly variable and context-specific (Bracking, 2003; Datta, 2009, 2017; Gamlen, 2014; Goldring, 2004; de Haas, 
2005; Horst et al, 2014). For instance, Goldring (2004) argues that the Mexican government became interested in 
collective remittances after debates concerning the relationships between family remittances and development had 
reached an impasse in the mid- to late- 1990s (see also Mercer et al, 2008). Furthermore, research also found that 
remittances can increase or create inequalities in countries of origin (Sikder and Ballis, 2013).  
8 The confinement of remittances to the economic domain finds a striking parallel with Zelizer’s (1994) work on the 
social meanings of money. Zelizer (1994) argues that social characteristics of money have been neglected by the vast 
majority of scholars, including sociologists. The direct consequence of this was that very little was known about the 
social life of money. What Zelizer (1994) shows is that despite the increasing monetisation and commercialisation of 
daily life, social relations have not become “flat”; people manage to counteract the increased standardisation of 
everyday life by, amongst other things, earmarking different currencies for different types of social interactions and 
incorporating money into personalised webs of friendship and family relations (Zelizer, 1994:2). Her comprehensive 
arguments in turn influenced a great deal of ethnographic work looking at how remittances may be seen differently to 
any other type of money (Carling, 2014). 
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(see Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis of processes of remittance earmarking). Whilst the 
importance of taking into account the context in which remittances are sent and spent has been 
recognised, the most recent development policies around remittances still seem to assume that 
remittances, considered as a homogenous bulk of money in general, need to be used more 
productively and more efficiently (see for instance Mashayekhi, 2015; de Vasconcelos, 2014) 
 
Further emphasising the inherently socio-cultural nature of remitting, more anthropological-
oriented accounts have looked at remittances through the lens of gift exchange, drawing on work 
of gift theoreticians like Marcel Mauss (A kesson, 2010, 2011; Cliggett, 2003, 2005; Monsutti, 
2004; McKenzie and Menjí var, 2011). What this literature shows is that, in some cases, the act of 
remitting can be considered as, if not more, important as remittances themselves.9 Remitting 
practices come to represent acts of gift giving and investment in people, i.e. they allow both the 
mutual recognition between migrants and recipients and the strengthening or reproduction of 
social ties between migrants and their relatives, friends and communities (Cliggett, 2003, 2005). 
Remittances, or “gift remittances” in Cliggett’s (2005) terms, take multiple forms and their values 
are to be found in the economic as much as, if not more than, in the social and symbolic. 
Importantly, and in contrast to economistic approaches that assume a one-way economic support 
from migrants to relatives and friends back home, the above literature allows us to account for 
the multiplicity and multi-directionality of these social, cultural and economic relations as well as 
the agential capacity of non-migrants (A kesson, 2011; Datta, 2017; Marchand, 2015). My 
empirical analysis in Chapter 5 builds upon this understanding of the social and relational nature 
of remittance practices to investigate the ways in which international and national policies and 
programs that aim to incorporate remittance flows into mainstream finance do not only target a 
‘sum of money’ but also shape and are shaped by people’s norms, expectations, practices and 
ideas as well as how members of remittance households and migrants relate to each other (RQ2).  
 
2.2.3.2. Remittances and gendered assumptions 
The remittances-for-development agenda is also embedded within a set of gendered assumptions 
that have direct implications with regard to the kind of policies that have been put forward over 
the years (van Naerssen et al, 2015). In contrast to earlier research that negatively depicted the 
consumption of remittances, researchers have argued more recently that the use of remittances 
on consumption “may not be necessarily bad” (Hassan et al, 2012:12). Sikder and Ballis (2013) 
have observed that remittances now come to be positively depicted either as insurance premiums 
(Lucas and Stark, 1985; Stark and Lucas, 1988), a safety-net (Afsar, 2005) and a form of social 
                                                     
9 See for example the work of Monsutti (2004) on Zambian migrants and Cliggett (2005) on the Hazaras in Iran. 
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security (Davis 2001) on the one hand, and in terms of providing welfare support on the other 
(Taylor, 1999). What is, however, striking amongst these studies, regardless of whether 
consumption is seen as good or bad, is the assumption that households in remittance-receiving 
countries are helpless, passive and waiting for remittance to arrive and address their social and 
economic predicaments (Sikder and Ballis, 2013). Crucially, Kunz (2015) argues that these 
assumptions are constitutive of a discourse around remittances that has been constructed over 
the gendered representations of two main populations: those of migrant men as remittance 
providers and those of women who stay behind as remittance receivers (see also Marchand, 
2015). While these representations are not reflected in formal statistics in many countries and 
have been extensively challenged by gender and migration scholars, they nonetheless continue 
producing within policy circles “a certain connotation, namely that of migrants as productive, 
while women in sending communities are conceived as largely ‘non-productive’” (Marchand, 
2015:194). I argue that these arguments result in two major processes of invisibilisation. First, it 
is assumed that consumption is antithetical to investment (Abbots, 2014). Because women ‘left-
behind’ are spending remittances rather than labouring and investing, they are not considered to 
be engaged in any ‘productive’ economic activity. However, it has been argued that spending 
money can also constitute a form of labour (Miller, 1998). In fact, Abbots (2014:144) argues in 
the context of remittance consumption dynamics among the peasantry in the Ecuadorian Andes 
that remittances are invested in the long-term future of the family “albeit not in the economically 
‘rational’ or self-maximising manner advocated (…) by development agencies”. Transforming 
remittances into household appliances, clothing for children, domestic and care labour or 
education constitutes processes that “both produces the house and reproduces family 
relationships” (ibid:145, see also Carsten, 1989, 1997). Drawing upon Lévi-Strauss’s (1987) work 
on the impact of material objects such as houses on social relationships, studies on migration have 
emphasised the role that objects bought through remittances can play as “place-holders” for 
migrants, symbolically replacing the physical void they have left (Colloredo-Mansfield, 1994; 
Cliggett, 2005; Gell, 1998). Crucially, as Abbots (2014:145) argues, “without female labour, 
remittance would not be transformed into a material presence”. This scholarship is crucial to not 
only critically assessing recent attempts to leverage remittances for financial inclusion and 
development but also appreciating how a partial understanding of what remittances are and do 
constitutes important limits to such projects (see Chapter 5 for an empirical investigation of the 
limitations of projects that aim to incorporate remittance flows into formal financial circuits) 
(RQ2). 
 
The second gendered process of invisibilisation that underpin the remittances-for-development 
agenda refers to the fact that people who stay behind, and women in particular, do not only spend, 
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or even transform/invest in Abbots’ (2014) terms, remittances; they “take on the totality of 
biological and social reproduction tasks while also engaging in income-generating activities” 
(Kunz, 2008:1405). These multiple tasks and activities are for the most part ignored by the 
remittances-for-development agenda. Instead, women at the receiving end “need to be made 
productive” (Marchand, 2015:194). While feminist scholars have critically analysed the processes 
through which the work conducted by women and others as non-wage workers are deemed ‘non-
productive’ and become erased (Federici, 2004; Mies, 1986), Bhattacharyya (2018) argues that 
the assumptions that underpin these processes of invisibilisation are not only economistic and 
gendered but also racialised. The ways in which various efforts to make “non-migrants” engage 
in productive activities and use their remittances more productively come to be attached to 
racialised understandings of the economy deserves, therefore, particular scrutiny, and will be 
analysed in Chapter 5. 
 
Over the past ten years, many commentators have noted a subtle but nonetheless critical change 
with regard to more recent policy-oriented interventions determined to find a way around 
harnessing remittances for development without being accused of infringing on the private 
nature of remittances (Horst et al, 2014). This shift has also been interpreted as a way to 
counteract the lack of empirical evidence about the systematic positive effects of remittances on 
poverty and inequality (Datta, 2017). As a result, the initial euphoria around remittances – and 
the policies seeking to directly change the ways remittances are used or sent – gave way to new 
strategies and policy interventions to expand the choices migrants and recipients have. In other 
words, and as Kunz (2011:57, emphasis mine) remarks, it is now accepted that “the potential for 
remittances and migration for development can only be achieved under certain conditions”, these 
conditions being related to the consolidation and expansion of a more efficient market for 
remittance services that is attached to the broader financial inclusion agenda. This echoes 
Bhattacharyya’s (2018:63) argument, which points out to the possibility that we may be “entering 
a time when an increasing proportion of the world’s population is unable to enter waged work”. 
In other words, those previously excluded from the discipline of ‘productive’ work may (re)enter 
spaces of capitalist accumulation not as ‘productive’ workers but as ‘productive’ (indebted) 
consumers. Building upon Bhattacharyya’s (2018) argument, I argue that this is through 
consumption practices, especially consumption of financial products and services, that the 
integration of remittance senders and recipients into the global economy has recently been 
conceived and promoted. This shift from the ‘remittances-for-development agenda’ to what I call 
the ‘remittances-financial inclusion nexus’ is what I turn to now.  
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2.3. The remittances-financial inclusion nexus: Financialisation in 
the making? 
Policy interventions and programmes on remittances have shifted from efforts to directly 
influence the ways in which these flows should be sent, received and used to more subtle attempts 
at broadening the choices migrants and members of remittance households have. Amongst key 
initiatives that have attracted a broad consensus within policy circles are calls for (1) greater 
competition amongst money transfer intermediaries, or Remittance Service Providers (RSPs)10, 
as well as greater formalisation of remittance transfers, and (2) stronger links between 
remittances and other financial products and services. Ultimately, the aim is to facilitate the 
construction of a “more efficient market for remittance services” (Horst et al, 2014:527).  In this 
section, I examine the drivers behind the emergence and consolidation of the ‘remittances-
financial inclusion nexus’. I then review a limited but growing body of literature on the 
‘financialisation of remittances’. I argue that locating these macro- and micro-level analyses 
within the broader literature on the financialisation of development allows us to account for the 
ways in which they not only draw upon the many analytical and conceptual strengths of this 
scholarship but also reproduce some of its theoretical and empirical limitations.  
 
2.3.1. Making remittances competitive, formal and ‘bankable’: The emergence of 
the remittances-financial inclusion nexus 
Rather than promoting the beneficial impacts of ‘productive’ remittances on either growth, 
development, poverty alleviation or inequalities, international institutions and policy makers 
have started to look at the ways in which remittances travel, hence putting the building of a 
remittance marketplace, or a “global remittance architecture”, at the top of the policy agenda 
(Sharma, 2009:1). The justifications and assumptions that drive this new consensus calling for 
greater competition and formalisation amongst RSPs are manifold. First, the justifications behind 
the drive towards the regulation of informal money transfers11 are to be found within the context 
                                                     
10 Broadly speaking, there are four kinds of RSPs: nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFI), banks and credit unions 
providing remittance sending services, post offices, and informal intermediaries such as non-formal couriers or friends 
and relatives who enable the sending of money from sender to recipient. The main players amongst NBFIs are Money 
Transfer Operators (MTOs) like Western Union and MoneyGram (Orozco et al, 2010). 
11 Many terms are used to depict so-called ‘informal’ remittance channels, including alternative remittance systems, 
underground banking or informal value transfer system (Maimbo and Passas, 2004). Hawala and Hundi represent the 
common means of money transfer outside the mainstream in the Horn of Africa, India and the Middle East, and in South 
and West Asia, respectively (Pieke et al, 2007). These mechanisms, based on trust, work as value transfer and do not 
require money to physically move. They rely instead on the transfer of information whereby a remitter hands money 
to an agent in the host country, who instructs a corresponding agent in the country of origin to pay out the equivalent 
amount to a designated individual (Passas, 2003). Money transfer through dedicated money transmitters are often 
labelled in the literature as informal, alternative or even semi-formal remittance channels and considered direct 
competitors to the big mainstream companies, such as Western Union and MoneyGram (ibid). These Money Transfer 
Organisations (MTOs) are not informal per se, but the sector is divided into large operators and smaller niche 
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of post 9/11 terrorism concerns (de Goede, 2003; Farrant et al, 2006). However, clear evidence 
contradicts the claims of informal systems of money transfer being a privileged route for terrorist 
financing (Horst et al, 2014; Lindley, 2011). Moreover, the logic with regards to security concerns 
seems for many observers clearly counter-intuitive as “changes in legislation, registration 
practices, or requirements of records keeping” may render some money transfer systems illegal, 
push them further “in the realm of the informal”, and subsequently lead to a black hole of 
accountability (Pieke et al, 2007:16). Second, formalisation of remittances, through increased 
competition amongst RSPs, is expected to decrease the cost of remittances transfer, contributing 
to an increased capital flow into developing countries (Holt, 2011). The reduction of the costs of 
remittance transfers constitutes a key priority for a broad coalition of actors12, as it is commonly 
accepted that a small decrease in money transfer prices can result in significant increases in 
remittance receipts (Datta, 2017). During the G8 L’Aquila Summit in 2009, the member countries 
committed to reducing the cost of remittances from 10 percent to 5 percent in five years, which 
became known as the “5x5 Objective” (World Bank, 2014:4). In 2011, the G20 further defined 
their aim to reduce the cost of remittances by enshrining the “5x5 Objective” in the Cannes 
Summit Final Declaration “Building Our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the 
Benefit of All” (ibid:5). The creation of numerous remittance price comparison websites by 
organisations such as the WB (https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/en) and Developing 
Market Associate (www.moneymove.org) represents one of the most visible components of this 
set of policies. However, despite a slight decrease, transaction costs have remained high – much 
higher than the 5% target – in many parts of the world, especially in the African continent. The 
average cost of sending $200 to Sub-Saharan Africa is 9.4%, compared to a global average of 
around 7% (KNOMAD, 2019).  
As part of a wider agenda that aims to increase the coverage of the financial sector, remittances 
now represent a key entry point to integrate the ‘unbanked’ and ‘underbanked’ into the formal 
banking system. In recent years, the aforementioned aims for greater competition and 
formalisation have increasingly been attached to the financial inclusion agenda, as the number of 
reports on the link between remittances and financial inclusion attests (Aga and Soledad Martinez 
Peria, 2014; Anzoategui et al, 2014; Global Migration Group, 2017; IFAD and World Bank, 2015; 
Isaacs, 2017; Mashayekhi, 2015; Toxopeus and Lensink, 2007; UNCTAD, 2015; World Bank and 
                                                     
operators, the latter working along a formal-informal continuum. They are specialised in supporting migrants’ 
remittance needs of specific groups and can take the form of highly institutionalised operators. Other informal 
remittance channels include hand delivery and transfer in the context of other businesses (Datta, 2009). 
12 The coalition includes International Development and Financial Institutions (including the WB, UK DfID, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Multi-Lateral Fund of the Inter-American Development 
Bank (MIF-IDB), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
via the International Migration Policy Program) as well as national governments, civil society organisations and 
financial and commercial companies. 
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IFAD, 2015; World Bank, 2013). Since collecting remittances may be one of the only forms of 
access a remittance recipient has to formal financial services (Isaacs, 2017), remittances are used 
as a tool to ‘help’ migrants and members of remittance households to not only gain, but also 
demand, access to formal financial products and services, including financial accounts, insurance, 
consumer loans, mortgages and credit cards (Agunias and Newland, 2012; Ardic et al, 2012; 
Yujuico, 2009). More specifically, by putting in place incentives to encourage remittance 
recipients to keep part of the remittance they receive in savings accounts, it is argued that their 
savings behaviours will be fostered and lead to increased investment and higher expenditures 
(World Bank, 2014). This, in turn, would lead to economic growth and poverty reduction 
(Terrazas, 2010). In fact, higher savings (loanable funds) in banks, as a direct consequence of an 
increase in ‘formal’ remittances, would allow banks to increase credit to previously unfunded 
projects and households (Addy et al, 2003; Farrant et al, 2006; Holt, 2011). In a report 
commissioned by the IOM, Isaacs (2017:116, emphasis mine) argues that one way to encourage 
remittance recipients to do this would be to “use the remittance payout locations as ‘education 
centres’ for financial services”. In a similar vein, initiatives to include remittances in the 
assessment of creditworthiness of remittance recipients and migrants have recently come to the 
fore (Agunias and Newland, 2012; World Bank, 2014). The idea is that through regular remittance 
receipts, banks would be positioned to gain a better understanding of who their remittance 
customers are, enabling them to cross- and up-sell supplementary financial products and 
services. The development of such “remittance-linked” and “remittance-backed”13 financial 
products are considered to be crucial to leverage remittances for financial inclusion (Agunias and 
Newland, 2012:126). 
Finally, and building upon the previous points, it is argued that formalisation and financial 
inclusion will contribute to help financial intermediaries and states raise development financing 
through future-flow securitisation and the issuance of diaspora bonds (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009). 
The securitisation of future remittances as a way to raise external financing has been advanced 
by a wide range of actors, including Dilip Ratha, Lead Economist of the Migration and Remittances 
Unit at the WB and head of KNOMAD (Ketkar and Ratha, 2001; World Bank, 2003). Remittance 
securitisation is presented as an alternative to ODA and FDI to increase funds for development; 
public investment can be financed via workers’ remittances as they represent a future-flow 
receivable that financial institutions can collateralise to access additional, stable and cheap 
capital (Agunias and Newland, 2012). In a future-flow securitisation, banks seeking to raise funds 
                                                     
13 Remittance-linked products are products such as savings account, insurances and loans that become available for 
remittance recipients whereas remittance-backed products such as remittance-backed mortgages and loans are 
products, which use remittance receipts to assess and provide credit loans. 
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sell the first right to receive a particular future income stream, e.g. funds that migrant workers 
remit, to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that is based outside the borrowing country (ibid). Once 
money is pledged, collection of remittance flows and payments to investors are organised by the 
SPV. Because remittances do not enter the issuer’s country, it is argued that banks mitigate the 
risk of a unilateral default loan decided by a government, namely sovereign risk (Hudson, 2008). 
Thus, by securitising remittance flows, developing countries could access finance at lower 
interest rates than through unsecured bonds (Hughes, 2011). As Datta (2017:544) remarks, 
“what start[ed] off as intra-household transfers can potentially emerge as a new development 
finance”. 
 
It is only very recently that critical analyses of these aforementioned policies have emerged and 
located attempts to incorporate remittance flows, migrants and their households into global 
finance within broader processes of financialisation (Bakker, 2010, 2015; Cross, 2013, 2015; 
Datta, 2012; 2017; Hudson, 2008; Kunz, 2012; Zapata, 2013, 2018), which I consider further 
below. 
 
2.3.2. Remittances: The latest frontier of the financialisation of development? 
The growing policy interest in formalising and linking remittances to the financial inclusion 
agenda as well as securitising future remittance flows may be attributed to the expansion and the 
deepening of the financialisation of development (Mawdsley, 2018a). Critical development and 
geography scholars have engaged with the concept of financialisation through numerous scalar 
and analytical entry points, ranging from international political economy (Bracking, 2016; Carroll 
and Jarvis, 2014, 2015; Soederberg, 2013a, 2015) to households and everyday financialisation 
(Rankin, 2013; Roy, 2010).  
 
Part of this expansion and deepening of financial logics, markets and discipline, Mawdsley 
(2018b) argues, is the shift in development finance, from ODA to private finance. While initially 
focused on raising donor contributions through ODA, mainstream development models are now 
increasingly seeking to use ODA to leverage private investments from sovereign wealth funds, 
investment banks, hedge and equity funds, venture capital and other non-state sources in order 
to not only fund the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) but also increase the significance and 
legitimacy of the private (financial) sector as a development actor. Through programmes such as 
the World Bank’s Maximising Finance for Development that aim to bring shadow banking14 into 
                                                     
14 Shadow banking consists of financial intermediaries that are not regulated like banks but conduct activities similar 
to traditional. Gabor (2018) argues that this includes credit creation and intermediation by pension funds or insurance 
companies and their asset managers, as well as deposit taking by money market funds. 
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development and promote practices such as loan securitisation, Gabor (2018: ii) argues that 
“financialisation is colonising international development” (see also Jafri, 2019).  
 
While neoliberal reforms forced upon countries across the world in the 1980s and 1990s 
(privatisation, liberalisation of exchange controls, land titling, removal of capital-account 
regulations, opening and privatisation of domestic financial systems, and so on) have constituted 
a capitalist response to the overaccumulation crisis that build up since the mid 1960s, they have 
also led to the deepening of the financial integration of countries in the Global South and their 
further subordination to the “money-power of capital” (Alami, 2019:12; see also Kaltenbrunner 
and Painceira, 2015, 2018). What the shift in development finance has allowed, Mawdsley 
(2018b:193) argues, is the creation of “investment opportunities in ‘frontier’ economies’”. In fact, 
a key role for development institutions such as the International Financial Incorporation (IFC) is 
now to mitigate risks for international investors and forge: 
 
new opportunities of accumulation in high-risk/high-return areas in extractive industries, 
financial services, and in water and energy, where political, social, economic and environmental 
factors cause concern but where significant opportunities for profit exist and where the profit 
motive can be pitched as an opportunity for improving governance and social conditions (Carroll 
(2012a:385). 
 
A key terrain that has enabled the financialisation of development is microfinance (Aitken, 2010, 
2013, 2015; Mader, 2014, 2015; Roy, 2010; Soederberg, 2013a; 2014; Weber, 2004, 2014; Young, 
2010). Whereas much of the debate around microfinance has revolved around whether or not it 
works (for development, poverty alleviation, incomes)15, critical political economy analyses have 
recently emerged to offer a more systemic understanding of the role of microfinance in the 
transformation of development as a program of financial market expansion. In other words, what 
is at stake in these foregoing analyses is not to explore whether microfinance works but what it 
“works at, and how” (Mader, 2015:19). Weber (2004, 2006) situates microfinance in the context 
                                                     
15 After more than three decades of expansion and universalisation, the capacity of microfinance to ‘make poverty 
history’ has been called into question. There is a growing consensus that microfinance has not been effective at 
increasing household incomes or alleviating poverty (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2007; Bateman, 2010; 
Guérin et al, 2015; Mader, 2013; Roodman, 2011; Sinclair, 2012). At best, microfinance’s impact on well-being is scarce 
and inconclusive. In 2011 already, based on Duvendack and colleagues’ (2011:4) systematic reviews of prior studies, 
it was found that “almost all impact evaluations of microfinance suffer[ed] from weak methodologies and inadequate 
data”. More recently, Duvendack and Mader (2019:7), in their systematic review of reviews, found that “the effects of 
financial services on core economic poverty indicators such as incomes, assets or spending, and on health status and 
other social outcomes, are small and inconsistent”. Even more problematic, far from the promised beneficial outcomes, 
microfinance has more often than not been called into question for doing more harm than good by increasing 
indebtedness (Schicks, 2010; Taylor, 2012), reproducing unequal gender relations (Roberts, 2014), increasing violence 
against women in the household and in public (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996; Isserles, 2003; Rahman, 1999), as well as 
causing extreme stress to its users (Rankin, 2001, 2013). 
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of the re-organisation of global capitalism in the early 1970s. Understood as “a neoliberal 
approach to poverty” (Weber, 2006:51), microfinance has had two main functions:  first, it has 
facilitated the advancement of financial sector liberalisation and commercialisation; second, it 
has provided a political safety net in the context of the debt crisis in the 1980s, hence limiting 
dissent and resistance by providing microloans to the poor in the informal sector. In turn, Roy 
(2010) traces the shift from the notion of development understood as the provision of social 
services and the improvement of human well-being to development as the integration of the poor 
into the financial markets. Roy (2010) suggests understanding microfinance through the concept 
of poverty capital, which she defines as “a subprime frontier where development capital and 
finance capital merge and collaborate such that new subjects of development are identified and 
new territories of investment are opened up and consolidated” (ibid:30). This “financialisation of 
development”, Roy (2010:31) argues, is fundamentally based on the view of a win-win 
partnership between those with high capital and those without; financial inclusion comes to 
represent both “a development problem and a business opportunity at the global scale” (ibid:  
211). Importantly, Soederberg (2014) advances that this increased reliance of marginalised and 
low-income workers, as well as unemployed or underemployed people, on credit for social 
reproduction is neither a natural market process nor a voluntary inclusion but a socially 
constructed act by neoliberal states and capitalists to ensure the (re)-imposition of monetised 
relations and its disciplinary and exploitative features on the working poor. By dismantling their 
welfare components and adapting the legal and regulatory apparatus to the needs of the lenders 
– e.g. weak soft laws on consumer protection, coercive hard laws on debt repayment, no legal 
limits on interest rates regarding consumer loans – “debtfare states” have actively contributed to 
the construction and expansion of the disciplining and the reliance of surplus population on debt 
for survival (ibid). Soederberg (2014) coins the concept of the poverty industry to signal the 
growth of a market where profits are made through the secondary exploitation of the 
unemployed and underemployed. While Soederberg (2014) pays a great deal of attention to the 
role of the law in reconfiguring capital-labour relations in order to enable further financial 
accumulation, the specific, intricate and inherently fragile socio-technical ways in which such 
processes are carried out are however largely overlooked. Moreover, nothing is said about the 
necessary but always contested work that is required to transform debtors into “subjects 
governable by financial means” (Kear, 2015:3). 
 
Recent work from Mader (2014, 2015), Aitken (2013, 2015) and others have started providing 
some answers to these aforementioned limitations. For Mader (2015:80) microfinance works at 
“financialising poverty”. In other words, microfinance contributes to rendering poverty 
favourable to logic of finance-led capital accumulation. It does so in three co-constitutive ways. 
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First, microfinance builds financialised material relations between wealthy lenders (owners of 
capital) primarily in the Global North and poor borrowers (sellers of labour power) primarily in 
the Global South, which enables the extraction of surplus from borrowers into financial markets 
(Mader, 2014, 2015).16 In other words, the day-to-day informal subsistence activities to manage 
poverty have become financial assets that can be added to the portfolios of institutional investors 
(Mader, 2014). According to Aitken (2013:475), the “poorest of the poor” are converted into asset 
streams through three distinct processes: valuation, intermediation and securitisation (see a 
more detailed analysis of these processes in the context of the remittances-financial inclusion 
nexus in Chapter 4). The second dimension through which microfinance deepens and expands 
markets is by constructing layers of financialised governmentality (Mader, 2015). Pervasive 
across all levels of action, it is argued that financialised governmentality has a disciplining effect, 
shaping and instrumentalising human conduct from investors to Microfinance Institutions 
(MFIs), and all the way down to loan officers and borrowers (see also Aitken, 2010; Young, 2010). 
This ‘behavioural (re)orientation’ of every single actor involved in microfinance, Mader (2014) 
remarks, is facilitated by a wide range of technical means that go from monitoring and ratings 
devices at the level of institutional investors and capital providers, financial metrics at the level 
of MFIs, intense reporting and constant visits at the level of loan officers, to public shaming and 
social capital devices at the level of borrowers17 (ibid). Third, microfinance builds upon 
mobilising narratives that portray finance as empowering and liberating (Mader, 2015; see also 
Schwittay, 2014). Causes and issues of poverty have been simplified and turned into technical 
and apolitical problems of (lack of) finance in order for the Western world, and in particular its 
middle and upper classes, to appropriate the problem and act upon it. Microfinance, as a tool that 
promotes self-help development, aligned itself with the notion of the “deserving poor”, which is 
still very much entrenched in advanced capitalist societies. Credit, or debt, as anti-poverty 
remedy becomes legitimate money for the poor (Mader, 2015; Schwittay, 2014). In recent years, 
new strategies of digital financial inclusion that aim to monetise the digital footprints of the poor 
and turn the latter into “generators of financial assets” that can be securitised are deemed to have 
contributed to the further financialisation of development (Gabor, 2018:16; Gabor and Brooks, 
2017).18 
                                                     
16 It has been calculated that the amount extracted from microloans in 2010, i.e. the amount of money microfinance 
borrowers paid to MFIs, accounted for over US $20 billion. Since 2003, a very conservative estimate of the amount 
extracted reached USD 89 billion (Mader, 2013, 2014). 
17 At the level of borrowers, the type of power that is at stake is to be found in the conception of citizens as 
“entrepreneurs of the self” (Rankin, 2001; Rose, 1996) and technologies as “technologies of the self” (Mader, 2015:93). 
In other words, relationships of power do not stem from a top-down authoritarian ruling but derive from threats and 
risks of punishment should individuals fail to discipline themselves enough, e.g. repaying on time by any means to avoid 
MFIs’ officers to harass you or seize your belongings (see Chapter 6).  
18 For a more detailed analysis of the behavioural turn in microfinance, see Section 2.4.2. 
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Over the past ten years, a small but growing critical literature on remittances has engaged in these 
aforementioned debates around financialisation and/of development (Bakker, 2010, 2015; Cross, 
2013, 2015; Datta, 2012, 2017; Hudson, 2008; Kunz, 2012, 2018; Zapata, 2013, 2018). Drawing 
upon the work of Weber (2004) on the role of microfinance as a crisis management instrument 
in the context of the crisis in the 1970s, Hudson (2008) understands the establishment of a 
discourse linking migration, remittances and development as a way to tap into one of the main 
sources of finance for developing countries, i.e. migrants’ remittances, in order to respond to the 
crisis in development financing and reach the targets of the SDGS, formerly called the Millennium 
Development Goals. These recent attempts to harness the potential of remittances serve, Hudson 
(2008:315) argues, to “both extend and embed the finance-led accumulation regime into the 
periphery of the world economy”. Importantly, he identifies two different but co-constitutive 
types of remittance-linked financialisation; financialisation as “banking the unbanked” on the one 
hand, and financialisation as remittance flows securitisation on the other. Hudson (2008) 
provides a range of critiques to this agenda, noting that securitisation generates new financial 
risks and facilitates speculation and that making the poor ‘bankable’ may exacerbate 
indebtedness, side-line more structural causes of poverty and inequality and closedown more 
progressive alternatives. In a similar vein, Bakker (2015, 2016) argues that these policies and 
programmes constitute one of the latest prominent cases of “neoliberal populism” (Roy, 
2010:32). In fact, attempts to use remittance to democratise finance and turn the resources of 
migrants into financial flows contribute, Bakker (2016:53) signals, to the increasing efforts to 
“extend and expand the reach of the market” in the name of development. Cross (2015:306, 
emphasis mine), in turn, draws upon the work of Carroll (2012b) and Mader (2014) on 
microfinance as a vehicle for market building to argue that this most recent development agenda 
on remittances constitutes a neoliberal project of financialisation that is designed to “construct 
markets and integrate economies into global capitalist markets”. She notably focuses on the ways 
in which remittance corridors are being reassembled through regulatory changes and financial 
literacy and inclusion schemes in order to provide advantages to new business models with 
higher margins, despite the fact that these corridors are “competitively priced and reliable” 
(ibid:309). In fact, Sharma and Knio (2011:11) demonstrate that the creation of a “gigantic 
paraphernalia” around remittances with limited evidence of its beneficial outcomes lends greater 
credence to the thesis of a supply-side push for special interests of the financial sector. From these 
perspectives, the alleged primary aim of reducing transfer costs of remittances for migrants and 
members of remittance households is, therefore, deemed of less importance than and, sometimes, 
in conflict with, expansive processes of financialisation (Bakker, 2015a; Cross, 2015). 
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On a more micro-level, several studies have looked at the everyday and more ‘mundane’ aspects 
of the financialisation of remittances (Datta, 2012; Zapata, 2013, 2018). Zapata’s (2013, 2018) 
research on failed attempts of the Colombian state to promote remittances-for-housing programs 
has shown that the everyday construction of migrants as financialised subjects is neither a linear 
nor uncontested process that can be generalised across place and space. In fact, Zapata (2013) 
shows how the Colombian government has mostly failed to shape the everyday identities and 
practices of migrants, the latter still opting for alternative strategies to access housing. This 
echoes Page and Mercer’s (2012:3) argument, which suggests understanding diasporas as 
“communities of practice”. In effect, remitting – far from simply reflecting individuals’ behaviours 
that derive from economic models of rational individuals, incentives and stimuli and are driven 
by a set of motivations that are arranged in a linear fashion, ranging from altruism to self-interest 
– is in fact a “social practice” (see also Datta, 2017). This social practice is to be understood as the 
combination of the personal realm of decision-making and the unconscious experience of 
socialisation that shape those decisions. Rather than just being autonomous individuals who 
make rational choices in reaction to various opportunities (e.g. change in information or prices), 
migrants here are defined as moral persons, whose actions shape and are shaped by their 
everyday life, a multitude of economic and social values and norms as well as their relational 
identities, be they of kinship or gender (Page and Mercer, 2012; see also Åkesson, 2011; Cross, 
2015; Datta, 2017). 
 
With the emergence of the remittance-financial inclusion nexus, the idea that the best way to 
render remittances and remittance recipients more productive is to link them to financial circuits, 
products and services has become more prominent. At the core of the remittance-financial 
inclusion nexus, therefore, are attempts to change the financial infrastructure and instruments 
with which remittances are sent, received, saved and invested. However, empirical analyses on 
the extent to which financial inclusion and related programmes can shape remittance recipients’ 
decision-making process, ‘nudge’ their remittance and broader socio-economic practices and 
behaviours and, ultimately, successfully incorporate them into global finance are mostly lacking. 
While the importance of remittance recipients in resisting processes of neoliberal financialisation 
is acknowledged in a limited number of studies (see for instance Zapata, 2013), the focus of 
analysis in most of the literature on remittances and financialisation has remained on migrants’ 
financial practices, and the numerous political and discursive attempts to shape these (Bakker, 
2015b; Datta, 2012; Zapata, 2013, 2018). A key point of departure of this research is to explore 
not only remitting but also remittance receiving as a social practice. The voices, practices and 
arrangements of those at the receiving end of remittances-financial inclusion policies and 
initiatives are put at the forefront of the analysis. Importantly, I argue that this lack of grounded 
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analyses of the ways in which members of remittance households respond to programmes under 
the remittances-financial inclusion nexus reflects the current limited engagement from economic 
and development geographers on the rise of a new behaviourism and experimentalism in 
development and anti-poverty policies and programs in the Global South, and how this trend 
plays out empirically (Berndt, 2015; Berndt and Boeckler, 2016, 2017; Boeckler and Berndt, 
2013; Mitchell and Sparke, 2016; Webber and Prouse, 2018) (see Section 2.4.2). 
 
Relatedly, while aforementioned studies that situate microfinance as part of wider processes of 
financialisation have provided invaluable critical insights (Mader, 2015; Roy, 2010; Soederberg, 
2014), it has recently been argued that too much emphasis has been put on the extent to which 
financial inclusion has managed to permeate people’s everyday lives (Bernards, 2019). I argue 
that a similar logic is at play in much of the literature on financialisation and/of remittances 
(although see Zapata, 2013, 2018). For instance, Mader (2015:90) advances that: 
 
(…) the continuing expansion of microfinance suggests the everyday “weapons of the weak” not to 
be strong enough to pose a serious challenge to the system, such that what most needs accounting 
for right now is the remarkable force and resilience of the microfinance system. 
 
However, the advancement of financial inclusion, and notably access to formal credit, in emerging 
and developing economies has been much more timid and uneven in practice than what is 
generally admitted or assumed from both critiques and proponents of the agenda. Bernards 
(2019:818) even argues that the growth of formal credit “has been prone to reversals in particular 
cases”. In fact, as Table 2.1 demonstrates, the advancement of financial inclusion in general, and 
of the remittances-financial inclusion nexus in particular, in countries such as Senegal and Ghana 
over the past decade is far from clear-cut. The percentage of the poorest 40% who saved at a 
financial institution increased from 5.4 to 13.5% in Ghana between 2011 and 2017 whereas the 
percentage of the poorest 40% in Senegal only increased from 1.4 to 3.3%. In Senegal, it even 
decreased between 2011 and 2014. In addition, access to formal credit remains very low for the 
poorest 40%, with only 7.9% reporting having borrowed from a financial institution in Ghana and 
3.3% in Senegal in 2017. The growth of formal credit has also been slow in the two countries, with 
only a 3.1-point increase in Ghana and a 0.8-point increase in Senegal between 2011 and 2017. 
Saving and borrowing from family, friends and credit and saving associations is still a much more 
common practice in both countries. As for remittance recipients, only data about the ways in 
which domestic remittances are received are available. Among domestic remittance recipients, 
the percentage who reported receiving any money using a financial institution account or Mobile 
Money (MM) account increased dramatically, from 29.6% to 59% and from 5% to 49.6% in Ghana 
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and Senegal respectively between 2014 and 2017. However, this does not say anything about the 
uses of other financial products and services. It, therefore, may be premature to link the 
numerous policies and initiatives of the remittances-financial inclusion nexus to broader 
processes of financialisation, understood as financial mass democratisation. Moreover, I question 
the extent to which remittances can currently be qualified as financialised in the sense of being 
turned into financial assets (through securitisation), rather than simply being tapped into as a 
source of value. While the securitisation of remittances was promoted extensively in the early 
2000s (see Section 2.3.1), the enthusiasm underpinning this agenda seems to have somehow died 
down over the last few years (Bakker, 2016). 
 
Table 2. 1 - Indicators of the remittances-financial inclusion nexus in Senegal and Ghana 
(adapted from Bernards, 2019) 
 
Financial 
institution 
account, income, 
poorest 40%  
(% age 15+) 
 
Saved at a financial 
institution, income, 
poorest 40%  
(% age 15+) 
 
Borrowed from a 
financial 
institution, 
income, poorest 
40%  
(% age 15+) 
Received domestic 
remittances: using 
an account  
(% recipients, age 
15+) 
Country 2011 2014 2017 2011 2014 2017 2011 2014 2017 2011 2014 2017 
Ghana 18.4 28.1 33.3 5.4 12.6 13.5 4.8 5.5 7.9 / 29.6 59.0 
Senegal 2.8 1.9 14.8 1.4 0.9 3.3 2.5 1.4 3.3 / 5.0 49.6 
 
(Source: World Bank Findex Data, available: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/global-financial-
inclusion-global-findex-database) 
 
One explanation for this overestimation of finance’s reach on remittances is that, despite Cross’ 
(2015) conceptualisation of the financialisation of remittances as the building and expansion of 
remittance markets, little is said about the intricate and grounded operations that are required 
for such financialising projects to materialise, leaving finance and the concrete formation of 
(remittance) markets black-boxed (Ouma, 2015a; Fields, 2018). While it is fair to acknowledge 
that remittances are usually considered to be much more than a sum of money in this literature 
(see for instance Hudson, 2008), it is however surprising to see how intra-household transfers, 
when located against processes of financialisation, are assumed to have an almost inherent 
financial worth that can be easily unlocked and transformed into new development finance. The 
incorporation of remittance flows but also migrants and remittance recipients into financial 
circuits is understood from a somehow narrow structuralist perspective, portrayed as the 
expression of the latest spatial fix of a crisis-prone system. By black-boxing and abstracting 
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finance and markets, these approaches fall short of explaining how remittance markets “come 
into being practically” (Ouma, 2015b:3).  
 
Overall, my critique is situated within broader concerns over the use of the concept of 
financialisation in “analytically imprecise and theoretically superficial ways” (Fields, 2018:121; 
Christophers, 2015a; Ouma, 2015a). The financialisation of remittances has come to represent a 
multitude of phenomena: it can refer to securitisation (Hudson, 2008), democratisation of finance 
and financial inclusion (Kunz, 2012), broader processes of financial accumulation and market 
construction (Cross, 2015) as well as ‘invitation to live by finance’ (Datta, 2012; Hudson, 2008; 
Zapata, 2013). While there is nothing wrong per se for a concept to mutate, expand and be used 
in different ways to explain the complex unfolding of various socio-economic dynamics, there are 
some limits to how far it can be stretched (Christophers, 2015a). Linking remittances to wider 
processes of financialisation may, therefore, run the risk of overestimating financial institutions’ 
current interest in, and effective capitalisation of, remittances on the one hand, and the power of 
financial inclusion in constituting new financial practices on the other. It also risks 
underestimating the chaotic, contingent and fragile accomplishment of a market-led development 
project such as the remittances-financial inclusion nexus. As Christophers (2015a:194) puts it, 
“narratives of financialization tend implicitly to become one-sided, even teleological scripts of 
linear, uninterrupted, ineluctable development”. In order to overcome these aforementioned 
limitations, I suggest drawing upon, and extending, the geographies of marketisation approach 
developed by Berndt and Boeckler (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) to the concerted efforts to make 
remittances work for development in general, and financial inclusion in particular.  
 
2.4. Geographies of remittance marketisation 
A geographies of remittance marketisation approach can provide a more empirically grounded 
and unitary account of the discursive, financial, political, legal, social, statistical, technological and 
behavioural developments around remittances in recent years. In the following sections, I explore 
how this approach is better suited to exploring not only the ways in which remittance markets 
are constructed, stabilised, expanded but also contested, concretely (Section 2.4.1) as well as how 
processes of ‘nudges’ and financial subjectivation unfold in practice (Section 2.4.2). 
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2.4.1. Opening the black box of remittance markets: Discursive borderlands, 
framing and overflows 
While the above accounts on the financialisation of remittances are rightly concerned about the 
consequences of the expansion of finance-led accumulation on the back of remittances, analyses 
of how such remittance markets are established concretely are largely lacking. Similarly, while 
international political economy approaches to financial inclusion emphasise the disciplinary role 
of the agenda in reconfiguring labour-capital relations that enable financial accumulation 
(Soederberg, 2014), little is said about the intricate socio-technical ways in which such processes 
are rendered possible (Bernards, 2019). Crucially, these limits in the literature reflect recent 
broader concerns over the lack of constructive engagement between the scholarship on the 
critical political economy of global finance and financialisation and the work on finance and 
market formation inspired by science and technology studies (STS) (Ouma, 2015a). On the one 
hand, the scholarship on financialisation tends to neglect the complex ways in which finance and 
finance-driven markets and practices are assembled. On the other hand, STS-inspired work on 
markets and finance is generally perceived to be uncritical with regard to the socio-economic 
effects of markets and broader contemporary dynamics of finance-led capital accumulation 
(Fields, 2018; Ouma, 2015a). It is only recently that several scholars, and geographers especially, 
haven taken up the task to bring STS-inspired and political economy approaches to markets and 
global finance into a productive dialogue (Bernards, 2019; Fields, 2018; McKenzie, 2017; Ouma, 
2015b, 2016a). This research adds to this emerging literature and aims to further understand not 
only how remittance markets sustain processes of finance-led capital accumulation but also how 
the financial incorporation of remittance flows and households is rendered possible practically 
in countries such as Senegal and Ghana (RQ1).  
 
The bringing of markets into being, or marketisation, constitutes one particular form of Çalíşkan 
and Callon’s (2010:2) concept of economisation, that is the “processes through which behaviours, 
organizations, institutions and, more generally, objects are constituted as being ‘economic’”. To 
be rendered economic, these ‘objects’ must be entangled with a heterogenous assemblage of 
human and non-human elements, including discourses, material and technical devices, norms and 
rules (Kear, 2018; Berndt and Boeckler, 2009). Importantly, Callon (2007a) calls these 
assemblages agencements. These are not only socio-technical assemblages; they also are 
“endowed with the capacity of acting in different ways depending on their configurations” 
(Callon, 2007a:320; see also Berndt and Boeckler, 2009:543). Agency from this perspective is not 
to be reduced to the bodily capacity of the human subject but is rather distributed (i.e. diffuse and 
entangled) across an assemblage of apparatuses, prostheses, rules, etc., that render possible the 
performance of specific subjectivities (Kear, 2018). In other words, subjectivities are “enacted in 
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a device”, or agencement (Callon and Muniesa, 2005 in Kear, 2018:309). Markets understood as 
socio-technical agencements come, therefore, to constitute a “combination of material and 
technical devices, texts, algorithms, rules and human beings that shape agency and give meaning 
to action” (Berndt and Boeckler, 2009:543). The role of human beings here is not to be 
underestimated; they usually represent “caged economists” (academics) and economists “in the 
wild”, i.e. business gurus, accountants, practitioners and consultants (Callon et al, 2002). In fact, 
it is important to note that economic knowledges and theories are significant in the constitution 
of markets. In the words of Callon (1998:2), “economics, in the broad sense of the term, performs, 
shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it functions”. In other words, 
economics is performative and “is embodied in procedures and physical artefacts, not just in 
ideas” (MacKenzie, 2009:13, see also Ouma, 2015b:28). The labour and efforts that underpin the 
processes of creating, maintaining and reinforcing the conditions and requirements that realise 
markets in their idealised forms is termed marketisation.  
 
Empirically, marketisation processes can be divided into two interwoven dimensions. The first, 
labelled markets as discursive borderlands, refers to the political and discursive extension of the 
market domain at a macro-level (Berndt and Boeckler, 2012). At the core of this dimension is the 
construction by powerful actors such as governments and international organisations of an 
imaginary boundary between the “market” and “its constitutive other”, the non-market, in order 
for the latter to be incorporated into the former. This idea of a boundary constitutes a core aspect 
of modernist thinking about the capitalist economy that is still prevalent nowadays, namely that 
a capitalist, progressive core is confronted to non-capitalist, deviant and traditional activities and 
places that either resist or are in the waiting of being “conquered” (Mitchell, 2007; see also 
Berndt, 2013). Crucially, while it may seem that what has been labelled the “non-market other” is 
located outside of a “bounded terrain”, Mitchell (2007:247 in Berndt 2013:2650) instead refers 
to these places as frontier regions, or “zones of ‘inclusive exclusion’, since what is declared to be 
outside the market already plays a role within it, through the declaration of exclusion and the 
continuous battles over its inclusion”. Berndt and Boeckler (2011) advance the concept of 
b/ordering (i.e. bordering and debordering processes) to account for the geographical nature of 
these boundary struggles. What marketisation does then is to proceed “through selective spatial 
ordering wherein certain spaces are demarcated as backward or outside the market” (Kear, 
2018:307). This is the context in which the political and discursive construction of so-called 
‘informal’ remittance-sending practices and corridors as ‘traditional’ as well as the narrative 
around the necessity to formalise and link remittance to financial products and services to make 
them ‘more productive’ can be situated (Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.1). I argue that the remittances-
financial inclusion nexus as a project of remittance marketisation needs these “backward”, non-
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productive activities and places as a mirror, against which a modern productive remittance 
market can be designed and developed as a sign of progress (see Chapter 5 and 6 for a discussion 
of how ‘alternative’ remittance circuits and remittance recipients’ financial practices are 
discursively and politically constructed by proponents of the remittances-financial inclusion 
nexus).  
 
The second dimension of marketisation, the framing of markets, relates to the work and 
investments required to make markets work at a more micro-geographical scale. For Callon 
(2007b:140), processes of framing are inherently exclusionary as to frame is “to select, to sever 
links and finally to make trajectories (at least temporarily) ‘irreversible’”. According to Berndt 
and Boeckler (2009), three key framings are decisive to realise markets: the conversion of goods 
into commodities, the formatting of calculative agencies and the formatting of market encounters. 
Taking these in turn, a thing, or an entity, must first be valued according to a set of criteria in 
order to become a commodity that can be bought and sold on the market (Çalíşkan and Callon, 
2010; Ouma, 2015b). The category of ‘commodity’ cannot be assumed to be a starting point; 
commodities are just not out there, waiting to circulate. Amongst many processes that contribute 
to the formatting of commodities, three are particularly important to emphasise. First, it is argued 
that for something to become a commodity, it must be “qualified and rendered a tradable object 
in the first place” (Ouma, 2015b:32). Second, for goods to be exchanged, they need to be 
disentangled from certain network relations – those of the sellers – and attached to others – those 
of the buyers. In other words, goods need to detached from their original context of production 
and become unambiguous in order to enable quantitative and qualitative valuations to attach 
property rights and a price to them. Finally, they must be singularised, i.e. reattached to the 
buyers’ world and be accepted as legitimate (ibid).  
 
Here, it is important to acknowledge that the existing critical literature on remittances has 
already been very effective at identifying political, discursive and technical mechanisms of 
remittance ‘commodification’ (Section 2.2.2). To my knowledge however, only Hernandez and 
Coutin (2006) explicitly use Callon’s work to come to terms with these processes. When central 
banks and international financial institutions define remittances as “both national resource and 
foreign currency” (Hernandez and Coutin, 2006:185), they qualify remittances as a legitimate 
source of development finance that can be capitalised on. As a result, ‘quasi’ property rights are 
attached to remittances as governments claim a return on investment in the form of remittances 
for having originally invested in migrant workers, e.g. education and health (ibid). The durability 
of the qualities of a good is, however, far from fixed and indefinite as the evolution of the discourse 
and policies of the remittances-for-development agenda attests, from attempts to directly 
 48 
influence the ways in which remittances are used to initiatives that aim to provide greater 
‘choices’ for migrants and remittance households.  What this means is that the “status of a good 
must instead be conceived as an effect of socio-technical agencements that are often destabilised 
during the ‘market as a process’” (Ouma, 2015b:34, see also Callon 1998). Moreover, when 
remittances are qualified as “cost free incomes” through discounting procedures, they are 
simultaneously being detached from any other regimes of value. In other words, to render 
legitimate states’ development strategies that aim to construct, maintain and deepen markets on 
the back of remittances, the latter must be detached, and even purified, from the realities of an 
international migration regime that creates and perpetuates indebtedness, sacrifice, separation, 
racism, xenophobia, exploitation and inequality, hyper-precariousness, imprisonment and even 
loss of life (Hernandez and Coutin, 2006). In Çalíşkan and Callon’s (2010) words, remittances 
must be pacified. Finally, attempts to depict and, ultimately, ‘make’ remittances stable, counter-
cyclical and productive constitute efforts to singularise them. As a result, these debates on 
remittances that produce and legitimise their development and productive potential contribute 
to transform remitters and remittees into “enterprising subjects of neoliberalism” that should 
invest and save rather than just spend remittances on daily needs (Hernandez and Coutin, 
2006:201). While reframing remittances as national resources, foreign donations, cost-free 
incomes and productive is an essential part of marketisation processes, the leveraging of 
remittances as a new source of value that can be tapped also depends on two other market 
framings: the formatting of agencies and market encounters. I argue that these two decisive 
market framings have largely been neglected by the existing critical literature on remittances and 
remittance markets. 
 
For a good to be “qualified, calculated and detached according to a specific modality of valuation” 
(Ouma, 2015b:37), the formatting of agencies of market agents is necessary. Yet, as highlighted 
previously, markets constitute an “arrangement of heterogeneous elements (conventions, rules, 
technical devices, infrastructures, logistical procedures, calculating systems, texts, discourses, 
scientific knowledge, embodied skills, human beings, etc)”, equipped with the ability to “bring 
about agency, to act and to give meaning to action’” (Berndt and Boeckler, 2012:204, see also 
Callon, 2007a:319). In other words, it is the configuration of all these elements – including human 
ability – that participate to the formatting of agencies, i.e. to the coming into being of the Homo 
economicus. In the remittance industry, the accomplishment of remittance markets depends on 
the capacity by states, development institutions, financial and commercial organisations to incite 
migrants and remittance recipients to channel, use, save and invest remittances through formal 
financial circuits. As I will show in more detail in Chapter 4, this normalisation of (financial) 
agencies amongst remittance recipients is supported by a wide range of elements, including 
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microfinance and MM agent networks, field experiments, text messages and technological devices 
amongst many others. Importantly, the production of asymmetries and unequal power relations 
are inherent to processes of market formation (Fields, 2018; Ouma, 2015b; Christophers, 2014). 
For instance, which agencies come to impose onto others the ways in which remittances or non-
market financial practices are valued relate to differentiated positions market agents occupy 
within specific market arrangements. Because market agencies are not equally equipped, some 
agents are therefore more powerful than others at imposing “the rules of the game”, that is the 
ways in which certain calculating agencies come to impose the ways in which goods are qualified, 
detached, calculated and singularised according to a certain regime of value and, ultimately, come 
to “decide on the location and distribution of surpluses” (Callon, 1998:46, see also Ouma, 
2015b:40). From this perspective, the power of certain agents involved in the remittances-
financial inclusion nexus, such as international financial and development organisations and 
transnational financial and commercial institutions, should not be understood as all-encroaching 
but rather dependent on a wide range of human relations and non-human elements. Power is 
diffused and becomes part and parcel of these elements that make up markets through grounded 
everyday mechanisms. Understanding how these asymmetries and unequal power relations 
come into being, what kind of socio-technical arrangements preserve them and how these can be 
undone is at the heart of the geographies of marketisation approach. In other words, this 
approach allows us not only to investigate the ways in which markets are formed but also the 
infelicities that these markets may bring about. Practice-oriented analytics are in this case by no 
means a way to deflect questions of power relations and structural dynamics.  
 
Finally, the third decisive market framing that is necessary for the practical accomplishment of 
markets relates to the organisation of encounters between goods and agencies. These market 
encounters also have to be formatted to “achieve the qualification of objectified commodities 
(first framing) by calculating agencies (second framing)” (Berndt and Boeckler, 2012:208). In 
other words, the ways through which market encounters between goods and agents are framed 
relies, again, on socio-technical arrangements that comprises of a wide range technical and 
organisational devices and procedures. Key amongst these mechanisms is the negotiating and 
setting of a price. As the chain connecting remittance senders and recipients becomes longer and 
more complex with newly-arrived actors such global investors, financial institutions and 
individual financial intermediaries among others, numerous market encounters take place 
between different agents and different prices must be agreed upon. Prices work at times as a 
strategic market device to integrate certain agents. However, as I show in Chapter 4, pricing 
remittance transfers and the financial products attached to them as well as enabling global 
investors to compare, plan and undertake investments requires significant financial engineering. 
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Importantly, and in contrast to many studies that apply the concept of financialisation, at the core 
of the geography of marketisation approach is the acknowledgement that these processes of 
framing are by no means frictionless; they are contested and require constant renegotiations. 
Callon (2007b) uses the concept of “overflows” to account for such fragility and messiness as one 
set of practices, identities, desires, norms, rules, customs and logics attempts to impose itself upon 
others. As long as overflows are contained, market rules appear as pre-given by those subject to 
them and the porosity of the boundary between the market and the non-market is rendered 
invisible, markets can be realised. However, stabilisation is always temporary (see Chapter 4 and 
6).  
 
Overall, I have shown that drawing upon and extending the geographies of marketisation to 
remittances overcomes some of the existing theoretical and empirical limitations that exist within 
the literature on financialisation and/of remittances. It allows for the empirical examination of 
the concrete ways in which remittance markets are realised, without overestimating the power 
of the remittance-financial inclusion agenda or neglecting its inherently fragile and contingent 
characteristics (RQ1). In the next section, I show that this approach also allows for the exploration 
of the ways in which remittance flows (RQ2) and households (RQ3) can be (re)configured and 
integrated into global financial circuits, and the technical and more fundamental limits to such 
processes. 
 
2.4.2. The behavioural turn in development: From remittance markets to 
remittance market subjects 
A nascent literature within economic geography has started to explore the rise of behavioural 
economics in development, noting that it constitutes a shift of focus from the market to the market 
subject or, in other words, from market regulation to behavioural engineering (Berndt, 2015; 
Berndt and Boeckler, 2016, 2017; Berndt and Wirth, 2019; Boeckler and Berndt, 2013; Fine et al, 
2016; Mitchell and Sparke, 2016; Webber and Prouse, 2018). Behind this new behaviourism is 
the idea that the market, although still considered the “ideal institutional arena” for development, 
can no longer “be trusted to realise itself all on its own in light of the behavioural anomalies 
besetting the poor” (Berndt and Boeckler, 2017:289). What is therefore recommended is for 
interventions to enable the poor to change their defective behaviours that are responsible for 
poverty. I argue that such a shift in development thinking and practice is also apparent in relation 
to the remittances-financial inclusion nexus. 
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From a marketisation perspective, behaviourism and experimentalism have provided a “new 
twist” to framing processes (Section 2.4.1), with two complementary sets of devices “intervening 
in strategic moments to frame possible actions” (Berndt and Boeckler, 2017:295; Berndt and 
Wirth, 2019). The first array of devices aims to “increase the commitment of targeted individuals 
to behaviour that is deemed more rational and in their real interest” (Berndt, 2015:581). They act 
as nudges and prompts that encourage/push people to change their behaviours and can include 
things such as simplification of procedures, disclosure labels, text messages as well as physical 
proximity and visits (of a loan officer to a borrower, for instance) (ibid). The second type of 
market devices refers to experimental methods, i.e. “the procedural settings provided by 
behavioural games and experiments that are also often used as socially and spatially enclosed 
stages on which nudges can be applied (…) and learning can be monitored” (Berndt, 2015:582). 
These include for instance methodological instruments such as Randomised Controlled Trials 
(RCTs), which have been used in the context of clinical investigation for a long time but have more 
recently allowed the spread of behaviourism into development policy realms (Berndt, 2015; 
Webber and Prouse, 2018). As Kear (2018:315) argues, RCTs have now come to constitute a 
“gatekeeper device” that not only decides on the kind of “treatment” required but also provides 
legitimacy to development policies inspired by behavioural economics.  
 
Now, several scholars have begun to examine this behavioural turn in relation to microfinance 
policies and programmes (Gabor and Brooks, 2017; Mader, 2016b, 2018), signalling a shift in the 
mission of microfinance to alleviate poverty, from microloans for entrepreneurship to a broader 
agenda of financial inclusion (Mader and Sabrow, 2019). Similar to microfinance, financial 
inclusion rests upon the fundamental premise that development and poverty alleviation can only 
be achieved by expanding financial markets. However, while the shift from microfinance to 
financial inclusion – and even digital-based financial inclusion (Gabor and Brooks, 2017:423) – 
has been regarded as nothing but rhetorical for some (Bateman, 2012), others have noticed major 
ways in which the agenda has further consolidated, transformed and expanded the power of 
financial markets in the name of development (Mader, 2016b; Gabor and Brooks, 2017). Three of 
these changes are important to account for as they have influenced how the remittances-financial 
inclusion nexus has manifested itself in recent years. With financial inclusion, the type of actors 
and services that are now included and deemed legitimate for helping the poor financially has 
broadened. MFIs are not the sole players anymore as a new coalition of actors has emerged, 
including large banks, philanthropic foundations, financial and technology companies – or 
Fintechs – credit card companies, mobile network operators and even social media companies 
(Chapter 1). Now portrayed by organisations such as the WB as the only legitimate source of ‘pro-
poor’ financial products and innovations, these private players provide not only lending but also 
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savings, insurance and, importantly, all kinds of payment products and services (Gabor and 
Brooks, 2017; Mader, 2016b). Maurer (2015) refers to “poverty payment” to characterise this 
shift partly away from credit and towards a widening array of financial and (digital) payment 
services. Furthermore, the financial inclusion mantra has changed what people expect and benefit 
from engaging with finance. While microfinance initially promised poverty alleviation and higher 
incomes through entrepreneurship, advocates of financial inclusion now attach little importance 
to entrepreneurial skills and activities and rather highlight the significance of financial 
intermediation, or what Mader (2018:466) calls “intertemporal intermediation19, and 
interspatial-interclass intermediation20”. Crucially, what matters is not so much anymore what 
borrowers do with their microloans but rather that all different financial needs are met at the 
right time and with the right formal products and services and market prices (ibid). In other 
words, financial inclusion now expects much more from clients than ‘just’ being entrepreneurs as 
the emphasis is increasingly put on the individual consumer and their ability to assess and 
manage risks, uncertainties and crisis on the one hand, and make the rights choices and take 
advantage of opportunities on the other. What results from this is the development of a whole 
apparatus of training and initiatives that aim to transform and/or enhance poor people’s 
calculative behaviours and practices. Alongside the renewed importance of financial education 
programs have emerged new devices and techniques that aim to channel behaviours in particular 
directions (Gabor and Brooks, 2017; Mader, 2016b, 2018). In fact, over the past few years, and 
especially since the publication of the 2015 WB report ‘Mind, Society and Behaviour’, poverty has 
come to represent: 
 
not only a deficit in material resources but also a context in which decisions are made. It can impose 
a cognitive burden on individuals that makes it especially difficult for them to think deliberatively 
(WB, 2015:13 in Gabor and Brooks, 2017:431).  
 
Drawing upon assumptions in cognitive psychology, proponents of this agenda have argued that 
financial instability and exclusion comes to constitute a behavioural problem as poor people are 
constrained by a cognitive tax that only allows them to make judgments and decisions that are 
rapid, automatic, intuitive or even unconscious (Cognitive System 1) rather than rule-based, 
rational and explicit (Cognitive System 2) (Berndt, 2015). As a result, what poor people are 
                                                     
19 With regard to intertemporal intermediation, the key economic problem of poor people with irregular incomes, it is 
argued, is not that they do not have enough money but rather that there is a “disconnect between times when they have 
money and times when they need money” (Mader, 2018:465). What savings and credit products and services allow is 
to alleviate poverty by shifting money across time, i.e. allowing people who do not have the capacity to pay for things 
now out of their current income to do it out of past income (savings) or future income (credit) or a mix of both. 
20 With interspatial-interclass intermediation, the macro-theory of change goes as follows: finance shifts money from 
places and people with excess capital to places and people that need capital. The smoother these economic interactions 
are, the higher economic growth is, from which poor people will ultimately benefit (Mader, 2018). 
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assumed to need is a set of devices which will equip them with the ‘financial capabilities’ to make 
the right choices. While these processes of financial subject formation have extended their reach 
and influence dramatically in recent years, what is missing from the above accounts is empirical 
research on how these nudges are put together in practice (RQ1), how effective they can actually 
be (RQ2), and whether and how populations accept, domesticate and/or resist such efforts of 
financial governance (RQ3). By centring the analysis on populations located in the Global South, 
I argue that a geographies of marketisation approach that is sensitive to this behavioural turn – 
or what Kear (2018:317) calls a “behavioural geography of marketisation” – is well placed to 
emphasise the fragility and contingency of the formation of remittance recipients as market 
subjects. It allows for an exploration of processes of financial incorporation and subjectivation as 
not inevitable but prone to “resistance from without and contradiction from within” (Fields, 
2017:588, emphasis mine). 
 
In fact, what is at stake here is not only accounting for moments of overflows (Section 2.4.1) but 
also more fundamental limits to financialisation (of remittance flows and households) as a project 
(Bernards, 2019; Christophers, 2015a; Horton, 2018; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2017). 
While overflows are connected to limits of market devices themselves (e.g. a credit-scoring 
algorithm that struggles to contain the capacity of human actors to ‘game’ it), it has been argued 
that this narrow focus on devices and other elements of the agencements can miss more 
fundamental limits that have to do with “the dynamics of ‘real economies’ themselves” (Bernards, 
2019:821). In fact, Marxian perspectives highlight that finance-led capital accumulation is 
dependent upon processes of realisation (Harvey, 2007). What this means with regard to the 
remittances-financial inclusion nexus for instance is that in a context of precarious, irregular and 
low-incomes economic activities, the accumulation of assets (e.g. savings) and the stable 
production of income streams (e.g. loan repayments) upon which financial accumulation is 
dependent may just not be possible, despite all the financial, material, legal and behavioural 
engineering that contribute to the formation of the ideal-type neoliberal subject. Both overflows 
and more fundamental limits of marketisation will be explored throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6 by 
paying particular attention to the everyday lived socio-economic realities of members of 
remittance households at the receiving end of marketisation processes. Importantly, centring the 
analysis on the socio-economic and financial activities, strategies, arrangements, practices and 
subjectivities of members of remittance households also allows for an exploration of other 
potential limits to financialisation that have been identified previously by various scholars. These 
include the prevalence and significance of alternative financial institutions and circuits (Langley, 
2010) (see Chapter 5 and 6) as well as, and importantly, individual and collective acts of 
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domestication (Pellandini-Simanyi et al, 2015) and resistance (Fields, 2018; Horton, 2017) (see 
Chapter 6). 
 
By exploring empirically how remittance marketisation programmes unfold on the ground, this 
research also contributes to an emerging literature that remains cautious about the performative 
power of neoliberal financial discourses, and the financial devices and services attached to them, 
to shape everyday financial practices and subjectivities (Coppock, 2013; Deville, 2012, 2014; 
Gonzalez, 2015; Kutz, 2018; Lai, 2017; Pellandini-Simanyi et al, 2015; Pellandini-Simanyi and 
Banai, forthcoming; Samec, 2018). Briefly, the financialisation of households has been 
approached through two different but complementary frameworks (Gonzalez, 2015). On the one 
hand, political economy studies focus on explaining the rising household debt over the last 30 
years. The emphasis is put on the neoliberal transformation of structural forces, i.e. stagnation of 
real wages, rising precariousness of employment, cuts in welfare provision, privatisation of social 
services and increasing costs of living, that force households to adopt ‘defensive consumption 
strategies’ by relying on debt not only to maintain their lifestyle but to ‘avoid falling behind’ 
(Montgomerie, 2009, 2013; Trumbull, 2012; Soederberg, 2013b).21 On the other hand, neo-
Foucauldian, cultural-oriented analyses of governmentality have looked at the consequences of 
the development of financial markets and the penetration of finance into daily life onto people’s 
subjectivities and practices (Langley, 2006, 2007; Marron 2013; Martin, 2002; Pryke and du Gay, 
2007). The financialisation of everyday life approach is interested in understanding how the 
disciplinary mechanisms of institutional reforms, financial regulations, instruments, innovations 
and discourses shape individuals’ and households’ attitudes towards risks and financial 
responsibilities. Households are called forth by the financial system and are demanded to behave 
as ‘risk takers’, ‘self-disciplined investors’, ‘entrepreneurs’ or even ‘traders’ to ensure their social 
reproduction and economic security (French and Kneale, 2009; Finlayson, 2009; Langley, 2006; 
Thrift, 2008). These processes constitute the construction – or the making – of financialised 
subjects, that are encouraged to behave in a way that is compatible with neoliberal policies and 
their underlying assumptions about the utility-maximising, rational agent, or Homo Economicus 
(Pellandini-Simanyi et al, 2015). 
 
While the ambiguities and fragilities of such processes of financial subject formation have long 
been recognized (Finlayson, 2009; Langley, 2006), the dominant use of the neo-Foucauldian 
framework of governmentality in the literature on everyday financialisation has led to a focus on 
the ways in which technologies and institutional programmes such as financial literacy initiatives 
                                                     
21 This institutional approach draws on Crouch’s (2009a, 2009b) notion of ‘privatised Keynesianism’ where individuals 
and not governments take on debt to stimulate the economy. 
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and credit-scoring algorithms serve to discipline individual subjects. Focusing on the causes of 
everyday financialisation (Pellandini-Simanyi et al, 2015), this approach has tended to generate 
the perception of an all-pervasive, almost inescapable (Hall, 2012), spread of neoliberal 
financialised logic in people’s everyday lives (Kutz, 2018). Very few studies, however, have 
committed to empirically researching the ways in which the proliferation of financial reasoning, 
products and services transform people’s ordinary economic practices, routines and norms 
(although see Coppock, 2013; Deville, 2012, 2014; Lai, 2017; Pellandini-Simanyi et al, 2015; Smith 
et al, 2006). Fewer even have done so in countries of the Global South (Gonzalez, 2015; Kutz, 
2018). In other words, the ways in which new financial products and services may change existing 
socio-economic and cultural arrangements, practices and subjectivities have tended to be inferred 
rather than observed (Pellandini-Simanyi et al, 2015). In contrast, Pellandini-Simanyi and Banai 
(forthcoming) advance the notion of ‘financialisation without financialised subjects’ to account 
for the fact that “people buy financial products described by FoEL [Financialisation of Everyday 
Life] studies without buying into the subject positions that these products are assumed to 
represent according to the FoEL literature” (e.g. investorial mindset, morally permissive attitudes 
to indebtedness, etc). In other words, financial products, such as mortgages and other credit 
products, and the discourses around these cannot easily shape subjectivities to their own image. 
Instead, any shift in subjectivities stems from the financial products’ interaction with existing 
everyday subjectivities and practices, and whether people are dealing with these products “in 
settled or unsettled times” (Pellandini-Simanyi et al, 2015:753; see also Deville, 2012, 2014). 
Contrary to the set of assumptions underlying neoliberal policies but also accounts from the other 
side of the political spectrum about the construction of the neoliberal self-disciplined subject, the 
formation of everyday financial subjects does not constitute a straightforward process that can 
be generalised across place and space. In fact, Berndt and Wirth (2019) argue that, with the 
aforementioned behavioural turn, one of the key ways in which marketisation unfolds is through 
processes of subjectivation. They refer to the formation of ‘quasi-subjects’ of marketisation to 
emphasise the unstable characteristics of such processes and the attempts by recipients of 
behavioural interventions to reaffirm their autonomy through acts and discourses that range 
from immediate adoption to outright resistance, and everything that lies in-between, i.e. 
“calculated conformity” (Scott, 1985 in Berndt and Boeckler, 2017:297). The reasons why 
processes of subjectivation may fail (Kutz, 2018) and the ways in which variegated financial 
practices and subjectivities – that differ from the neoliberal self-disciplined subject – emerge 
and/or endure (Lai, 2017) deserve, therefore, more empirical scrutiny and will be explored in 
detail in Chapter 6. 
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Finally, a behavioural geography of marketisation approach enables a more nuanced analysis of 
the variegated spatialities of market making processes (Kear, 2018). Here, particular attention is 
paid to the extent to which location influences the capacities of a market understood as an 
agencement to enact particular subjectivities and format, frame and equip Homo economicus with 
prostheses. In contrast to previous categories that assume an areal/scalar/hierarchical spatial 
representation of the market (e.g. borderlands in Section 2.4.1), Kear (2018) advances the notion 
of ‘marketsites’ as a spatial translation of the concept of agencement in order to account for the 
scattered encounters between economic subjects and the heterogenous elements that configure 
a market. The marketsite becomes the particular place and juncture where all these elements 
come together to create “a market condition in which economic subjects behave as if they are 
rational” (Kear, 2018:317). In other words, the marketsite becomes the locus where market 
devices such as nudges enable the Homo economicus to come into being and survive. Kear (2018) 
uses the case of prepaid card disclosures that nudge customers at the Point of Sale (POS) to 
illustrate how particular locations are more significant than others in making subjects behave 
more rationally. Importantly, marketsites are actual geographical points but are not reduced to 
any specific and fixed location; they are rather formed by the agencement that configures it. 
Drawing upon Kear’s (2018) insights, my analysis of the extent to which branchless banking in 
Senegal and Ghana construct specific subjectivities among various market actors, including 
banking agents (Chapter 4) and members of remittance households (Chapter 6), contributes to 
this preliminary behavioural geography of marketisation.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the vital contributions of previous studies that have challenged 
policies and initiatives that aim to construct and expand markets on the back of remittances. I 
have shown, however, that previous work on the ‘financialisation of remittances’ runs the risk of 
overestimating finance’s reach on remittance flows and households on the one hand, and 
underestimating the fragile and chaotic accomplishment of such market-led development 
projects on the other. This is due to two key reasons. First, the concept of financialisation is 
treated in this literature as explanans (the explanation) rather than explanandum (what is to be 
explained), leaving finance and the concrete formation of remittance markets black-boxed. 
Second, empirical analyses on the extent to which remittances-financial inclusion policies and 
programmes can ‘nudge’ remittance flows and remittance recipients’ practices and behaviours 
are mostly lacking. In contrast, I suggest that a geographies of remittance marketisation approach 
allows for a grounded exploration of how remittance markets are realised in countries such as 
Senegal and Ghana (RQ1), how remittance flows (RQ2) and households (RQ3) are integrated into 
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global finance, and the controversies and limits to such accomplishments. Such an approach 
provides a more unitary account of all the discursive, financial, political, legal, social, statistical, 
technological, material and behavioural engineering that has taken place around remittances in 
recent years. It is also better suited to understanding attempts to format members of remittance 
households in home countries as market subjects as neither straightforward nor unopposed 
processes. In fact, a geographies of remittance marketisation approach that is attuned to the 
behavioural turn in development and financial inclusion allows for the empirical research of 
whether/how processes of financial subjectivation unfold on the ground. The following 
methodological chapter sets out how these areas of inquiry were pursued. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Researching the marketisation of remittance flows 
and households 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter details the methodological approach that underpinned my investigation into the 
marketisation of remittance flows and households in Senegal and Ghana. Recent studies have 
critically examined the ‘financialisation of remittances’, calling into question the market-based 
approach to the project and its prioritising of the political and financial concerns of a broad 
coalition of global and national actors over the needs of migrant men and women and the people 
they send remittances to (Datta, 2017; Cross, 2015; Hudson, 2008; Kunz, 2013; Zapata, 2013, 
2017). While being sympathetic to these political economy takes on the financialisation of 
remittances, I question the extent to which remittance flows and households can be theoretically 
conceptualised as financialised (Chapter 2). Importantly, these theorisations partly derive from 
several methodological shortcomings, particularly a neglect of the intricate ways in which the 
financial incorporation of remittance flows and households unfolds in practice.  
 
In order to overcome these limitations, I draw upon Ouma’s (2015b) work on export food markets 
to advance a ‘critical ethnography of remittance marketisation’, which is concerned with opening 
up the black box of both remittance markets and households. After discussing some of the 
methodological strengths and limitations of previous studies on financialisation, financial 
inclusion and remittances, I outline how I sought to develop a methodological approach to 
address my research questions, through my use of multiple methods, case studies, sources and 
sites. I then provide a detailed account of the research process, which consisted of (1) a pilot study 
in Senegal; (2) document analysis of key programs and activities targeting remittance recipients 
for financial inclusion; (3) semi-structured interviews with institutional and private sector 
actors; (4) semi-structured interviews with remittance households; (5) ethnographic interviews 
with front desk employees and agents of financial and commercial institutions; (6) in-field 
observations; and (7) data interpretation, analysis and presentation. Finally, I reflect on power 
relations and my own positionality in relation to the research process through the concept of 
‘triple subjectivity’ (that is, the researcher/research assistants/research participants 
relationship). This includes consideration of some of the practical and ethical challenges I 
encountered during my fieldwork. 
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3.2. Researching remittance markets in the making: 
Methodological underpinnings 
My research is methodologically informed by what Ouma (2015b:78) calls a “critical ethnography 
of marketisation”. This methodological approach derives ontologically, epistemologically and 
theoretically from a constructionist research programme on marketisation that is concerned with 
the ways in which goods, agencies and encounters are formatted in practice, how markets are 
rendered stable but also how they are constantly prone to contestation and resistance. Here, the 
term “ethnography” is neither used in the classic anthropological sense nor should it be 
understood as mere in-field or participant observation. Rather, it constitutes a way to deconstruct 
and reconstruct taken-for-granted categories such as remittances and markets through a 
reflexive approach that entails the exploration of various questions through a wide range of 
methods of data collection and analysis in different sites of interest (Davies, 2008:77 in Ouma, 
2015b). As Ouma (2015b:79) puts it: 
 
What lies at the core of the ethnography of marketisation (…) is a situated, embodied approach 
that conceives of “knowledge”, “subjects”, and “objects” as constituted by relationally, materially, 
and temporally embedded practices.  
 
What follows from this key epistemological point of departure is that the knowledge that informs 
practices can only be unpacked – however partially – by participants not only during interviews 
but also through the ethnographic gaze of the researcher. As a result, “the submundane practices” 
of market agents need to be put at the center of the analysis (Ybema et al, 2009:3, in Ouma, 
2015b:79). By “following the actors” – understood as a methodological concept – one allows 
participants to “unfold their own frames of reference, vocabularies and theories by temporarily 
suspending (or at least trying to) one’s own frames of references as a researcher” (Latour, 
2005:30; Ouma, 2015b:85).  
 
My critical ethnography of remittance marketisation draws upon the strengths of the 
multimethod approach (semi-structured and ethnographic interviews, document analysis and in-
field observations) of previous studies on the Global Remittance Agenda, which contributes to 
overcoming “the macro-micro/global-local divides that plague much social science enquiry 
today” (e.g. Kunz, 2011:11; see also Zapata, 2011). It also responds to some methodological 
limitations identified in the literature on financialisation and/of remittances and financial 
inclusion. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, such an approach allows one to build upon and extend 
analyses of discourses that contribute to the construction of remittance markets. While the 
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existing literature tends to give significant weight to the power of policymakers and other market 
actors (NGOs, governments) (see for instance Bakker, 2015a; Cross, 2015), much less attention is 
paid to the inner workings of financial and commercial companies and how these relate to 
market-making actors on the one hand, and their (remittance) customers on the other. In other 
words, as Ouma (2015b:18) puts it, a key methodological concern of such an approach is to 
investigate not only “what things are done and why they are done but also to how they are done 
– how the messy work of making markets plays out in practice”. To understand the ways in which 
these remittance markets are put to work in practice, everyday discussions, observations and 
ethnographic interviews with private sector actors at different levels, from directors to managers 
and tellers, become as important as ‘expert’ interviews with policymakers and state officials 
(Chapter 4).  
 
Furthermore, a critical ethnography of remittance marketisation allows for an exploration of 
whether and how the financial incorporation of remittance flows (RQ2) and households (RQ3) 
unfolds concretely in two countries of the Global South. In that sense, this approach aims to go 
beyond the methodological limitations of some of the existing literature on financial inclusion and 
everyday financialisation, which tends to infer rather than observe the processes through which 
the incorporation of new financial products and services into people’s everyday life may 
transform or draw upon existing socio-economic and cultural arrangements, practices and 
subjectivities (Pellandini-Simanyi et al, 2015). In fact, it has been argued that very few studies on 
everyday financialisation have committed to empirically research the ways in which the 
proliferation of financial reasoning, products and services transform people’s ordinary economic 
practices, routines and norms (although see Coppock, 2013; Deville, 2012, 2014; Gonzalez, 2015; 
Pellandini-Simanyi et al, 2015; Smith et al, 2006). Households are instead understood as 
“bookkeeping units that consume, save, hold assets, acquire debts and take risks”, or what 
Gonzalez (2015:785) calls a “portfolio view of households”. Rather than grounded observations, 
the methodological tools and resources that are usually used are quantitative data, including 
households’ surveys as well media and expert analysis and defining global trends in the financial 
industry, which makes it difficult to fully understand the underlying dynamics of socio-economic 
and financial practices and the social content of debt relations (Gonzalez, 2015). For instance, 
Gonzalez (2015) argues that credit in most of these studies is seen as being imposed onto 
households and consumption by financial means and is reduced to the dominant logic of 
defensive consumption. While there is truth to this narrative, Gonzalez (2015) argues that 
households in Chile for instance do not only engage in consumer credit from a defensive 
consumption perspective but also in contexts of stability and improvement. This limited 
understanding of consumer credit in the literature on the financialisation of households and 
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everyday life is linked to its narrow geographical scope, mostly focusing on “Anglo-American 
economies where wage stagnation and a general deterioration of the middle classes play a major 
role” (ibid:786). The point here, Gonzalez (2015) argues, is not to deny that credit now acts as an 
unnamed social policy but that, in many contexts, it does through more complex ways. For 
instance, the institutional fabric, localised attitudes, and social and economic habits of both 
individuals and households within a particular community are amongst the many place-based 
elements that Gonzalez (2015) identified as essential to the construction of financial 
subjectivities.  
 
Similar methodological concerns have been raised with regard to the ways in which remittance 
households have been conceptualised as simply remittance-receiving sites in part of the 
remittance literature (Erdal, 2012). This is especially true within the New Economics of Labour 
Migration (NELM) framework, where, again, the household survey approach tends to be the norm 
(Mazzucato et al, 2006). As Erdal (2012) argues, by using individual members of remittance 
households – rather the household – as a unit of analysis, remittance practices can be located 
within broader relations of kin, kith, gender and so on (see Chapter 5). Moreover, by paying 
particular attention to socio-economic and financial practices and experiences of members of 
remittance households, this approach enables the exploration of the ways in which remittance 
market-making processes are intertwined, and even clash, with “other geographically and socio-
technical situated ways of performing the economy” (Ouma, 2016b:2). This, in turn, renders 
visible moments and practices not only of domestication but also refusal and resistance (see 
Chapter 6).  
 
Overall, my critical ethnography of remittance marketisation examines the grounded, fragile and 
frictional attempts to incorporate remittance flows and households into global finance, and how 
members of remittance households in home countries experience and respond to these. This 
approach aims not to render ‘local’ remittance households located in the ‘periphery’ as passive 
objects “subjugated by global forces” (Ouma, 2015b:79). The influence of political economic 
structures is not denied, but rather combined with grounded empirical investigation in order to 
render visible “the messiness of economic practice” within broader political economic 
transformations (Ouma, 2015b:80).  
 
3.3. Methodological framework 
My methodological framework for researching the uneven financial incorporation of remittance 
flows and households in Senegal and Ghana consisted of multiple: (1) methods including semi-
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structured interviews, ethnographic interviews, in-field observations and document analysis; (2) 
case studies of remittance markets in Senegal and Ghana; and (3) sources of institutional and 
private sector actors and remittance households in Dakar and Thiès (Senegal) and Accra and 
Tamale (Ghana). This approach allowed me to overcome some of the aforementioned 
methodological limitations of previous studies. 
 
3.3.1. Multiple methods 
In order to research processes of incorporating remittance flows and households into global 
financial circuits, I have used a multiple-methods approach (see Table 3.1). One of the strengths 
of this approach is its capacity to provide and improve credibility through methodological and 
data triangulation (Baxter and Eyles, 1997; Yin, 2003). Each of the four research methods outlined 
above have generated different types of data from different sources of knowledge, enabling me to 
address my key research questions. Interviews with institutional and private sector actors, in 
combination with ethnographic interviews, in-field observations as well as document analysis of 
key programs and activities targeting remittance recipients for financial inclusion, allowed for an 
exploration of key elements that shape remittance market making (RQ1). Building on these 
findings, in-depth semi-structured interviews with remittance households allowed me to 
investigate the extent to which remittances can be incorporated into global finance (RQ2). Finally, 
in-depth semi-structured interviews with remittance households and institutional actors, 
combined with ethnographic interviews and in-field observations, enabled an analysis of the 
ways in which members of remittance households have responded to processes of market subject 
formation (RQ3).  
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Table 3. 1 - Summarising the research methods and evidence base used to address my research questions 
RESEARCH QUESTION (RQ) METHODS USED EVIDENCE GENERATED 
RQ1 – How do remittance markets 
come into being concretely in 
Senegal and Ghana?  
Document analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pilot Interviews with 
institutional actors 
 
Semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews with institutional 
actors 
 
Ethnographic interviews 
 
In-field observations 
Database of annotated key documents (including institutional literature, official and 
commercial documents, websites) of the main actors involved in the financial inclusion-
remittances agenda (e.g. state agencies, international development institutions, 
commercial and financial institutions, and local associations) 
 
Institutional and private sector actors in Dakar and Thiès, Senegal (25 interviews in total) 
 
 
 
Institutional and private sector actors in Senegal and Ghana (56 interviews in total) 
 
 
 
Private sector actors in Senegal and Ghana (15 actors in total) 
 
6-month fieldwork in Senegal and 4-month fieldwork in Ghana  
 
RQ2 – To what extent can 
remittance flows be incorporated 
into global financial circuits? 
 
Semi-structured, in depth 
interviews with remittance 
households 
 
Remittance households (92 interviews in total with 32 participants in Senegal and 28 in 
Ghana) 
 
 
RQ3 - How do members of 
remittance households respond to 
processes of financial subject 
formation? 
Semi-structured, in depth 
interviews with remittance 
households 
 
Ethnographic interviews 
 
In-field observations 
Remittance households (92 interviews in total with 32 participants in Senegal and 28 in 
Ghana) 
 
 
 
Private sector actors in Senegal and Ghana (15 actors in total) 
 
6-month fieldwork in Senegal and 4-month fieldwork in Ghana 
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3.3.2. Multiple case studies: Remittance market-making in Senegal and Ghana  
This research used a multiple case study design in order to research the uneven geographies of 
financial incorporation of remittance flows and households across different socio-economic 
contexts in the Global South. Studies that critically analyse the links between remittance, finance 
and development have mostly focused on the (cultural) political economy dimensions of the 
phenomenon (Cross, 2014, 2015; Hudson, 2008), the global remittance architecture (Bakker, 
2015b; Gibson, 2012; Pellerin and Mullings, 2013; Sharma, 2011) and the experiences of migrants 
residing in the economies of the Global North (Bakker, 2015a; Datta, 2012; Mullings, 2012).22 
Relatedly, while research on everyday financialisation through critical analysis of the rise of 
microfinance and its transformation into financial inclusion and, more recently, digital financial 
inclusion, has increased over the last few years (Gabor and Brooks, 2017; Kar, 2018; Mader, 2015; 
Rankin, 2013), the mechanisms and processes through which markets are constructed and 
market-based relations are enacted in practice remain largely unexplored in countries of the 
Global South, especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. As Ouma (2016b:2) argues, the 
financialisation of households in ‘Africa’, whether through Mobile Money (MM) and/or 
microfinance, is a phenomenon that is “yet to be subjected to such a generative analysis”. More 
broadly, it has recently been argued that the ways in which the marketisation of development is 
unfolding concretely in countries of the Global South deserve more empirical scrutiny (Berndt, 
2015). As a result, and in order to provide original empirical and theoretical contributions, I took 
institutional and private sector actors, remittance households and other remittance market-
makers residing in the Global South as the main focus of this research. 
 
The reasons this research focused on Senegal and Ghana were manifold (see Figure 3.1). First, the 
need for greater empirical and theoretical knowledge on the financial incorporation of 
remittances flows and households in Sub-Saharan Africa, and West Africa in particular, has 
particular academic and policy relevance, given (1) the growing number of initiatives targeting 
remittance flows and households in the region,23 and (2) the very limited number of critical 
studies of these attempts at ‘harnessing’ remittances for development in the region (with the 
exception of Cross, 2013, 2015). In fact, Eastern and Southern Africa are usually considered to be 
more advanced sites of financial inclusion, especially digital financial inclusion, and hence have 
attracted most of the research so far. For instance, with the rapid uptake of M-Pesa, Kenya is a 
                                                     
22 Notwithstanding the work of Kunz (2011) and, to some extent, Zapata (2013). 
23 See for instance the work of the World Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Developing Markets 
Associates, Better Than Cash Alliance, International Organisation for Migration, UN Capital Development Fund and 
World Savings and Retail Banking Institute, in partnership with governments. 
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frequent case study for researchers working on the uses and outcomes of mobile financial 
services (see for instance Jack and Suri, 2011; 2014). 
 
Figure 3. 1 - Senegal and Ghana in West Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Map adapted from Googlemaps) 
 
Second, remittances arguably play a key role in the economies of both Senegal and Ghana, 
contributing to the sustenance of millions of households. Senegal, with an estimated 800 000 
emigrants (5% of the population) remitting over USD 2.2 billion in 2018, ranks 4th among 
remittance-receiving countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 3rd among West African countries, and 7th 
in remittances as a percentage of GDP (9,1%) (KNOMAD, 2019). As for Ghana, remittance inflows 
amounted to USD 3.8 billion in 2018, representing 7,4% of GDP. Ghana ranks 2nd among 
remittance-receiving countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and 9th in terms of percentage of GDP (see 
Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3. 2 - Remittance Inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: KNOMAD, 2019)24 
 
In both countries, remittances are deemed to play a key role in financing development and 
enhancing financial inclusion. In effect, a wide range of national, regional and international, public 
and private actors have been involved in the design, piloting, and implementation of various 
policies and initiatives that aim to financially incorporate remittance flows and households into 
global financial circuits. For instance, a report commissioned by the IOM in 2017 and examining 
the remittance-related services and practices of financial institutions in Ghana indicated that: 
  
(…) it has been acknowledged that the transfer of remittances through formal financial channels 
can enhance the development impacts of financial transfers by encouraging more saving and 
enabling better matching of saving with investment opportunities (…) (Teye et al, 2017a). 
 
During my initial document analysis, the two countries appeared the most frequently. Table 3.2 
includes a sample of the main remittance-for-development events and conferences, on-going or 
soon-to-be-launched programmes, pilot projects and policy recommendations I successfully 
identified during this initial period of online searches. 
 
                                                     
24 It is important to bear in mind that the World Bank’s Migration and Development Brief uses officially recorded 
remittances data. If they were to include remittances through informal channels, its true size and social impact is much 
larger (Ratha, 2018) 
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Table 3. 2 - Identification of remittance-for-development events, projects and policy recommendations in Senegal and Ghana from online searches 
SENEGAL GHANA 
Organisation(s) 
involved 
Description Organisation(s) 
involved 
Description 
International Fund for 
Agricultural 
Development (IFAD); 
World Bank (WB); 
Universal Postal Union 
(UPU); UN Capital 
Development Fund 
(UNCDF) 
African Postal Financial Services Initiative: Financing 
Remittance Facility (FFR)’s project on remittances and 
postal networks that aim to expand services using 
existing infrastructure, i.e. post offices. Ghana and 
Senegal as pilot countries. 
IFAD, WB, UPU and 
UNCDF 
African Postal Financial Services Initiative: Financing 
Remittance Facility (FFR)’s project on remittances and 
postal networks that aim to expand services using existing 
infrastructure, i.e. post offices. Ghana and Senegal as pilot 
countries. 
ADA-microfinance Migrant remittance boosting project, which aims to 
offer transfers at a moderate price, as well as associated 
savings and credit products in which the transferred 
money can be invested. 
IOM Assessment of remittances-related services and practices 
of financial institutions in Ghana. 
International 
Organisation for 
Migration 
Project “Jappando” that aims to maximise the 
developmental capacity of migrants’ business projects. 
IOM and Developing 
Markets Associates 
Capacity building and policy development workshop to 
identify and develop appropriate initiatives that can 
leverage the flow of international remittances for broader 
economic development. 
IFAD; International 
Network of Alternative 
Financial Services; 
Auxfin 
Project of a user-owned remittance service that 
provides an alternative to the current cash-to-cash 
dominated remittance services; increases financial 
literacy among remittance senders and recipients; and 
links remittances to microfinance services. 
African Export-Import 
Bank (Ghana) and 
Western Union 
First future-flow securitization by an African country. 
International Labour 
Organisation 
Remittance transfers in Senegal: Preliminary findings, 
lessons, and recommendations on its marketplace and 
financial access opportunities. 
Government of Ghana 
and Switzerland 
Remittance Grant Facility (RGF) to support companies to 
develop affordable and accessible products and services 
that extend the scope of remittances to the 
rural areas 
Centro Studi di Political 
Internationale (CeSPI) 
and Acra 
Roundtable at the World Social Forum: Remittances, 
Diaspora and Microfinance-experiences, prospects and 
opportunities. 
European Union, 
African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Secretariat and 
IOM  
DEVCO project to leverage remittances to promote 
migrant entrepreneurship programme. 
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Finally, rather than providing a strict comparative analysis of two case studies, Senegal and Ghana 
were chosen to explore the ways in which the geographies of remittance marketisation unfold in 
countries with relatively different degrees of financial penetration and trajectories. In fact, while 
similar market-makers could be found in the two countries (ranging from IFIs and international 
development organisations to governments and NGOs), leading private sector actors in Senegal 
and Ghana differed and so did some of the main market-making strategies, products and services 
that had been put in place in recent years to incorporate remittance flows, senders and recipients 
into financial circuits. For instance, levels of financial inclusion amongst remittance recipients in 
the two countries differed greatly, with 12% of the population holding a financial institution 
account in Senegal compared to 35% in Ghana in 2014. Moreover, the ways in which people 
received remittances varied significantly. For instance, domestic remittances received via a 
financial institution and a mobile phone represented only 4% and 10% respectively of all received 
domestic remittances in Senegal compared to 16% and 35% in Ghana (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 
2018). Importantly, since 2015, Ghana’s MM market had been one of the fastest growing MM 
markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, “giving the oft-heralded East African markets a run for their 
money” (Mattern, 2018:1). While only 13% of Ghanaian adults owned a mobile account in 2014, 
39% were MM account owners three years later (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2018). In contrast, at the 
time of fieldwork, MM in Senegal had not taken off yet. As such, while the marketisation of 
remittances in Senegal was mostly carried out via an MFI-led branchless banking strategy 
through retail agents, the MNO-led branchless banking model – or MM – was more prevalent in 
Ghana (see Chapter 4). Focusing on Senegal and Ghana, therefore, allowed me to explore the 
differentiated efforts and investments as well as controversies involved in the attempts to create 
and expand remittance markets in two different regulatory, socio-economic, technological and 
cultural contexts. 
 
3.3.3. Multiple sources: Institutional and private sector actors and remittance 
households in Senegal and Ghana  
My analysis of remittance marketisation and remittance recipients’ economic and financial 
practices started in both countries with a period of fieldwork of about three months in Dakar and 
two and a half months in Accra, the two capital cities. The main reason for this was that head 
offices of most financial, commercial and development organisations I wanted to interview were 
located in these two cities. During these periods, I used multiple methods of semi-structured 
interviews, in-field observations and document analysis, to investigate the various human and 
non-human elements that contributed to the construction of remittance markets (RQ1). 
Following the completion of these first parts of my fieldwork in both capitals, I moved my 
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research to two additional analytical and geographical entry points for a period of three months 
in Thiès, Senegal, and one and a half months in Tamale, Ghana (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4). Research 
in these two towns enabled me to generate data on remittance households’ socio-economic and 
financial practices and their lived experiences of, and responses to, processes of market 
integration, thereby addressing RQ2 and RQ3. It also allowed me to generate more data and 
provide confirmative but also contradictory insights from institutional and private sector actors 
(to be discussed in Chapter 4). To this end, I used semi-structured interviews (with multiple 
revisits) as well as ethnographic interviews and in-field observations. 
 
Figure 3. 3 - Locating Dakar and Thiès in Senegal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Map adapted from d-maps.com) 
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Figure 3. 4 - Locating Accra and Tamale in Ghana                                                                                    
(Source: Map adapted from d-maps.com) 
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Thiès and Tamale were chosen as key analytical entry points for multiple reasons. First, both 
towns have constituted key internal, regional and international emigration hubs in both 
countries. International migrants originating from Thiès represented 9% of the international 
Senegalese migrant population in 2013 while 14.7% of internal migrants in Senegal originated 
from the Thiès region (Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2014). In Ghana, 
the northern region, of which Tamale is the capital, has had one of the highest outward migration 
rates in the country since 1960s (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). Second, one of my aims was to 
account for the significance of internal migration and remittances in both countries (Awumbila, 
2015). For instance, Castaldo and colleagues (2012) show that internal migrants outnumber 
international migrants in Ghana and that internal migration may be more important for poverty 
reduction compared to international migration as it involves poorer populations. More 
specifically, this allowed me to contrast the different strategies put in place by different actors to 
integrate both internal and international remittances into financial circuits. Third, both towns 
had numerous active MFI and bank branches as well as MM point of services. This was not 
necessarily the case in other well-known areas of emigration. This was confirmed during 
interviews with employees of financial institutions in Dakar and Accra. Finally, all the above 
points were discussed with numerous migration scholars in both countries to ensure the 
relevance of my analytical and geographical entry points to address my research questions. In the 
next section, I describe how I operationalised my research methods to generate my evidence base 
on the marketisation of remittance flows and households.  
 
3.4. Research process 
The research methods and evidence base that I generated to address my key research questions 
are summarised in Table 3.1 (see Section 3.3.1). The ways in which my research methodology 
was operationalised can be divided into six main parts: (1) pilot interviews with institutional and 
private sector actors and migration scholars in Dakar and Thiès; (2) document analysis of key 
programs and activities targeting remittance recipients for financial inclusion; (3) semi-
structured interviews with institutional and private sector actors; (4) semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with Senegalese and Ghanaian remittance households; (5) ethnographic interviews  
with private sector actors; and (6) in-field observations in Dakar, Thiès, Accra and Tamale. The 
empirical research was carried out over 10 months (June 2016; October 2016-February 2017; 
September 2017-December 2017), divided between Senegal (1+5 months) and Ghana (4 
months). The following section examines the ways in which I deployed each of these research 
methods. 
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3.4.1. Pilot Study  
In June 2016, I carried out a one-month pilot study in Senegal in order to establish initial contacts 
with institutional and private sector actors and test my methodological design, especially my 
interview schedule with financial and commercial institutions. This pilot also allowed me to 
explore and determine field sites for the second part of my fieldwork (RQ2 and RQ3).  
 
Originally, my research plan was to focus on the IFAD-run ‘African Postal Financial Services 
Initiative’, which is a regional program that aims to expand the role of postal networks in rural 
Africa in 11 countries.25 The objectives of the initiative included deepening the range of financial 
services provided in rural areas, including saving, loans and insurance products. My aim was to 
draw a comparative analysis of the ways in which Senegalese and Ghanaian remittance recipients 
were responding to this program. The pilot interviews I undertook with representatives of key 
institutions involved in the IFAD-run program were supposed to confirm that these projects were 
up and running and that the number of remittance recipients that were beneficiaries of these 
initiatives was significant enough, visible and accessible for my research. After ten days of 
interviews and discussions, I realised this was not the case and that I needed to recalibrate the 
focus of my research. Instead of focusing on one specific program, I decided to take a broader 
approach to understand how commercial and financial institutions considered remittance 
services within their broader portfolio of financial services and how/whether remittance 
recipients were increasingly being targeted as potential customers. During the remaining three 
weeks of my stay, I conducted interviews with employees of two of the main MFIs in the country 
as well as several banks. I also made initial contacts and conducted interviews with a state official 
of the Direction de la Réglementation et de la Supervision des Systèmes Financiers Décentralisés 
(DRS-SFD) – the microfinance governmental unit – as well a representative of the Senegalese 
Ministry of the Economy, and two international organisations including the IOM and a customer 
protection association (Table 3.3). This allowed me to identify a number of private-led, 
remittance-based initiatives, products and services that confirmed the increasing importance of 
the remittance-linked financial inclusion agenda in Senegal. 
 
In parallel, I met with migration scholars from the University of Cheikh Anta Diop to discuss 
potential field sites (where RQ2 and RQ3 could be addressed) and to ask them about research 
assistants I could work with. While I already had several locations in mind based on the analysis 
of secondary qualitative and quantitative sources, these discussions proved to be helpful in 
identifying additional factors to be taken into account, such as the availability and density of 
                                                     
25 This programme is part of IFAD’s Financing Facility for Remittances and its 50+ pilot projects that aim to maximise 
the impact of remittances on development (IFAD, 2016). 
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financial institutions, the existence of over-researched areas as well as practicalities such as 
travelling times between field sites and Dakar, as I was planning to make several trips back to 
Dakar to continue interviewing institutional actors. The town of Thiès was ultimately identified 
as an ideal location and I spent ten days there at the end of my trip to familiarise myself with the 
town and make initial contacts with institutional actors as well as the family I would be living 
with. I was put in touch with this family by my Wolof teacher in Dakar, who happened to be from 
Thiès. I subsequently met with Aminata, who said her family would be happy for me to stay at 
their house in the outskirts of Thiès during my longer visit. During these ten days, I also conducted 
semi-structured and ethnographic interviews with institutional actors, including several 
employees of MFI and bank branches (Table 3.3). This was partly done in order to establish initial 
contacts, as one of my strategies to access remittance recipients was to use these institutions as 
gatekeepers. I did not manage to carry out interviews with remittance recipients at that stage as 
I was still looking for a research assistant to work with. It is only when I got back to London that 
I was put in touch with Fatou Diop, a Dakar-based researcher from Thiès. I arranged a few phone 
calls with Fatou while in London in order to give her as much time as possible to familiarise 
herself with the study and the interview schedule.  
 
 
Table 3. 3 - Research undertaken in pilot study (June 2016, Dakar and Thiès, Senegal) 
TYPE OF ACTORS 
NUMBER OF 
INTERVIEWS 
LOCATION 
Academics 7 Dakar 
Actors involved in the IFAD-run 
program 
4 Skype and Dakar 
MFIs and banks 6 Dakar and Thiès 
State actors 3 Dakar  
Development organisations 4 Dakar 
Customer protection association 1 Dakar 
TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS = 25 
TOTAL NUMBER OF HOURS = 22 
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3.4.2. Semi-structured interviews with institutional actors in Dakar, Thiès, Accra 
and via skype 
I came back to Senegal in October 2016 and stayed in Dakar for seven weeks before heading to 
Thiès. I constructed a database of annotated documents produced by 42 institutions, with the 
purpose of gaining insight into remittance market-making efforts and processes in Senegal from 
a varied range of institutional perspectives (RQ1). I managed to subsequently interview 19 out of 
these 42 institutions (see Table 3.4). These institutions were identified from my research in 
London and Dakar, using online and in-field sources. In effect, I reviewed the content of key 
documents produced by the main actors involved in the remittance-linked financial inclusion 
agenda in Senegal, including institutional literature, websites, annual reports, and official and 
commercial documents. Information about the policies, programs and activities of these 
institutions was organised into categories related to RQ1 and served, in turn, as prompts during 
interviews. In addition to this, I used interviews and in-field observations conducted during the 
pilot study to identify several other institutions. In fact, as Figure 3.5 illustrates, financial 
institutions generally advertised their remittance services on billboards (e.g. Money Express, RIA, 
Wari, Western Union). Overall, my database included documents by financial institutions (MFIs 
and banks) providing remittance services as well as Money Transfer Operators and Mobile 
Network Operators providing remittance and other financial and commercial services. It also 
included reports by civil society organisations as well as international organisations and state 
agencies involved in the remittances-financial inclusion agenda.  
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Figure 3. 5 - Billboard at the entrance of the main agency of the MFI ACEP in central Thiès 
 
(Source: fieldwork photograph in Thiès) 
 
In Thiès, I conducted interviews with local and regional branch directors of six of the same 
institutions (mostly MFIs) I had interviewed in Dakar to understand how national strategies of 
enrolment were implemented and how remittance-linked products were promoted and 
commercialised at a branch level. The number and type of participants I interviewed was shaped 
in part by the extent to which these actors were willing to be interviewed. While MFIs, Money 
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Transfer Operators (MTOs) and state actors were in general quite open to the idea of being part 
of the research project – although several participants required perseverance and numerous 
follow-up emails and calls – banks, on the other hand, and especially French-owned institutions, 
proved to be very difficult to access even when recommendation letters from the university were 
provided. This did not turn to be a problem as I quickly realised that most of the new remittance-
linked initiatives and products originated from MFIs, MTOs and Mobile Money Operators 
(MMOs).  
 
In Accra, Ghana, where I spent two and a half months overall, I constructed a database of 
documents produced by 39 institutions, and managed to interview 22 (see Table 3.4). These 
actors were identified using both online sources and in-field-sources. I spent my first few days 
walking around the city to get a sense of which banks and MFIs were providing remittance 
services. As in Senegal, this could in fact be identified by using in-field observations of billboards 
(Figure 3.6).   
 
Figure 3. 6 - Billboards on Oxford Street in Accra, Ghana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: fieldwork photographs in Accra) 
 
 
Banks were much more easily accessible than in Senegal. They were also much more active in 
their attempts to leverage remittances and enrol remittance recipients. MMOs play a more 
significant role in the remittance marketplace in Ghana than in Senegal (although the remittance 
sector in Senegal is quickly evolving), which explains why some of the organisations I interviewed 
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are Fintechs and so-called MM aggregators.26 I did not conduct interviews with institutional and 
private sector actors in Tamale for several reasons. First, the day before heading to Tamale for 
what was supposed to be a period of two months, I got ill and found out 48 hours later that I had 
caught malaria. As a result, I had to stay in hospital for eight days and subsequently spent another 
week in Accra to fully recover. This significantly delayed my research and left me with only six 
weeks in Tamale to conduct interviews with remittance recipients. Second, in contrast to Thiès 
where I used several financial institutions as my gatekeepers, I managed to work with two local 
researchers in Tamale (see below) who were able to access research participants based on the 
criteria they were given. Finally, reflecting on my period of fieldwork in Senegal and considering 
how the domestic remittance market operates in a slightly different manner in Ghana – notably 
due to the prominence of MM – I decided that my time would be better used conducting several 
interviews with MM street agents, rather than conducting interviews at branch level with some 
of the same financial and commercial institutions I had interviewed in Accra. On this basis, Table 
3.4 summarises institutional and private sector actors I interviewed across Dakar, Thiès, Accra, 
and Tamale. 
 
                                                     
26 Aggregators serve as intermediaries which allow payment instrument providers (like Mobile Network Operators 
offering mobile money services or banks offering mobile banking) to easily integrate with entities (like utility 
companies, businesses or donors) that want to send money to or receive money from their customers or recipients 
(McKay and Pillai, 2016). 
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 Table 3. 4 - Institutional and private sector actors across Dakar and Thiès (Senegal) and Accra and Tamale (Ghana) 
INSTITUTIONS ROLE TYPE OF INSTITUTION 
Dakar-based institutions (N=19) 
ACEP  Director of Strategic Development Microfinance Institution (MFI) 
Baobab Senegal (2) Regional Director 
Operations Manager 
MFI 
UM-PAMECAS Sales and Communication Manager MFI 
U-IMCEC Manager of the Money Transfer Department MFI 
MECAP Director MFI 
COFINA Chief Financial Officer MFI 
Banque Atlantique (2) Director of the Money Transfer Department; Senior Accounting Officer Bank 
CBAO (2) Senior Employee in the Money Transfer Department; Management 
Control 
Bank 
Ecobank n/a Bank 
Central Bank of West African States 
(2) 
Director of the Microfinance Department Central Bank 
La Poste Senegal (2) Operations Manager; Director of the Money Transfer Department State-owned company 
PosteFinances Operations Manager Financial institution 
Joni-Joni Sales Manager Money Transfer Operator (MTO) 
Wari Senior Product Management Officer MTO 
Wizall Co-founder MTO 
Orange Money (2) Orange Money Director for Orange Africa & Middle East; Sales 
manager 
Mobile Money Operator 
Association Pour le Développement 
de Keurykao (ADK) 
President Association 
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Fonds d’Appui à l’Investissement 
des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur 
(FAISE) 
Senior Accountant State agency 
Direction de la Réglementation et 
de la Supervision des Systèmes 
Financiers Décentralisés 
(Microfinance Unit) 
 
Head of Strategy State agency 
Thiès-based institutions (N=6) 
ACEP Branch Director MFI 
CMS Regional Director MFI 
Baobab Senegal  Branch Director MFI 
PAMECAS Regional Director MFI 
La Poste (2) Regional Director State-owned company 
PosteFinances Branch Director Financial institution 
Accra-based institutions (N=22)  
Access Bank Head of inclusive banking Bank 
AfB Managing Director Non-banking financial institution 
Beige Capital Head of E-banking Bank 
Fidelity Bank Director of Mobile Money department Bank 
GCB Bank Manager of Alternative Channels Bank 
HFC Bank n/a Bank 
Omnibank Manager of Alternative Channels Bank 
ARP Apex Bank Limited Manager for Project and Credit Umbrella organisation for the Rural & 
Community Banks 
Advans Ghana Deputy Chief Executive Officer MFI 
Midlands n/a MFI 
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Pan-African Savings and Loans Head of E-business and Remittances MFI 
Unicredit General Manager MFI 
Airtel Money Head MFI 
MTN  General Manager of Mobile Money Limited MMO 
Vodafone Cash Product Specialist MMO 
Zeepay Co-founder and Managing Director Aggregator 
Jumo Country Director Fintech 
Bank of Ghana (2) Head of oversight and risk assessment in the payments system 
department; Economist 
Central Bank 
Ministry of Finance Senior Economic Officer State agency 
IOM Project Assistant International Organisation 
CGAP (2) Digital Financial Services Consultant International Organisation 
State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs (SECO) 
 
Deputy Head of Cooperation Swiss Embassy in Ghana 
Total number of institutions = 41 
Total number of interviews = 56 
Total number of hours = 53 
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In interviews with institutional and private sector actors, I asked about the rationale for providing 
and promoting remittance services, including general questions about the significance of 
remittance services in terms of revenues, commissions, required investments and partnerships 
to set up such services, and main obstacles encountered. Further questions explored the general 
remittance marketplace and regulatory context, especially around Know-Your-Customer 
regulations and MM. A further set of questions examined the links between remittances and 
financial inclusion. I asked how remittance customers were perceived, whether strategies were 
put in place to enrol them, and, if so, what type of financial innovations, products and literacy 
programmes linked to remittances were designed and commercialised. I generally concluded by 
requesting participants’ opinions on the barriers and outcomes of expanding financial services to 
remittance customers and where the market would be in five/ten years (see the interview 
schedule in Appendix 1). 
 
Interviews with institutional and private sector actors in Dakar and Thiès were all conducted in 
French and mainly took place in these commentators’ office spaces. In Ghana, all interviews with 
institutional actors were conducted in English. These interviews, although semi-structured, 
turned more often than not into conversations, which allowed for the main themes to be explored 
as well as for new questions and topics to arise. Generally, this interview process enabled me to 
gain insights into what and how organisations were trying to design and implement initiatives 
and products linked directly or indirectly to remittances, which organisations were the most 
active, and why. I adapted my interview schedule for non-financial institutional actors such as 
state agencies and civil society organisations. Discussions usually lasted between 45 and 90 
minutes and were recorded (except for a few exceptions) and transcribed word-for-word, which 
subsequently allowed in-depth analysis.  
 
3.4.3. Semi-structured interviews with remittance recipients in Thiès, Accra and 
Tamale 
As Appendix 2 shows, I interviewed 31 and 28 members of remittance households in Senegal and 
Ghana respectively. In Senegal, all interviews were conducted in Thiès whereas, in Ghana, 
interviews took place in both Accra and Tamale. In Senegal, 12 participants were interviewed 
once only while 19 participants were interviewed twice, through revisits usually taking place two 
or three weeks after the initial interview. One participant was interviewed three times. In Ghana, 
I conducted revisits with 13 remittance recipients while 15 were interviewed once only. In total, 
92 in-depth interviews were carried out across Thiès in Senegal and Accra and Tamale in Ghana. 
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In order to maintain the anonymity of my participants, I have used pseudonyms in place of 
remittance recipients’ first names. 
 
3.4.3.1. Identifying and accessing remittance recipients 
 Thiès, Senegal 
The main fieldwork in the Thiès region was carried out between November 2016 and February 
2017. As mentioned earlier, the selection of this research site was informed by discussions with 
migration scholars as well as existing studies and census reports that identified Thiès as an 
important – although under-researched – hub of internal and international emigration.  
 
I stayed with one family throughout my stay in Thiès. The household was comprised of Aminata 
and Omar and their three children, Omar’s mother and one of his aunts as well as two domestic 
workers, Astou and Galo. The house was situated in Mbour 3, a relatively new residential area in 
the southern part of the town. I spent the first three weeks familiarising myself with the town and 
interviewing representatives of the four main MFIs in Thiès. After the initial interviews at the 
main agencies, I was directed to smaller branches where I was able to conduct shorter interviews 
with front desk officers directly in touch with customers collecting their remittances over-the-
counter.  
 
To be able to interview remittance households, I worked with Fatou Diop, a Dakar-based 
researcher with great depth of experience of carrying out fieldwork research with academics as 
well as NGOs across the country. Fatou was introduced to me by a France-based Senegalese 
migration scholar I had been in touch with prior to fieldwork. Fatou and I spent a few days in a 
couple of branches in order to initiate contact with potential research participants. This proved 
to be effective although very time-consuming; it took us two days to identify the first five research 
participants. As a result, we decided to slightly change our strategy by asking several front officers 
from three of the four main MFIs to provide a list of remittance customers that regularly came to 
collect either domestic, regional or international remittances. We made it clear that we were 
seeking a mix of remittance recipients with and without accounts, with and without a loan to pay 
back. As for the fourth MFI – Baobab Senegal – I met with a manager of Banking Correspondents 
(BCs27) who agreed to take me with him regularly on his visits to BCs. This allowed me to be 
introduced to six BCs, who in turn facilitated my access to 7 research participants that used BCs 
                                                     
27 As I will explain in more details in Chapter 4, Banking Correspondents (BCs) are agents that are part of Baobab’s 
banking network. Usually shopkeepers, BCs are provided with the necessary equipment and technology to allow 
Baobab’s customers to conduct various types of transactions at their shops, including originally cash-in (savings 
deposit), cash-out (savings withdrawal) transactions, loan repayments as well as money transfers from one account to 
another. 
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as a remittance-receiving location point. Overall, these combined strategies enabled us to have 
access to fifteen research participants located across the town as well as the surrounding villages, 
including Tienaba, Khombole and Toubatoul (see Figure 3.7). 
 
Figure 3. 7 - Map of the Thiès region, including Tienaba, Khombole and Toubatoul 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Map adapted from Googlemaps) 
I was, however, fully aware of the potential bias that the use of financial institutions’ front officers 
as gatekeepers could cause. As such, I also contacted several civil society organisations whose 
work focused on issues of indebtedness and promoted the financial autonomy of their members 
(urban and rural women in the Thiès region). Two organisations in particular supported me in 
identifying research participants: Groupe d’Initiatives pour le Progrès Social / West African Region 
(GIPS/WAR) and Association pour le Développement de Keurykao (ADK). I was introduced to these 
two organisations by one of the migration scholars I had interviewed in Dakar. I met with the 
President of each association as well as other committee members on multiple occasions to 
explain the aims of my research and who I was seeking to interview. Through both associations, 
I got access to a dozen research participants, mostly located in Keurykao, in the northern part of 
the town (see Figure 3.8).   
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Figure 3. 8 - Locating Keurykao in Thiès 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Map adapted from Googlemaps) 
Finally, Fatou, who grew up in Thiès, also identified several potential participants. It is important 
to note that front desk officers or committee members were not present during any of the 
interviews we carried out. Although we tried to make it clear to research participants that we 
were not linked to any financial institutions or associations, our motivations were still perceived 
as ambiguous by some, which caused several misunderstandings as well as several last-minute 
interview cancellations. 
 
 Accra and Tamale, Ghana 
I stayed in Accra for two and a half months and in Tamale for one and a half months. I decided to 
conduct interviews with remittance recipients in both cities due to time-related constraints. 
While I was in Senegal for 6 months – including the one-month pilot trip – I spent 4 months in 
Ghana. In Accra, I worked with Sonya Adu-Gyamfi, a senior research assistant at the Centre for 
Migration Studies at the University of Accra. Interviews were conducted with residents of two 
neighbourhoods, namely Nima and Kokomlemle, for several reasons. First, whereas Nima is 
described as a non-indigenous, low-income, urban slum settlement (Awumbila et al, 2014; Owusu 
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et al, 2008), Kokomlemle represents one of the middle-income areas in the centre of Accra, 
established to accommodate the Ghanaian middle-class (Tetteh, 2016). By interviewing 
remittance recipients in both neighbourhoods, insights into how processes of remittance 
integration into the formal financial system are experienced in different ways depending on 
income levels were provided. Second, while Nima is mostly known as one the historical migrant 
neighbourhoods in Accra, recent studies showed that a significant number of households have 
members abroad remitting (Owusu et al, 2008). This was illustrated by the recent opening of 
bank branches, Western Union point-of-services and Forex Bureau Operators in the area. New 
Town Road, which runs through both neighbourhoods, was the site of a significant number of 
banks and MFIs, with numerous billboards showing the wide array of companies through which 
remittances could be sent and received (Figure 3.9). Finally, and from a more practical 
perspective, narrowing down the field site in Accra allowed me to significantly decrease the 
amount of time I would otherwise have had to spend travelling across the city and sitting in traffic.  
 
The strategy used to access remittance recipients was similar to that in Senegal. Several banks’ 
and MFIs’ front officers acted as my gatekeepers while Sonia Adu-Gyamfi, the research assistant 
I worked with in Accra, also helped identifying several potential research participants. In 
addition, David, a youth leader from Nima introduced to me by a Professor from the University of 
Ghana, and Hamza, a tour guide whom I met on multiple occasions and who gave me a one-day 
tour of the neighbourhood, acted as gatekeepers and supported me in identifying more than half 
of the research participants.  
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Figure 3. 9 - Locating Nima and Kokomlemle in Accra, Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Map adapted from Googlemaps) 
 
In Tamale, I worked with two local researchers, Issahaku Musah Sugri and Braimah Abdul Latif, 
who had been recommended to me by Dr. Joseph Kofi Teye, the Director at the Centre for 
Migration Studies, University of Ghana and Dr. Francis Xavier Jarawura of the University of 
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Development Studies in Tamale. Prior to my arrival in Tamale, I arranged several phone calls with 
Francis as well as both Sugri and Latif to explain my research aims and to ask Sugri and Latif to 
start identifying potential research participants based on criteria I specified in oral and written 
forms (Section 3.4.3.2). Interviews were conducted in Tamale as well as in several surrounding 
rural and peri-urban settings, including Savelugu, Mbanayili and Kumbungu to mirror the 
research done in Thiès, Senegal (Figure 3.10). 
 
Figure 3. 10 - Tamale, Savelugu, Kumbungu and Mbanayili in Ghana 
 
 ` 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Map adapted from Googlemaps) 
 
3.4.3.2. A profile of remittance recipients 
The aim of my field research was not to select a representative sample of remittance recipients 
in both countries, but to explore the different ways in which financial inclusion processes were 
experienced by a heterogeneous set of remittance households. The data obtained and presented 
in this research aimed to illustrate the diversity of remittance households’ configurations and the 
range of their remittance-linked socio-economic activities and practices (Chapter 5) and the 
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different responses to attempts of financial incorporation (Chapter 6). As such, several 
considerations were taken into account when identifying and selecting research participants.  
 
First, particular efforts were made to include participants that received not only international 
and/or regional but also domestic remittances. This was notably informed by the fact that not 
enough attention had been paid to domestic migration and remittances despite their significance 
in the national economies of both countries (Awumbila, 2015; Chort et al, 2017). Even when this 
is the case, domestic and international remittances are often looked at separately. In Senegal, 25% 
of remitters were domestic migrants (13/51) whereas in Ghana, domestic migrants represented 
41% of remitters (21/51). The fact that financial institutions acted as several of my gatekeepers 
explains why the majority of participants in both countries received remittances from 
international migrants since at the time of writing international remittances could be collected 
mostly from financial institutions whereas domestic remittances could be collected from both 
financial and non-financial points of services, such as retail shops and multi-service boutiques. 
Second, I interviewed both female and male participants receiving remittances not only from 
male but also female remitters. This was informed by the result of recent studies and census on 
domestic migration, which highlighted the significance of female mobility in both countries 
(Ackah and Medvedev, 2012; Ghana Statistical Services, 2014). In Ghana, half of internal migrants 
are women whereas in Senegal, women are found to be more likely to migrate than men (Ackah 
and Medvedev, 2012; Chort et al, 2017). More specifically, several Ghanaian migration scholars 
have argued that gendered dimensions of remittances have changed over time; many young 
women and girls are now moving independently from their families from urban and rural 
communities in the north to urban centers in the south, taking over roles and responsibilities that 
were formerly considered to be exclusively male (Abdul-Korah, 2011; Awumbila, 2015). In 
contrast, Chort and colleagues (2017) have demonstrated that female mobility in Senegal appears 
to be mostly linked to family motives (especially marriage) while labor mobility is frequently 
observed for men. In Senegal, 23 out 32 participants were female remittance recipients (72%). 
These 32 participants received cash and in-kind remittances from 51 remitters, 84% of whom 
were male (43/51) and 16% female (8/51). In Ghana, 14 out of 28 participants were female 
remittance recipients (50%). These 28 participants received remittances from 51 different 
remitters, 71% of whom were male (35/51) and 29% female (16/51). Third, I tried in most cases 
to interview, if not the head of the household, the person partly or fully in charge of the household 
budget, including the management of remittances. This proved to be difficult at times because 
financial institutions’ front officers often dealt with remittance customers that collected 
remittances but handed the money over immediately to the household’s head. This in itself is 
quite telling regarding the limitations financial institutions faced when trying to enrol remittance 
 
 
89 
recipients or encourage remittance customers to keep remittances in bank accounts. Finally, I 
made sure that I included participants living not only in urban but also peri-urban and rural 
settings. The main reason for this was to document whether/how financial and remittance-
related practices differed spatially, especially when bank and MFI branches were not easily 
reachable. In both countries, 71% of the households interviewed lived in urban settings while the 
rest lived in rural and peri-urban areas with more limited access to financial institutions and 
remittance-related services.  
 
Interviews with members of remittance households explored remittance practices, including how 
remittances were received, sent, spent and/or distributed as well as processes of decision-
making that underpin these practices. I asked participants about the main sources of income of 
their households, their different paid and unpaid activities and requested their opinions on the 
significance of remittances for their households. A further set of questions explored their financial 
practices, the type of financial institutions they dealt with, their views on so-called ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ financial products and arrangements. I also asked about what kind of changes, if any, 
these brought in their everyday lives (see interview schedule in Appendix 3). 
 
In Senegal, interviews were conducted in Wolof while interviews in Ghana were conducted in Twi 
in Accra, and in Dagbani in Tamale. All interviews were recorded and then transcribed and 
translated in verbatim form. After carefully reading the transcriptions, I sat down with each 
researcher to clarify parts of the translated transcriptions that were unclear (issues of translation 
and transcription will be discussed in further detail in Section 3.5.1.). It was on that basis that I 
identified research participants we would re-visit and interview for a second time.  
 
3.4.3.3. Revisits 
Overall, I conducted 32 revisits; 19 in Senegal and 13 in Ghana. Asking questions about money, 
household budgeting and other financial practices can raise suspicions and is not generally a topic 
people easily engage in, especially with strangers. These revisits proved to be essential in 
understanding household dynamics and relationships, notably between recipients and remitters 
and in mapping out the diversity of financial practices, arrangements and circuits of research 
participants. On many occasions, it was during the second or third visit that key insights were 
gained. For instance, several recipients told us about bank accounts they were using (or not using) 
or the loans they had taken out only during our revisits. Another recipient informed us about the 
fact that her husband recently got married a second time only at the very end of our second revisit, 
on the way back to the bus station. This helped us to put in context her worries about an uncertain 
future. Overall, I got the sense that several participants were feeling slightly more at ease during 
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revisits. They sometimes allowed me to gain a deeper – although still very partial – 
comprehension of the role and significance of remittances in their everyday lives and how these 
were intertwined with broader financial arrangements and practices. 
 
3.4.4. Ethnographic interviews and in-field observations  
My evidence base also included multi-sited ethnographic interviews and in-field observations, 
conducted during fieldwork in Senegal and Ghana. Ethnographic interviews with remittance 
market actors such as MFI tellers, BCs and MM agents enabled me to collect more situated 
perspectives in contrast to semi-structured interviews with senior employees in office spaces. In 
Thiès, I visited five guichets – sub-branches – and conducted multiple short interviews with tellers 
from the country’s three historical MFIs: Crédit Mutuel du Sénégal (CMS), Alliance de Crédit et 
d’Épargne pour la Production (ACEP), Union des Mutuelles du Partenariat pour la Mobilisation de 
l’Épargne et du Crédit Au Sénégal (UM-PAMECAS). I also visited and interviewed five Banking 
Correspondents (BCs) from Baobab Senegal (Table 3.5). In Tamale, I regularly visited four MM 
agents that were located close to where I lived in Kokomlemle. All these points were visited by 
remittance customers to collect their money over-the counter (MFI) and to make cash-in and 
cash-out transactions (MM). I asked MFI tellers and MM agents about their day-to-day activities 
and whether/how they tried to enroll remittance customers and/or advertise remittance-linked 
financial products, such as mobile-based insurance and credit products (see Chapter 4).  
 
Table 3. 5 - Tellers and agents interviewed across Thiès and Tamale 
INSTITUTIONS ROLE TYPE OF INSTITUTION 
Thiès-based banking agents (Number of institutions = 4) 
ACEP (2 participants) Tellers Microfinance Institution 
(MFI) 
CMS (2) Tellers MFI 
PAMECAS (1) Tellers MFI 
Baobab Senegal (6) Banking Correspondents 
(BCs); Manager of BCs 
MFI 
Tamale-based Mobile Money agents (N=1) 
MTN (4) Mobile Money agents Mobile Money Operators 
Total number of institutions = 5 
Total number of actors = 15 
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I also followed one manager of BCs for a week, while they were visiting customers and BCs across 
the town and the surrounding villages. On a typical day, we were able to see between three and 
eight BCs, depending on how scattered the BCs were. The BCs’ manager would use public 
transport, which considerably limited the number of BCs they could visit when going to rural 
areas but also left plenty of time for discussion that revolved around their work, the work of BCs 
and the rationale, expectations and problems behind the deployment of such agent network. 
 
These ethnographic interviews were complemented by in-field observations, which consisted of 
my own personal notes and photographs. Three main themes arose out of these in-field 
observations: (1) geographical distribution of bank and microfinance branches as well as money 
transfer and MM points of services; (2) visibility of marketing and communications strategies 
(billboards, stickers, direct marketing actions, etc); and (3) interactions between tellers/agents 
and their customers (including attempts to enrol new customers) one the one hand, and 
interactions between BCs and their managers on the other. Ethnographic interviews and 
observations were recorded in a field diary and used for subsequent thematic analysis (see 
Section 3.4.5).  
 
3.4.5. Interpreting, analysing and presenting the data 
All interviews were fully transcribed in either French or English. While I transcribed all the 
interviews with institutional and private sector actors, the vast majority of interviews with 
remittance households were translated and transcribed by the research assistants I worked with. 
Long debrief sessions were organised (until my very last day in Ghana!) with research assistants 
to go through transcribed interviews and clarify unclear points. These sessions also allowed me 
to ask what they thought and how they interpreted what they had been told. This took a much 
longer time than anticipated but constituted a first key step of the data analysis process (see also 
Section 3.5.1).  
 
The transcripts were then organised into separate files, according to the location of the interviews 
and the type of participants, i.e. institutional actors and remittance households. I started to 
analyse my interviews and in-field observations with institutional and private sector actors from 
Senegal and Ghana and subsequently went about analysing interviews and observations with 
remittance households. This analysis process involved four main stages. First, as I read and re-
read the interviews to (re)familiarise myself, I started coding the transcripts by hand through a 
process of open coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). This entailed highlighting key words and 
sentences, writing comments on the margins and making detailed notes in a word document. I 
formulated initial ‘emic’ codes that emerged from the data itself. Second, I used the NVivo 
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software in order to combine and supplement the initial open codes with ‘etic’ codes, which 
related to broad themes underpinning my initial research and interview questions. Third, in order 
to refine the key themes and sub-themes identified through the first two stages and establish 
connections between them, I printed all the ‘nodes’, i.e. the combination of my comments and 
extended quotations relating to each specific theme that I had identified. This crucial process of 
axial coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) allowed me to further scrutinise emerging patterns, ideas 
and concepts. Constantly moving back-and-forth between my research questions and my 
evidence, I developed three main documents in which I included and connected these multiple 
themes and sub-themes. These three documents broadly corresponded to my three research 
questions. Fourth, through an iterative exercise of comparing, contrasting and integrating my 
empirical data, I reworked each document, which eventually formed the basis for my three 
empirical chapters and the overall structure of my thesis. 
 
During my write-up, I sought to retain the context-rich ‘thick’ data generated during the data 
collection and analysis processes, and I tried to preserve the integrity of participants’ views and 
experiences as much as I could. Different strategies were adopted to present narratives, ranging 
from ‘author-saturated’ to ‘author-evacuated’ texts (Geertz, 1988 in Lake and Zitcer, 2012). I used 
‘empathetic evocation’ to depict situated experiences and ‘selective deployment’ of participants’ 
views to illustrate my claims, alongside ‘dialogic collaboration’ to assert polyvocality and 
recognise the ways in which knowledge is co-produced through interviews (Lake and Zitcer, 
2012, see also McDowell, 1998). To make participants’ positionality visible, I indicated remittance 
recipients’ name and activity, where they lived, who the main remitter was in relation to the 
participant, and where the main remitter lived. Similarly, for institutional actors, I specified these 
participants’ institution, and job title.  
 
However, presenting others’ views and stories necessarily constitutes a partial and selective 
endeavor (McDowell, 1998). Just as the construction of markets should not be taken for granted, 
knowledge production is not, and should, not appear as a straightforward and linear process 
devoid of any power relations. I turn to some of these issues in the final section.  
 
3.5. Power relations and positionality: researcher, research 
assistants and participants 
Geographers, and feminist geographers especially, have long conceived knowledge production as 
a situated, relational and asymmetrical accomplishment that is mediated through relations of 
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power developing along lines of class, gender, race, age, nationality, and so on. However, the focus 
has most often been on the subjectivity and positionality of the researcher/interviewer (England, 
1994). An important issue then arises when one wants to actively include the role and influence 
that research assistants had not only during the research process but also on the research 
outcomes. In fact, despite Temple and Edwards’ (2002) acknowledgment of this influence 
through their concept of the ‘triple subjectivity’ (the research/research assistants/research 
participants relationship), it has recently been argued that the issue still remains largely 
unexplored (Deane and Stevano, 2016). Similarly, Leck (2014:59) remarks that research 
assistants’ perspectives and voices are “largely absent from oral and written accounts, including 
in dissertations and theses”. As highlighted previously, interviews with remittance households in 
both countries were carried out in Wolof, Twi and Dagbani with four different research assistants. 
In the following, I insert research assistants in the research process to account for one particular 
aspect of this ‘triple subjectivity’, that is the evolving nature and configuration of power relations 
among researcher, research assistants and participants and how these interact with each other. 
This allows me to contextualise some of the practical and ethical challenges I encountered during 
fieldwork, including issues of wage payments, language and translation, consent as well ‘giving 
back’. 
 
3.5.1. Relations between researcher and research assistants 
As mentioned earlier, I worked with Fatou Diop in Thiès, Sonia Adu-Gyamfi in Accra and Issahaku 
Musah Sugri and Braimah Abdul Latif in Tamale. In both countries, I was almost always present 
during the research activities, including the interviews.28 As a result, I ended up spending quite a 
significant amount of time with each of them. While the nature of the relation with research 
assistants is primarily one of employment that is characterised by unavoidable wealth and power 
asymmetries (Molony and Hammet, 2007), it is also multifaceted (Deane and Stevano, 2016). The 
research assistants I worked with were also my ‘cultural’ guides, my everyday companions and 
some became friends I am still regularly in touch with. One of the main hurdles I encountered at 
the beginning of the fieldwork in Senegal was to ensure I addressed the payment of wages with 
fairness and transparency; my priority was for them to receive wages that corresponded to the 
standard in the field. However, I was also very conscious of my limited fieldwork-related funding. 
Balancing these two contradictory priorities proved to be a real challenge. After enquiring about 
good payment practices to several Senegalese researchers as well as several international 
researchers who undertook research in Senegal, I quickly realised that I was going to have to 
spend most of my available funding just in Senegal. I then asked Fatou to send me a budget 
                                                     
28 In Tamale, I had to miss several interviews due to Malaria. 
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covering transport costs, her time spent in the field, her per diem as well as transcription work. 
After a few emails back and forth and several phone conversations, we agreed on an amount and 
on how and when payments would be made. I conducted a similar process in Ghana. I found this 
to be quite challenging as well as awkward at times, having to justify why I could not agree on 
Research Assistants’ (RAs) first budget proposals. This was literally the first time I was put in the 
role of an ‘employer’. While I am relatively confident that the issue of wage payment was 
conducted to the required ethical standard, the whole process made the employer-employee 
relation fairly evident from the very beginning in both countries.  
 
While the asymmetries in wealth and power were undeniable, it is also important to note how 
the RAs took ownership of the research process. In several instances, especially at the beginning, 
I was told that some of my questions “did not quite work” and that I should rather re-order or 
rephrase them. For instance, my questions regarding remittance households’ monthly incomes in 
Tamale were received with polite skepticism by Sugri. He suggested it was probably best to ask 
about daily or weekly payments but warned me that the variations from one month to another 
were significant anyway. Similarly, when I asked Sugri in an email about gifts and compensation 
to participants, his position was one of an ‘educator’: 
 
So, when it comes to research, we often buy soap or any kind of soft drink to visitors who are 
illiterates and are low income earners as well. This is to just show some kind of appreciation for 
their time with us but not payment for the information given. You and I know that paying a 
respondent for information given deviates from research ethics. The idea of money comes if you 
forget to buy the respondent a gift but still wish to give him/her something as a token of 
appreciation for his/her time with you. Basically, this is what I can say on this. Maybe as time goes 
on, I will be educating you on our traditions and practices in Africa, Northern Ghana specifically  
(Email communication, December 2017). 
 
This excerpt also demonstrates that research assistants were crucial not only as linguistic but 
also cultural ‘brokers’ before, during and after interviews. In Tamale, the two RAs I worked with 
not only helped me overcome the language barrier but also provided insight into the financial 
practices of local communities and guidance on cultural issues. They also played a pivotal role in 
negotiating access to participants. In addition, it is undeniable that RAs contributed to shaping 
my own thoughts, and ultimately the direction of the research. On many occasions, the RAs I 
worked with had the most direct interaction with research participants and, therefore, had 
critical insights into research findings. I organised regular ‘debrief’ sessions with them to discuss 
interviews that had recently taken place. During these sessions, I asked them about what they had 
been told, what they made of the interviews and what they thought of some specific answers. I 
 
 
95 
was keen to hear their opinions and have them reflect on what they had been told and compare 
their thoughts with mine. I found this to be very useful in grasping the broader context within 
which these interviews happened and understanding why certain questions had been answered 
in certain ways. As mentioned already, I also arranged ‘debrief’ sessions on reception of 
transcripts. This allowed me to clarify some participants’ answers and work with RAs on follow-
up questions for our revisits. This confirmed the importance of asking RAs’ own opinions and the 
influence these have on the general research activities (Deane and Stevano, 2016; Gent, 2014; 
Molyneux et al, 2009). 
 
3.5.2. Relations between researcher and participants 
During the period of fieldwork, research assistants mediated my relations with participants with 
regard to three key issues; that of research legitimacy, consent and ‘giving back’. I take these three 
issues in turn first, before exploring the broader question of representation. 
 
3.5.2.1. Legitimacy 
Despite the wealth of literature on researchers’ positionality and the power relations between 
researchers and participants, the ways in which research assistants mediate these relationships 
have been relatively neglected. Here, I want to acknowledge the crucial role that RAs played in 
the production of legitimacy of my research. In Senegal for instance, Fatou took the initiative to 
always introduce ourselves as members of the same research team and referred to ‘our’ research 
when speaking with participants for the first time. This helped participants to feel at ease, 
knowing that a Senegalese researcher was also part of the project. However, I felt it was important 
to emphasise that the research output – the PhD thesis – would ultimately be written by myself. 
Fatou, now a PhD candidate herself, also told me that based on her experience it was useful to 
point out that the research was part of my/our desire to build a career in academia. While I was 
surprised by this strategy at first, this proved to be reasonably effective. Most importantly, one 
way in which RAs rendered my work legitimate to participants was by clarifying – sometimes at 
multiple times and at length – that I was not working for either a bank or a MFI. I do not think I 
would have been able to convince several participants without the help of the RAs. It is fair to say 
that this had significant impacts on the quality and depths of our conversation with participants. 
On several occasions however, some potential participants were still unsure about my role and 
refused to be interviewed. Similarly, two participants in Thiès asked us to stop the interviews 
after a few minutes when they realised the type of questions they would have to answer. 
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3.5.2.2. ‘Giving back’ 
Issues of ‘giving back’ are usually connected to those of positionality and reflexivity in the field. 
Here, I want to focus specifically on the ‘who’, ‘when’ and the ‘what’ aspects of ‘giving back’. First, 
on a grounded level, an important component that constituted the relation between researcher 
and participants related to the rather controversial issue of compensation. While it often seems 
the ‘right’ thing to do on the ground, some authors emphasise issues of postcolonial dependency, 
the creation of expectations among participants, and standard set by researchers introducing 
payments, which others are then required to follow (Deane and Stevano, 2016: Devereux, 1992; 
Staddon, 2014; Sultana, 2007). More broadly, this ambiguity reflects the gap between the ethic of 
the academy and the ethic of the field site (Monteith, 2017; Sultana, 2007). Prior to my period of 
fieldwork, I adopted the principle of non-compensation in order to comply with the institutional 
ethical requirements of my university. This required me to fill a form and tick a few boxes, among 
all the other preparatory tasks to check off. While this procedural approach treats the 
consideration of ethics as a one-time event, I realised fairly quickly that ethical challenges crop 
up throughout the research process and constantly need negotiation, flexibility, and sensitivity to 
local contexts. When such issues arise, our research is obviously not paused. While important 
efforts were made to handle these contradictions ethically and with fairness, it is also important 
to acknowledge the partiality of some of my decisions. In Senegal, I did not offer financial 
compensation to my participants but occasionally provided small gifts like soap or soft drinks as 
a way to show my appreciation. Decisions to offer gifts were made with Fatou based on our own 
perception of how disruptive the interviews had been for the participant. On several occasions, 
participants asked for un petit quelque chose (a small something) at the end of the interview. Fatou 
often responded by saying the we were both students and did not have much money. In Tamale, 
however, especially when we interviewed participants for a second or third time, the two RAs 
suggested providing a small financial contribution, instead of a second soap or another soft drink. 
This was particularly true for those living in rural areas. I felt it was not necessarily unethical. 
After all, I was asking for their time and some of our participants postponed their time of arrival 
at the market because of us. I made it clear this was not payment for the information given, but 
some kind of appreciation for the time spent with us. We agreed on the amount to give and that 
we would give the money only at the end of the interview without necessarily telling participants 
in advance. I believe this did not affect their willingness to participate nor the responses given.  
 
Another important element that relates to ‘giving back’ and that goes hand in hand with 
disseminating findings and producing research outputs and/or policy recommendations is the 
necessity, or ‘obligation’ (Van Blerk and Ansell, 2007), to ‘feedback’ to those involved in the 
research process (Staddon, 2014). Feedback in my research so far has taken various forms, both 
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verbal and written, and is still on-going. In effect, I started discussing the content and structure 
of a written report with two organisations I have been in contact with, i.e. ACSIF, a nation-wide 
customer protection organisation that supports people that have been victims of bank/MFI 
dishonest practices and ADK, a local association in Thiès that works against women’s over-
indebtedness. A number of participants were members of either/both organisations. However, 
given issues of access as well as literacy among a large number of my participants, providing 
written reports remains a questionable, if not problematic, way of feeding back and raises 
question as to who in the community in which I worked do I ‘give back’ to. 
 
3.5.2.3. Consent 
Another gap between formal ethic guidelines and the ethic of the field related to the issue of 
consent, and the consent form more particularly. The ethics guidance I received as a postgraduate 
researcher emphasised the importance of transparency, which involved giving a full and honest 
account of my intended research to everyone involved and making sure that people participated 
on a basis of informed consent. In my case, I was required to seek written consent from my 
participants by the ethical committee. I felt that this did not allow enough flexibility with regard 
to the methodological approach and research context of my study. Printed consent forms, while 
being without a doubt absolutely vital for a clinical trial, may be slightly inappropriate for some, 
if not most, of remittance recipients in my research. On several occasions, I sensed participants’ 
wariness about signing forms and the “power differentials embedded in the act of eliciting a 
signature” (Bryant, 2014:135). Despite a number of slightly awkward situations, I continued 
using the consent form as I felt a certain sense of duty to hand it out. However, and as Rutazibwa 
(2017) pointed out in her lecture given at the Institute of Development Studies in Brighton, the 
seemingly mundane practice of shoving a consent form to every participant being interviewed 
raises fundamental questions about practices of doing Development Geography and the urgency 
to decolonise these (Rutazibwa, 2017). 
 
3.5.2.4. A politics of engagement 
The research that I conducted was ethically fraught in other ways too. There were multiple 
occasions in which I was explicitly aware of the power imbalance with research participants. For 
instance, some asked me for advice on how they might be able to get a visa to travel to France or 
the UK. Others wondered if I could offer some help with applying for a scholarship in European 
universities. As the following excerpt from my field notes demonstrates, asymmetries of power 
along the lines of race and nationality were sometimes explicitly pointed out: 
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Second week in Thiès, Saturday morning, Fatou and I met Momar, in Hersant.  I got his contact from 
the cashier at PAMECAS (a microfinance institution). We greeted and after doing small talk for a 
few minutes, I started explaining to him the reason of my visit, my research objectives, etc. We 
started the interview. One hour in, we stopped the interview because it was prayer time. When 
Momar came back, we started talking about his master’s dissertation and why I chose this 
particular research topic. I tried to give him a few reasons, but he cut me off and said: ‘I went to 
university, I have a master, and I’ve been thinking of doing a thesis on religion practices. But do you 
think I can go to Europe and research, say the religious practices of white people?  (Field Notes, 
November 2016). 
 
During this conversation, Momar also asked me how I thought my research was going to impact 
the everyday lives of the research participants. This is a question I raised to myself so many times 
before: was what I was doing justifiable on ethical grounds or was I just perpetuating unequal 
power relations? Like most PhD researchers and academics, I have an underlying hope that my 
research, if good enough and effectively disseminated, may benefit in some shape or form the 
research participants involved in this research. However, the relevance of a PhD thesis and 
academic papers to research participants remains rather dubious. More fundamentally, the 
capacity of academics, and western academic especially, to speak of/on behalf of (marginalised) 
populations in the Global South has been thoroughly critiqued (Staddon, 2014) and the 
detrimental implications of such representations have long been examined (Kapoor, 2004; Katz, 
1994; Kobayashi, 1994). 
 
The stark power differentials between the participants and myself could not be eradicated by my 
attempts to be self-reflexive, respectful and supportive during the data collection process and 
thereafter. I have found it productive to engage with these issues from the perspective of what 
Cindi Katz (1992:501) calls a “politics of engagement”, when scholarship is merged with a clear 
politics that works against the forces of oppression. Following Katz (1992) and Sultana’s (2007) 
arguments, I took the position that if capital accumulation was a global process with various 
regional and local forms, giving up on international field research would rule out the possibility 
of establishing connections that engage capitalism at different geographical sites, and to work 
against global inequalities. While political intentions clearly do not resolve issues around data 
extraction and power differentials, they may contribute to shaping a story that is not of 
marginalisation alone where ‘those poor people’ might be the key narrative theme, but of the 
systemic predations of a global economic system and the domesticising and oppositional 
practices attached to it. In other words, the primary object of this research was not the people ‘to 
be developed’ but the apparatus that was doing the ‘developing’ (Ferguson, 1990:xiv; 
Schoeneberg, 2018). I also tried to cultivate relationships with some activists and researchers, 
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especially in Senegal, that worked and organised against the CFA franc. I interviewed some of 
them and published an interview for a french left-wing magazine,29 and wrote a piece30 with 
Ndongo Samba Sylla, for Discover Society about the CFA franc and its links with coloniality, a topic 
that remains poorly understood in countries like France.  
 
3.5.3. Relations between research assistants and participants 
The last relation that is essential to critically investigate is that between research assistants and 
participants. The following excerpt from my field notes demonstrates how the ways in which 
Fatou interacted with and positioned herself in relation to research participants impacted on my 
understanding of specific situations:  
 
After the interview with Mamina, on our way back to the bus station, Mamina and Fatou had what 
seemed to be quite an intense conversation – in Wolof. Once in the taxi, Fatou told me that Mamina 
had just found out her husband got married with a second woman without telling her: shock! It’s a 
woman from the area that Mamina knows, apparently. She was devastated, Fatou told me. Mamina 
said that her husband decided to marry another woman, to prioritise himself over the needs of the 
children. This now means that her husband sends less remittance. Fatou said that Mamina was 
really angry; that instead of investing into the well-being of the households, the husband had 
decided to be selfish (Field Notes, January 2017). 
 
In this particular instance, it was only at the very end of our third and last visit that Mamina 
revealed this information. This turned out to be essential for my own understanding of Mamina’s 
socio-economic situation, why it had not improved and why she was receiving less remittances 
than before. On the long journey home, the conversation – or improvised ‘debrief’ session – that 
followed with Fatou about the internal politics of households in Senegal, and polygamous 
households in particular, contributed to shaping my understanding of the politics of remittances, 
a social practice of receiving, spending, and redistributing money within the remittance 
household (see Chapter 5). Importantly, if it was not for Fatou and her ways of always trying to 
engage in respectful, polite and kind interactions with participants, I would have never found this 
out. Moreover, and as Fatou suggested, I am not entirely certain that Mamina would have shared 
this piece of information to a male research assistant. It is my understanding that participants 
viewed Fatou as playing an active role in the research. The extent to which I was active during an 
interview depended on a range of factors, including how busy the participant was. In fact, the 
                                                     
29 The interview can be found on the website of the Revue Ballast: https://www.revue-ballast.fr/ndongo-samba-sylla-
le-franc-cfa/. 
30 The Discover Society piece can be found here: https://discoversociety.org/2018/09/04/when-monetary-coloniality-
meets-21st-century-finance-development-in-the-franc-zone/. 
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need for Fatou to constantly translate what participants meant that the duration of the interviews 
was considerably lengthened. Often, when Fatou and/or I felt this started to become tiring for the 
participant, the time taken for translation was shortened. This made the revisits even more 
crucial in order to follow up on themes which had not been talked about in depth and clarify 
certain points that remained unclear.  
 
While I emphasised the beneficial impact that similarities in positionality between research 
assistant and participants had on the research activities, it is important not to romanticise the 
‘purity’ of RAs, and not to essentialise one’s ethnic or national identity. As Deane and Stevano 
(2016:223) argue with respect to their own research, “education, employment status and wealth 
differentials between the research assistant and (many of) the participants do impact the 
interaction and the quality of communication”. In other words, “RAs bring their own concerns, 
values, beliefs, and assumptions to the research process which are shaped by their own social 
worlds and require consideration” (Leck, 2014:61). The four RAs I worked with throughout my 
research were far more educated than most participants. By regularly working with international 
researchers, the incomes of at least two RAs, although irregular at times, were far higher than 
most participants’ revenues. Added to this, one particularly striking example of how power 
differentials manifested themselves was during a conversation I had with one of the RAs in Ghana 
during a debrief session. I asked about a question in the transcript that was left blank and that 
pertained to the socio-economic activities, including income-generating activities, of the 
participant. Because I was ill, I had not been able to attend this initial interview. The RA told me 
that “she was not doing anything”, hence he left the space blank. During our revisit, I asked the 
same question in English, which the RA translated. The participant responded that she was 
looking after her children while her husband was away as well as her stepmother who was ill. 
While I cannot be certain that the same answer was given to the RA in the first place, the RA’s 
reaction pointed to the ways in which the gendered assumption of the ‘passive’ female receiver 
also permeated some of his own perceptions and beliefs. The effects of these power differentials 
remained more often than not very difficult to disentangle. Because I did not think about it enough 
while building my research design, I can only acknowledge the potential source of bias they may 
have had on the research process and outcomes of this study.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has set out my constructionist approach to research, inspired by Ouma’s (2015b) 
critical ethnography of marketisation. Taken together, my discussion in this chapter 
demonstrates how I have sought to draw upon the strengths and overcome some of the 
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methodological limitations in previous studies, and to address my specific research questions on 
the marketisation of remittance flows and households in Senegal and Ghana. My methodological 
framework for researching the uneven financial incorporation of remittance flows and 
households has consisted of: (1) multiple methods of document analysis, semi-structured 
interviews, ethnographic interviews and in-field observation; (2) multiple case studies of 
processes of remittance market-making in Senegal and Ghana; (3) multiple sources of 
institutional and private sector actors and members of remittance households; and (4) multiple 
sites across Dakar and Thiès (Senegal) and Accra and Tamala (Ghana).  I have also outlined some 
of the practical and ethical tensions that arise from the evolving nature and configuration of 
power relations among researcher, research assistants and participants. The next chapter 
presents my theoretical and empirical analysis of the differentiated ways in which remittance 
markets are realised in Senegal and Ghana. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The formation of remittance markets in Senegal and 
Ghana 
 
 
Thus, at a time when development, society, and nature seem to be all about markets – when 
markets have become the ‘new religion’ (Chakrabortty 2010) – and when the developmental 
prospects of large parts of the Global South are rethought through the prism of ‘market-oriented 
development,’ it seems to be important to take markets, their making, and their governmental 
effects seriously. (Ouma, 2015b:213) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
International and domestic remittances have long been considered an “untapped market” (Gupta 
et al, 2007). A wide-ranging set of private sector actors, from small blockchain technology firms 
to international banks and giant incumbent companies such as Western Union, is now getting 
ready for “the battle for the remittances market”, deemed ripe for “digital disruption” (The 
Economist, 2018). This chapter critically examines the differentiated constructions of remittance 
markets in Senegal and Ghana across different scales and sites (RQ1). It highlights the ways in 
which the creation, stabilisation and expansion of such markets is contingent, fragile, contested 
and always in the making. It also situates these market-making processes within broader 
processes of finance-led capital accumulation. Previous analyses of the ‘financialisation of 
remittances’ have called into question the market-based approach to the project and its 
prioritising of the political and financial concerns of a broad coalition of global and national actors 
over the needs of migrant men and women and the people they send remittances to (Cross, 2013, 
2015; Datta, 2012; Hudson, 2008; Kunz, 2011, 2012; Zapata, 2013, 2018). The seemingly 
ideologically neutral policies put forward to create and sustain remittance marketplaces and 
eventually make the latter more amenable to financial investments need to be understood, it is 
argued, as part of “a neoliberal project of financialisation (…) that aims to construct markets and 
integrate economies into global capitalist markets” (Cross, 2015:306). Taken together, these 
policies and the programmes and initiatives that result from these come to represent a 
contemporary form of market-building as development, whereby markets are constituted 
through the proliferation of new forms of knowledge and institutions, and the advancement of 
new spheres of private sector activity (Carroll, 2012b). 
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However, the incorporation of remittances, migrants and Remittance Recipients (RR) into 
financial circuits tends to be treated in this emerging critical literature on remittances as 
explanandum rather than explanans, leaving finance and the concrete formation of remittance 
markets black-boxed (Ouma, 2016a). Rather than a practical accomplishment, the 
‘financialisation of remittances’ is understood from a somehow narrow structuralist perspective, 
portrayed as the expression of the latest spatial fix of a crisis-prone system (see for instance 
Hudson, 2008; Cross, 2015). By black-boxing and abstracting finance and markets, these 
approaches fall short of explaining how remittance markets come into being practically. In 
contrast, my empirical analysis suggests that the construction, stabilisation and expansion of 
remittance markets are not natural nor uncontested processes. It shows that it is essential to bear 
in mind that intra-household transfers do not have an inherent financial worth that can be easily 
unlocked and transformed into new development finance. Building markets that enable 
remittance money transfers to be tapped into by state and private sector actors requires 
extensive financial, material, technological, legal and discursive constructions and, importantly, 
behavioural engineering. This comprises, among many other elements, the investment in, and 
building of, physical, communicational, informational and social remittance-linked ecosystems, 
the strategic implementation of management techniques, the design and commercialisation of 
new financial products based on the acquisition and deployment of new market devices as well 
as the disciplining of a wide range of financial and economic practices and actors through 
contracts, rules and regulations. 
 
The chapter begins by outlining the remittance landscapes in both Senegal and Ghana, focusing 
on the similarities and differences with regard to market-making strategies, the various actors 
involved, as well as the design and commercialisation of remittance-linked products and services. 
It then examines how remittance markets come into existence and some of the controversies that 
come with such processes. To do so, I sought to build upon and extend Berndt and Boeckler’s 
(2009, 2012) geography of marketisation approach by paying particular attention to the practical 
accomplishment of three key market framings: (1) the conversion of remittances into 
commodities; (2) the formatting of agencies among different remittance market actors; and (3) 
the formatting of market encounters between remittances, financial and commercial institutions, 
and global investors.  
 
4.2. Remittance landscapes in Senegal and Ghana  
As indicated in Chapter 3, Senegal ranks 4th among remittance-receiving countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with an estimate of 800 000 emigrants remitting over USD 2.69 billion in 2018. Data on 
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domestic remittances is, however, much harder to find. Interestingly, the WB-led Migration and 
Remittances Households Surveys carried out in 2009-2010 provide differentiated data on 
channels used by ‘internal’, ‘within-Africa’ and ‘OECD’ migrants (Plaza et al, 2011). In 2009, it was 
estimated that 82% of international remittances to Senegal were sent through Money Transfer 
Operators (MTOs) – mostly via Western Union, MoneyGram and RIA – while only 13% were either 
sent through relatives, friends and informal agents or brought back by ‘OECD’ migrants 
themselves (ibid). With regard to regional remittances, 60% were sent through informal channels 
by migrants within Africa whereas only 31% were channelled through MTOs and 9% through 
postal money order and other means. Direct transfer to bank account did not even account for 
1% up until 2009. As far as domestic remittances were concerned, the vast majority – 91% – were 
either sent through a friend/relative, transported via courier, bus and other transport, or brought 
back by migrants themselves on visits home in 2009 (ibid). This has, however, changed 
dramatically over the past ten years (see Table 4.1). In effect, in 2017 only 10% of recipients 
received domestic remittances in person and in cash (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2018). In contrast, 
67% of recipients received remittances through a mobile phone compared to 10% in 2014 (ibid). 
Relatedly, while only 5% of recipients received their remittances using a financial institution 
account or a Mobile Money (MM) account in 2014, almost 50% of recipients now use an account 
to received remittances (ibid). While usage seems to have slightly decreased recently from 46% 
in 2014 to 36% in 2017, over-the-counter services – that is, in a branch, through a mobile banking 
agent, or through a money transfer service – are still widely popular to send and receive domestic 
transfers. The most surprising insight from the Global Findex Database – which, I would argue, is 
to be taken with caution – is the fact that only 7% of recipients received domestic remittances 
through a money transfer service compared to 44% in 2014 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2018). This is 
in fact surprising given that the two main over-the-counter providers in Senegal are Money 
Transfer Organisations (Wari and Joni-Joni), which continue to grow their agent networks 
domestically, provide international and regional remittance services and have even started 
offering services via digital channels, notably mobile app and wallet. It is nonetheless clear that 
while banks are still almost inaccessible to the vast majority of the Senegalese population, Mobile 
Network Operators (MNOs) such as Tigo and Orange and their MM services Tigo Cash and Orange 
Money (OM), regional Money Transfer Organisations (MTOs) such as Wari and Joni-Joni as well 
as newly-arrived Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) such as Baobab Senegal, have contributed to 
these developments within the domestic – and, to a lesser extent as yet, the regional and 
international – remittance landscape. 
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Table 4. 1 - Methods of receiving domestic remittances in Senegal in 2014 and 2017 
 2014 2017 
Received domestic remittances in person and cash 
only (% recipients 15+) 
47% 10% 
Received domestic remittances using a financial 
institution account or a mobile money account (% 
recipients 15+) 
5% 49.6% 
Received domestic remittances through an over-the-
counter service (% recipients 15+) 
46% 36% 
Received domestic remittances through a money 
transfer service (% recipients 15+) 
44% 7% 
 
(Source: World Bank Findex Data, available: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/global-financial-
inclusion-global-findex-database) 
 
With its 1.3+ million active users, OM’s services include basic wallet services such as person-to-
person transfers and bill and merchant payments. OM announced its ambition in the near future 
to become a ‘digital’ bank and offer a wide range of digital financial services, alongside 
international and domestic mobile-based remittances (JeuneAfrique, 2017). Domestically, Wari – 
the largest local MTO launched in 2008 – and Joni-Joni – launched in 2013 – dominate the money 
transfer market and represent OM’s main competitors. To gauge service popularity, the IFC uses 
agent uptake as transaction data is not available: Wari is offered by 82% of agents31 and Joni Joni 
by 54% whereas OM service is offered in 40% of agents (IFC, 2018). The two MTOs also have the 
intention to expand their financial services and turn into digital providers. As a Wari employee I 
interviewed declared: 
 
Our idea is to turn Wari into a bank of proximity. That means offering services of proximity deemed 
inaccessible to a large segment of the population given the low percentage of the population 
holding a bank account. All the opportunities that are still dormant, we are going to capitalise on 
them. (emphasis mine) 
 
At the time of fieldwork and writing, while these conversations are taking place and negotiations 
are on-going between MNOs and MTOs on the one hand and financial institutions on the other, 
                                                     
31 Most agents are non-exclusive and can therefore work with more than one principal. 
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neither OM nor Wari and Joni-Joni are at a stage of being able to provide interest-accrued savings 
accounts, credit or insurance products.  
 
The story is however rather different with regard to the newly-established for-profit MFI Baobab 
Senegal. Most banks and several historical MFIs are still cautious32 about focusing on digital 
financial services and do not necessarily target RR directly for financial inclusion (Orozco et al, 
2010). While senior employees of banks and MFIs in Dakar told me that the enrolment of RR was 
part of their wider strategy of increasing their customer base, realities on the ground were much 
messier. The materialisation of these enrolment strategies was far from obvious when speaking 
to branch employees in Thiès. This was particularly true so far as MFIs were concerned. The 
microfinance industry was and is still dominated by a cooperative type of governance (Baumann 
et al, 2015). The main means of financing is through savings mobilisation. However, the majority 
of new major microfinance players, including Baobab Senegal, which have entered the market in 
the last ten years are limited liability corporations and are financially backed by capital market 
actors, including their holding and a wide range of institutional investors. Baobab Senegal was set 
up as a “greenfield” MFI. Greenfield MFIs are institutions that are created without pre-existing 
infrastructure, staff, clients, or portfolios and use standard operating procedures disseminated 
by a central group, often a holding company. The holding company usually plays a strong role in 
providing investment and expertise for the microfinance entities. After the Paris-based Baobab 
Holding was created in 2006, the first institution was set up in Madagascar in 2006. Baobab 
Senegal followed in 2007, then Baobab Ivory Coast and Nigeria in 2010. The group is now present 
in more than ten countries across the globe. Baobab’s portfolio is funded at 40-45% through 
deposit mobilisation while equity and debt funding is raised at the domestic, regional and 
international level for the remaining 55-60%. This shift towards for-profit microfinance in 
Senegal is partly explained by the introduction of a new law in 2008 that encouraged the 
development of commercial MFIs (Touré, 2014; Baumann al, 2015). An official of the Direction de 
la Réglementation et de la Supervision des Systèmes Financiers Décentralisés (DRS-SFD) – the 
Microfinance Department – stated that “Baobab, with the support of all its backers, is deemed to 
dominate the market in the near future”. While the significance of the aforementioned actors in 
constituting the remittance marketplace in Senegal is obviously not to be undermined (and will 
require further research to understand how the digitisation of remittances and financial inclusion 
plays out in the future), particular attention is paid here to Baobab Senegal, which is at the 
forefront – perhaps coincidentally – of the remittances-financial inclusion nexus. In effect, Baobab 
                                                     
32 Société Générale de Banques in Senegal is one of the few commercial banks to have entered this market via its 
subsidiary, Manko, which can compete directly with microfinance institutions. In 2017 the bank launched its own 
mobile wallet “YUP”, to which savings and microloans services recently added (Laurin, 2018). 
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recently started to roll out a network of agents called Banking Correspondents (BCs), and to offer 
Digital Financial Services (DFS) by harnessing the already-existing network of MTOs’ agents (see 
Section 4.3.2.1). Focusing in detail on how the financial institution entered the microfinance 
market, capitalised on the human and material remittance architecture, and how it is now 
upscaling its operations, i.e. incorporating more and more clients (including RR) into formal 
financial circuits, is of strategic importance. It allows us to understand how the remittance 
landscape in Senegal is being (re)structured to facilitate the marketisation of remittances.  
 
Figures on international remittance flows to Ghana have been a source of debate for a long time 
(Teye et al, 2017a). However, data provided by the World Bank shows that remittance inflows to 
Ghana in 2018 amounted to USD 3.8 billion, compared to USD 3.5 billion in 2017 (KNOMAD, 
2019). The most important countries of origin of remittances to Ghana are the USA, Nigeria, UK, 
Italy, Germany, Togo, Canada and Burkina Faso. Interestingly, roughly 32% of remittances to 
Ghana come from other African countries. Recent studies indicate that a large fraction of 
international remittances is still transferred through informal channels, that is via the post or via 
friends, relatives and migrants themselves coming back home (Ahinful et al, 2013; Teye, 2016). 
Whereas the proportion of international remittances transferred through informal channels 
represent about 30% in Ahinful and colleagues’ study (2013), Teye (2016) estimates that only 
53% of the remittances received within 12 months prior to the research were received through 
formal financial institutions and MTOs. In a recent baseline assessment of household remittances 
implemented by the Ghana Statistical Service with financial support from the IOM, it was 
estimated that 39.4% of households received international remittances through friends and 
relatives while more than 52.6% of all recipients indicated that they received their cash 
remittances through MTOs (Ghana Statistical Service, 2017). According to a WB-led Migration 
and Remittances Households survey carried out in 2009, while 22% of international remittances 
were either sent though relatives and friends or brought back by ‘OECD’ migrants themselves, 
74% were sent through MTOs (Plaza et al, 2011). With regard to regional remittances, 73% were 
sent through informal channels by migrants within Africa whereas only 23% of regional 
remittances were sent through MTOs. According to Teye (2016), formal financial institutions are 
deemed too expensive by both migrants and recipients (high transfer charges and uncompetitive 
exchange rates). However, the use of financial accounts is likely to have increased given the 
increasing possibilities for migrants to send international remittances directly to bank accounts 
in partnership with MTOs. Furthermore, several MNOs have recently started to provide cross-
border mobile remittances services; while no data is available, mobile-based international 
remittances are yet to reach a satisfactory threshold based on the conversations I had with 
different MNOs, banks and remittance experts in Ghana. As far as domestic remittances are 
 
 
108 
concerned, it was estimated in 2011 that the vast majority – 94% – of transfers were either sent 
through a friend/relative or brought back by migrants themselves on visits home (Plaza et al, 
2011). The situation is, however, very different today in Ghana where the use of MM to transfer 
money within the country has dramatically increased over the past few years (Table 4.2). In effect, 
while almost 30% of domestic RR received their money using a financial institution account or a 
MM account in 2014, 59% of recipients received their money using an account in 2017. Relatedly, 
only 13% of recipients received their remittance in person and in cash in 2017, as opposed to 
50% in 2014 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2018).  
 
Table 4. 2 - Methods of receiving domestic remittances in Ghana in 2014 and 2017 
 2014 2017 
Received domestic remittances in person and cash 
only (% recipients 15+) 
50% 13% 
Received domestic remittances using a financial 
institution account or a mobile money account (% 
recipients 15+) 
29.6% 59% 
Received domestic remittances through an over-the-
counter service (% recipients 15+) 
18% 23% 
Received domestic remittances through a money 
transfer service (% recipients 15+) 
13% 6% 
 
(Source: World Bank Findex Data, available: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/global-financial-
inclusion-global-findex-database) 
 
A number of initiatives to formalise and leverage domestic and international remittances have 
emerged over the last few years. The IOM in Ghana is particularly active in promoting and 
developing remittance-linked financial inclusion. As part of an ongoing initiative to improve 
capacities to leverage migrant remittances for financial inclusion and development in Ghana, in 
2016 it launched two reports on remittances – a baseline assessment of household remittances 
and an assessment of remittance-related services and practices of financial institutions. 
Furthermore, the development consultancy Developing Markets Associates Global was 
commissioned by the IOM Ghana team to facilitate a workshop in June 2017 with key 
stakeholders, with the stated aim of building capacities in identifying and developing appropriate 
initiatives that could leverage the flow of international remittances for economic development. 
Similarly, the Remittance Grant Facility (RGF), a project funded by the government of Ghana as 
well as the government of Switzerland through its State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, was 
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launched in 2016 with the aim to encourage the formalisation of remittances. By providing 
financial support to private sector actors involved in the remittance industry to develop new 
remittance products and services, the project is: 
 
to provide better incomes for poor household with a more efficient use of remittances (…) and to 
encourage savings and investment as opposed to consumption. (RGF website, 2016, emphasis mine) 
 
Several financial institutions have also started considering mobile-based remittances as an 
important entry point for further financial inclusion. One set of initiatives is the development of 
kiosk-based banking platforms. For instance, as part of their financial inclusion strategy, 
Omnibank, a Ghanaian-owned bank, has deployed service points – or pay-houses – that offer 
utility payments and mobile remittance services (Figure 4.1). By offering these basic services 
closer to communities, the aim is to then up-sell and cross-sell other financial services. Kiosk 
operators are given targets in terms of accounts opening: 
 
The idea was to bring the banking services closer to customers (…) A customer who is doing mobile 
money, chances are that he or she is not a registered customer in the bank, it's just an ordinary 
person. So, the person comes and says: ‘I want to do mobile money’. Now, the operator of the kiosk 
is able to talk to you: ‘In addition to this, you can have an account with us, etc’. That would increase 
our bank customer base. (Omnibank, Alternative Channels Manager) 
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Figure 4. 1 - Omnibank pay-house in Accra 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: photograph from in-field observations in Accra) 
 
Relatedly, and as a way to get ‘closer’ to their actual and potential customers, GN Bank has opted 
for a slightly different strategy that is more directed towards deposit mobilisation. In fact, GN Bank 
use officers that go to ‘the field’ and collect money on a weekly basis from clients’ own business 
locations, often the marketplace, to then credit the amount into their accounts. This model, based 
on the savings system of susu33, has recently been taken up by many financial institutions, 
especially Savings and Loans companies. Comparing these two strategies, an employee from 
Omnibank told me that their strategy of operating kiosks to provide MM services rather than doing 
susu-based collection was a way for them to “do centralised financial inclusion through MM” 
(Omnibank, alternative channels manager). 
 
                                                     
33 In its mutual form, the word susu is used in reference to Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. Susu collectors, 
however, act as a form of financial intermediaries, or mobile bankers. For a small fee they provide an alternative means 
for Ghanaians to securely save and access their own money. Chapter 6 will examine the formalisation of susu in more 
detail. 
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Another way in which financial institutions attempt to include RR financially is through 
enrolment in the banking hall. Recipients that come to branches to collect their over-the-counter 
remittances are perceived by most institutions I interviewed as potential banking customers. 
Several banks and MFIs indicated that their tellers and customer service officers have been 
trained to convince remittance clients to keep the money they receive in bank accounts. Sales 
executives of one particular bank have to report the number of new accounts opened on a 
monthly basis; in nine months in 2016, 8000 new accounts were opened through this strategy. 
These enrolment strategies – whether they take place in kiosks or in banking halls – are often the 
outcomes of strategies designed within often newly-constituted remittance departments of 
financial institutions, especially banks. Several banks I interviewed mentioned their increasing 
interest in fee-based incomes, hence echoing the broader, albeit still very partial, shift away from 
credit towards payments, an agenda Maurer (2015) calls “poverty payment”. At the heart of this 
poverty payment agenda is the development of digital platforms, and MM ecosystems in 
particular. Before delving into how this MM ecosystem is being constructed concretely, it is worth 
briefly presenting who the main players are and the kind of products and services that they 
provide. 
 
There are four main MNOs in Ghana. Due to regulations, every MNO that wants to enter the MM 
market is required to set up a new financial services company. In 2017, the four MNOs were: 
Vodafone Ghana Mobile Financial Services and its product Vodafone Cash, Mobile Financial 
Service Ghana Limited and its product Tigo Cash; Airtel Money and the market leader MTN Mobile 
Money Limited. MTN dominates mobile wallet usage with more than 90% of market share (IFC, 
2018). Airtel and Tigo recently merged and are now called AirtelTigo. At the time of the 
interviews in mid-2017, MTN had approximately eight million active clients while Airtel had 
400 000. By the end of 2017, there were 11,1 million active MM customers across the country. In 
contrast, Ghana only had 345 000 active MM customers in 2012 and 4,9 million in 2015 (Bank of 
Ghana, 2017). There are 140 000 active registered MM agents across the country, out of which 
85 000 are registered with MTN and 23 000 with Airtel.34 In 2012, there were only 5 900 active 
agents. Person-to-person money transfers were the basis upon which MTN Mobile Money 
launched their services in 2009, a service which has now met a significant demand. Importantly, 
MM and its often-promoted P2P remittance service are deemed to open up the door to (digital) 
financial inclusion. In effect, mobile remittances are only one of the many Digital Financial 
Services (DFS) that MNOs can offer. Over the last two years, new mobile financial products such 
as mobile-based savings account, loans and insurance and even the purchase of government 
                                                     
34 It is important to note that agents can work with multiple Mobile Money entities. 
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treasury bills using MM have been launched by MNOs in Ghana, with MTN leading the way in 
collaboration with banking and non-banking financial institutions as well as Financial Technology 
companies (Fintechs). While it is clear, as several MNOs I interviewed indicated, that the primary 
reasons behind the development of these new mobile financial services are commercial, these 
very same actors are increasingly considered by a range of international financial and 
development organisations, philanthropist foundations as well as private sector representatives 
to play a major role in reducing poverty through DFS (IFC, 2018). 
 
Interestingly, several financial institutions have opted for a MNO-led style of agency banking by 
developing Mobile Banking, designing ‘push and pull services’ (i.e. allowing customers to transfer 
money from their mobile wallets to their bank accounts and vice versa) and relying upon the 
already-existing infrastructure of MM agents. Access Bank for instance, at the time of the 
interview, was about to launch a new product that would allow customers to open an Access bank 
account on the institution’s mobile banking platform35 without having to visit a branch. These 
accounts are then automatically linked to mobile wallets. To access any mobile banking platforms, 
customers have to dial a USSD36 code. Making the latter popular and remembered by the 
population has become a key marketing battle, as indicated by Figure 4.2. 
  
                                                     
35 Mobile Banking is not to be conflated with Mobile Financial Services (MFS). Mobile banking does not require the use 
of a mobile wallet. Mobile phones are simply used as an access channel to a bank account and no retail agents are 
involved. 
36 USSD is a GSM communication technology that is used to send text between a mobile phone and an application 
program in the network. 
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Figure 4. 2 - Marketing visuals of USSD codes – Access Bank and GCB Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: photographs from in-field observations in Accra) 
 
This section provided the necessary background information into the remittance landscapes in 
Senegal and Ghana and explained the reason why particular attention will be paid to MFIs in 
Senegal (with a particular focus on Baobab), and Mobile Money Operators (MMOs) in Ghana (with 
a particular focus on MTN).  
 
4.3. Constructing remittance markets in Senegal and Ghana 
This section investigates in detail the ways in which the construction of remittance markets is 
accomplished practically and some of the controversies attached to these. Drawing upon Berndt 
and Boeckler’s (2009, 2012) geography of marketisation approach, it focuses on three key 
framings, namely the conversion of remittances into commodities, the formatting of agencies and 
the formatting of market encounters between goods and agencies.  
 
4.3.1. Pacifying remittances 
 
Remittance is truly important (…). It is a free foreign exchange earner. (Bank of 
Ghana, Senior Economist, emphasis mine) 
 
My brother first went to Libya and we were those who gave him fare. He stayed 
there for some time but was later taken into police custody for about one year 
and three months. They were interrogated to know why they were in Libya. After 
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the interrogation, they considered them, trained them for one year on how to live 
their lives in Libya, and were later given identification cards, which gave them the 
opportunity to gain jobs. After Libya, he went to Italy and then came back to 
Ghana again. (Ali, timber trader and farmer, Savelugu, Tamale, wife and brother, 
Accra and Spain)37 
 
As shown in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2), remittances are ‘commodified’ through a combination of 
political and discursive processes that in turn require particular practices of ‘discounting’ 
(Hernandez and Coutin, 2006). Since April 2016, the Senegalese diaspora is officially the fifteenth 
administrative region of the country. A change in the constitution has allowed Senegalese living 
abroad to elect deputies at the National Assembly. This political move is representative of one 
such discursive framing that qualifies remittances as national incomes and contributes to the 
nationalisation of migrant labour (Hernandez and Coutin, 2006). At the same time, in its 2016 
National Policy on Migration, the Ministry of Interior of the Government of Ghana declared: 
Migration is now widely seen as key to development and for poverty reduction. For example, the 
flow of remittances into Ghana is estimated to outweigh that of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
official development assistance (ODA) to Ghana. (Ministry of Interior, 2016:1) 
Remittances are also discursively constructed as foreign in origin, hence comparable to other 
financial flows such as ODA and FDI. Qualifying remittances as a national resource and a foreign 
currency contributes, in turn, to the treatment of the money that migrants send home as a “free 
foreign exchange earner” (see above quote from senior economist of the Bank of Ghana). What 
the two above quotes demonstrate is the extent to which remittances can have very distinct 
meanings to different actors. More specifically, remittances are embedded in two competing 
regimes of value; one in which remittances are cost-free incomes that can be capitalised on; the 
second in which acts of migrating and remitting bear financial but also physical and security costs. 
The same Bank of Ghana economist said to me that remittances constitute “a transfer without 
quid pro quo that helps to reduce the gap of the current account balance” (emphasis mine). While 
the cost of exports is usually taken into account to calculate the profits in national balance of 
payment statements, in the case of remittances, the costs of migrating and the risks taken up by 
migrants, are not accounted for. Remittances are not contingent upon anything; they are a 
transfer “without quid pro quo”. Therefore, and as I have shown in Chapter 2, remittances are 
detached from the cumbersome realities of their production that is underpinned by a coercive 
international migration regime. Here, I want to go further and suggest that this process of 
                                                     
37 Ali is a timber trader and a farmer from Savelugu near Tamale (Ghana) who receives remittances from his wife and 
his brother, located in Accra and Spain respectively. 
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‘pacifying’ remittances also prevents us from locating remittances and the global agenda built 
upon them within the broader relationship between migrant labour and capital accumulation. 
 
An increasing number of observers have called for a more systemic understanding of remittances 
as the fruits of migrants’ labour in host countries, that is as cross-border wage remittances (Cross, 
2015, Delgado Wise and Marquez Covarrubias, 2009; Ferguson and McNally, 2014; Glick Schiller, 
2010; Pröbsting, 2015). They emphasise the ways in which historical patterns of migrant labour 
are linked to processes of primitive accumulation, dispossession and racialisation. The neoliberal 
era of capitalism, they argue, constitutes the “globalisation of primitive accumulation” in the 
forms of a wide range of extensive and accelerated processes of dispossession that lead to 
“coerced mass movements of peoples” (Ferguson and McNally, 2014). The commodification of 
land, the privatisation of national companies and the destruction of entire industries through the 
implementation SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s in both Senegal and Ghana as well as the 
devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 in Senegal constitute few of the many elements that explain 
displacement and processes of mass emigration (Cross, 2013; Dembele, 2003; Nubukpo et al, 
2016). Of course, the appropriation of racialised labour-power is not a new phenomenon.38 What 
is striking about the neoliberal period, however, is the ways in which the differentiation and 
hierarchisation of the global labour market, supported by coercive immigration regimes and 
discriminatory welfare policies, are being designed to cheapen migrant labour, especially low-
skilled labour, from the Global South by limiting its political and socio-economic rights (Castles, 
2011). Much migrant labour, and in particular low-skilled, undocumented or temporary workers, 
forms a “vulnerable and hyper-precarious section of the working class” (Ferguson and McNally, 
2014:5, emphasis mine). This perspective does not aim to deny the agency of migrant workers 
who decide in the current era to internally relocate or to cross borders for the search of a better 
livelihood but rather to make visible the structural conditions leading to decisions to migrate. 
 
Importantly, the pacification of remittances should not be understood in isolation from other 
processes of marketisation. My analysis suggests instead that it constitutes just one of the three 
framings that contribute to the (re)structuring of the remittance marketplace. I turn now to the 
second market framing: the formatting of agencies.  
  
                                                     
38 The neoliberal period does in fact represent only one of the modes of appropriation of dispossessed people from the 
peripheries, following slavery and indentured servitude in the 17th and 18th century and the so-called ‘coolie labour’ 
system in India and other parts of Asia (Ferguson and McNally, 2014). 
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4.3.2. Valuing Remittances: the acquisition and formatting of agencies  
Turning remittances into financial resources that can be leveraged for further financial inclusion, 
– through for instance the provision of ‘second-generation’ products such as loans and insurance 
– depends on the capacity to get migrants and RR to channel remittances through the formal 
financial sector. In other words, it is reliant on the acquisition and retention of migrants and RR 
as active customers of banks, MFIs and/or MNOs, and the ‘management’ of their remittances in 
ever-increasing volumes. How is this being achieved in practice? Drawing upon Callon’s and 
Çalíşkan’s (2010) second process of framing, the incorporation and circulation of remittances 
within financial circuits is guaranteed by the formatting of specific market agencies among RR 
and migrants, as well as the agents that mediate remittance flows (Banks/MFIs/MNOs and their 
agents). These agencies are formatted – i.e. made aligned to notions of market rationality and 
entrepreneurialism – by a particular socio-technical agencement of human beings and market 
devices, in material, technical, discursive and/or textual terms. Understanding how the diverse 
human and non-human elements of this agencement are put to play in the context of the 
marketisation of remittances in Senegal and Ghana is what I focus on now. 
 
Financial inclusion market makers as well as banks, MFIs and other commercial financial service 
providers such as MNOs have recently turned to branchless banking through retail agents to 
deliver formal financial services to so-called ‘unbanked’ and ‘underbanked’ populations. In fact, 
branchless banking constitutes a new way of distributing financial services outside bank 
premises allowing customers to make not only financial transactions such as deposits, 
withdrawals and loan repayments but also domestic and international remittance transfers at a 
whole range of retail agents. Two main models of branchless banking have emerged over the past 
ten years: one led by financial institutions, i.e. banks and MFIs, and the other by non-bank 
financial actors, most often MNOs. In Ghana, I mostly focus on the MNO-led model of branchless 
banking while in the Senegalese case, the MFI-led model of branchless banking constitutes my 
main analytical entry point. This is not to deny that both models, as well as other models of 
branchless banking such as mobile banking and ATMs have emerged in the two countries but 
rather to offer a more encompassing picture of the various ways in which different actors and 
devices contribute to the differentiated formation of remittance markets in different places. 
Importantly, domestic and, at a later stage, international remittances, through the sheer scale of 
their flows, are considered to play a major role in the success of branchless banking through retail 
agents in particular, and financial inclusion more generally (Noor and Thomas, 2013).  
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4.3.2.1. MFI-led branchless banking through retail agents in Senegal  
Figure 4.3 depicts two typical small shops located in the centre of Thiès, the third biggest city in 
Senegal. The picture on the left is a multi-service boutique people visit to do all sorts of things 
such as topping up credit or browsing the internet for between 250 and 500 CFA franc an hour 
(£0,35-0,70). On the right is a shop that sells tableware and rugs. These two shops also provide 
money transfer services, notably Wari, Joni-Joni – the two main MTOs for domestic money 
transfers in the country – but also mobile-based money transfer service, OM. The pink board 
attached on top of both shops on which the word ‘Baobab’ is written indicates that the shops also 
are two of the 550+ BCs of the MFI Baobab Senegal.  
 
Figure 4. 3 - Banking Correspondents’ boutiques 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: photographs from in-field observations in Thiès) 
 
Like the vast majority of MFIs and banks in the country, Baobab Senegal provides money transfer 
services in its forty agencies across the country. What differentiates Baobab from its competitors, 
however, is the organisation’s aggressive and novel strategy of enrolment of clients, including RR, 
and its attempts to provide them with supplementary financial products. Whereas Baobab’s 
earlier strategy of enrolment was to tap into existing MFI customers in predominantly urban 
areas where its competitors were already located (Touré, 2014), the MFI is now actively seeking 
to expand its customer base by reaching out to populations that have supposedly not had access 
to formal finance previously. In order to develop its delivery channel, attract new clients and gain 
market shares, Baobab has decided to get closer to a spatially dispersed population, especially in 
peri-urban and rural areas. In 2014, the MFI launched its agent-banking network that allows its 
customers to conduct various types of transactions at a BCs’ location, including cash-in (savings 
deposit), cash-out (savings withdrawal) transactions, loan repayments as well as money transfers 
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from one account to another. By the end of 2016, amongst Baobab’s 200 000+ clients, 70% were 
making regular transactions, and of those, between 20 and 30% were using Baobab services 
through the network of BCs. 
 
In Thiès, BCs are scattered all across the town (Figure 4.4). When describing the role they play in 
the organisation’s strategy of increasing its customer base in the country, Baobab’s Country 
Director points out that: 
 
There are people that do not have access to mainstream financial products but, more importantly, 
that need infrastructure in their geographical zones. Products are not the only things we need to 
provide. We need to provide accessibility and proximity and this can only be done if we are based 
where they live. 
 
Financial exclusion is here depicted as a problem of accessibility and/or a lack of proximity, as 
the director of the main branch in Thiès states:  
 
The main problem, it’s the distance. We are not where they are. With BCs, we’re getting closer to 
them so that they can do their operations.  
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Figure 4. 4 - Location of Baobab Banking Correspondents across Thiès, Senegal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Baobab website) 
 
In contrast, most banks and MFIs in Thiès only have between one and four brick-and-mortar 
agencies. In peri-urban and rural areas such as Tienaba, Khombole and Toubatoul, twenty 
kilometres outside Thiès, several shops have taken up the task of acting as BCs, whereas only a 
couple of Baobab’s competitors are present (Figure 4.5).  
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Figure 4. 5 - Banking Correspondents across Thiès, Tienaba and Khombole 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Baobab website) 
 
While offering proximity is of significant importance, BCs have also been set up to guarantee a 
certain level of profitability. In the opinion of Baobab’s Country Director, almost half of the 
branches of its three main competitors, i.e. CMS, ACEP and PAMECAS, are in deficit: 
 
It is not in every area that you can make Bank or MFI branches financially profitable. We want to 
be everywhere, but we don’t want to destroy value. BCs allow us to meet these two criteria: 
guaranteeing proximity without destroying value. 
 
While proximity is mostly understood in its physical sense, the notion underpins at least two 
other different but complementary meanings: proximity can be social and digital. Taken together, 
my evidence shows that these three forms of proximity act as nudges, or ‘commitment devices’, 
that encourage RR as well as BCs to behave in certain ways rather than others. More specifically, 
the physical/social/digital proximity between RR and BCs is dependent on and enhanced by the 
physical/social/digital proximity between BCs and Baobab. In turn, these proximities are 
supported by the acquisition of calculative agency, i.e. the distributed agency of a wide range of 
human (economists in the ‘wild’, consultants) and non-human elements (management sciences 
and techniques, informational infrastructure, measuring devices as well as rules and regulations). 
All these elements are involved in the valuing of remittances for financial inclusion purposes 
(Çalíşkan and Callon, 2010). I now turn to the concrete ways in which the physical/social/digital 
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proximity between RR and BCs on the one hand, and between BCs and Baobab on the other, has 
been made possible, with the purpose of formatting RR and BCs agencies. 
 
The rolling-out of BCs network is not of Baobab’s own making but has been financially and 
practically facilitated by the IFC and the MasterCard Foundation. Baobab is in fact one of the eight 
MFIs to be part of the ‘Partnership for Financial Inclusion’, a seven-year, USD 37.4-million joint 
program of IFC and The MasterCard Foundation to “expand microfinance and advance digital 
financial services in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Koblanck et al, 2017:15). Based on a multi-year 
longitudinal study and numerous rounds of field visits between 2014 and 2017, the initiative aims 
to “develop and test innovative business models for financial inclusion” (ibid). Before going 
further, it is important to mention that this initiative, while fitting nicely with the remittances-
financial inclusion-development nexus and partly involving the same type of organisations, does 
not necessarily target migrants or remittances recipients and their remittances directly. The 
scope of the initiative is broader with the ambition of reaching an entire population. This was 
notably stated at the launch of the ‘Mass-market financial inclusion’ programme, the result of a 
new partnership between Baobab and the MasterCard Foundation in 2016 that aims to reach over 
one million customers across Senegal, Madagascar and the Ivory Coast by 2019 (Baobab, 2017). 
As such, the formation of remittance markets needs to be understood as provisional and partly 
the result of political, historical and material contingencies. For instance, a global ‘expert’ on 
remittances and financial inclusion I interviewed mentioned he was interested in the work of 
Baobab as it was quite complementary to the work they were doing in the country. They, 
however, had not been in contact with the MFI yet. Nonetheless, another report commissioned by 
the IFC and the MasterCard Foundation for the very same programme highlighted that: 
 
The long-established prevalence of migration and remittances in the Senegalese market (…), well-
established practices of transfers within social networks, and an appreciation for how DFS may be 
a stepping stone to access more traditional forms of banking services, are factors that may work in 
favour of Digital Financial Services (DFS) in Senegal and can be leveraged by providers. (Koblanck 
et al, 2017:34) 
 
As mentioned above, this idea of a new way of delivering financial services is part of a programme 
of fast-paced, high-volume acquisition of new clients. Based on a research survey led by Baobab 
in partnership with IFC in 2014 of two thousand households that focuses on money management 
practices and financial services usage, new products and delivery channels were developed to 
respond to the gaps that were identified. For instance, Baobab developed an application on a 
tablet that allows Baobab’s field staff to offer savings accounts. These accounts are deemed to 
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reduce the need to go to a branch and require minimum documentation and no account-opening 
fees or minimum balances.39  
 
The approach of Baobab and IFC to improve products and delivery is based on an iterative process 
that requires numerous pilot tests. Some of these pilot tests take the form of Randomised 
Controlled Trials (RCTs). For instance, a research project in 2016 supported by the MasterCard 
Foundation and the IFC led by four economists from the IFC and the WB used a RCT to learn about 
the impact of access to agent banking on account opening and account usage in Senegal (Buri et 
al, 2018). A randomly selected group of people were given different nudges (financial incentives) 
and requirements as a way to assess whether or not branchless banking better promotes take-up 
and usage of accounts than offering the same services through the branch (ibid). The approach 
taken up by Baobab is quite representative of the increasing use of field experiments as testing 
grounds for further development interventions in the Global South (Berndt, 2015; Karlan and 
Appel, 2011). These field experiments based on RCT methodologies act as a key market device 
that aims to push, sometimes iteratively, RR and BCs’ behaviours towards particular directions 
aligned with the neoclassical model of the rational and adaptable subject conscious of the 
necessity of continuous market learning and market skills acquisition.40 
 
What is particularly interesting to note is that most BCs also happen to be domestic or regional 
money transfer Points-Of-Services (POS). With the emergence of Wari and Joni-Joni over the past 
10 years, multiservice boutiques and other small shops have diversified their activities and 
sources of income by becoming money transfer agents. These points have sprung up by the 
thousands all across the country; Wari currently has over 27 000 POS across the country. The fact 
that most Baobab BCs are also in the money transfer business, while not necessarily being a pre-
planned strategy, is not coincidental. These shops are street-front boutiques that have the 
required physical and technological infrastructure and skills as well as enough cash flow to 
operate with. Most importantly, they are embedded in the community they live in. In the words 
of a senior employee of Baobab Senegal: 
 
It is easier to train a guy that already does money transfers. He’s got a place already and you need 
to understand that these guys, they already have a customer base and we, as Baobab, we’re coming 
to try to attract them, to tap into it. (translation mine) 
 
                                                     
39 This is not the case for other MFIs. 
40 Chapters 5 and 6 will examine the ways in which RR and agents react to these market devices in more detail. 
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Agent’s network density and the availability of cash constitute the two most important aspects of 
the money transfer business. MTOs and MNOs such as Wari, Joni-Joni and OM have had to 
champion the sciences of agent network and liquidity management to become serious money 
transfer players in Senegal. Baobab was then able to tap into the pool of experienced and skilled 
agents to deploy its new approach of delivery.  
 
BCs are trained and supported by Gestionnaires de Correspondants (managers); they are on-field 
employees of Baobab that regularly visit BCs, assess their cash-flow availability, their marketing 
approach but also support them technically when, for instance, the system is down. Each BC is 
followed by an on-field manager while it is my understanding that each manager is in charge of 
on average fifty BCs. As mentioned in Chapter 3, I followed a manager for a week during which 
we went from one BC to another to check on the operations, fix equipment and provide training 
for newly-equipped BCs. BCs are generally encouraged by their managers to push their customers 
to open bank accounts and promote other Baobab financial products: “We want the BCs to help 
us opening accounts. These are people we train, and we have agents that follow them” (Baobab 
branch director, Thiès). In December 2015, Baobab organised a 3-month long competition for all 
BCs across the country; a financial prize was awarded to whoever sent the highest number of 
potential customers to Baobab’s agencies. BCs scored points only if prospects were turned into 
credit customers. A BC I met multiple times in central Thiès told me that he managed to convince 
many of his long-time clients as well as his close friends and family members to open Baobab 
bank accounts: 
 
I was calling lots of people to convince them. I managed to get lots of them to open accounts by 
telling them that they could get a loan for the Tabaski.41 When I send someone to the agency, there 
is a good chance they will get a loan. They know me well at Baobab now. (Banking Correspondent, 
Thiès, translation mine) 
 
As such, BCs’ managers play a crucial role in the formatting of BCs behaviours through their 
constant visits and presence as well as their operational and marketing training. Tools such as 
the competition mentioned above allow Baobab to assess their BCs marketing and enrolment 
skills and send signals to the latter on how they should understand their new role as Baobab’s 
new front office officers. Through this strategy of agents’ network enabled through POS, Baobab 
has been able to attract a significant number of new customers; between 2014 and 2016, Baobab’s 
                                                     
41 Tabaski is the term used in Senegal to designate Eid al-Adha, i.e. the second of two Islamic holidays celebrated 
worldwide each year (the other being Eid al-Fitr). 
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customer base increased by 60%, from 120 000 to 200 000. I was told by a BCs’ manager that in 
the town of Kayar, near Thiès, Baobab had no customers before they set up a BC. A year later, they 
managed to attract 200 credit customers and more than 2000 clients in total. The reason why it 
still seems relatively far from the 1.2-million target already mentioned is because many of the 
products and technological devices deemed to further increase the MFI’s customer base took 
longer than expected to be designed, tested and approved. Crucially, until the end of 2016-
beginning of 2017, BCs could not sign up new clients themselves. Instead, potential clients were 
encouraged to visit a Baobab branch where they could open a savings account. This changed when 
a new technology was introduced that allowed BCs to open accounts themselves rather than 
sending potential customers to the main branch. I now turn to these elements that render the 
proximity between RR and BCs on the one hand, and Baobab’s branches and headquarters in 
Dakar on the other, possible. 
 
These social, physical and digital proximities, and the agencies they contribute to mould, cannot 
be understood without paying attention to the human, material and technological infrastructure 
that contributes to the formation of BCs as site-specific socio-technical agencements (Kear, 2018). 
As indicated in Chapter 2, marketsites constitute particular places and junctures where all 
elements that configure a market come together to create “a market condition in which economic 
subjects behave as if they are rational” (Kear, 2018:317). BCs have been equipped with biometric 
Point-Of-Sale devices that allow them to identify customers through their fingerprints before the 
latter can make any transactions. The device is now also used when BCs sign up new clients, 
including RR. It can now take less than five minutes to open a savings account. Through a tablet 
running on an Android application, customers’ details are recorded (including a photo and 
fingerprints) and then transmitted to Baobab’s core banking application. In fact, BCs – but also 
field staff and loan officers – all have remote, real time access to Baobab’s core banking system. 
This core banking system – which is the same in every country Baobab operate in – is stored in 
the cloud and a range of dashboards monitors all BCs and bank transactions to identify trends, 
irregularities and usage patterns. Moreover, alongside BCs, additional encounters between RR as 
market subjects and other site-specific socio-technical agencements have been deployed through 
the development of a mobile application for field staff, including on-field loan officers. In contrast 
however to BCs, these marketsites have the particularity of being mobile; they penetrate into 
people’s homes, streets and even barber shops. In effect, Figure 4.6 captures the moment a 
Baobab on-field employee signs up a new client at his barber’s after a haircut.  
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Figure 4. 6 - Baobab on-field officer enrolling a new client at a barbershop 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Baobab website) 
 
The app allows loan officers to have direct, real-time access to the core banking platform, that is 
amongst other things a list of their clients, their geo-location, account balance, payment history, 
delays in repayment and the attached paid fees as well as outstanding loans. One outcome of this 
market device that Baobab advertise on their website is that 94% of loan officers were better able 
to manage their portfolio at risk by being informed about which particular clients they should 
prioritise and monitor and by being able to systematically check their clients’ financial behaviours 
before making any decisions, such as disbursing/renewing a loan for instance. In addition to this, 
the app provides a contact database that allows loan officers to call their clients anywhere and at 
any time, and especially as soon as they spot any delays in loan repayments. Again, this is 
something Baobab is eager to promote on their website by sharing the following account of one 
of their loan officers in Thiès: 
 
I call my clients even outside of business hours thanks to the application. It allows us to do our 
work at any time. (Carisch, 2016) 
 
By making it easier and faster for loan officers to check their clients’ financial behaviours on a 
daily basis, the technology reduces loans processing time significantly. While several remittance 
recipients said that it takes on average three to four weeks to get a loan from Baobab’s main 
competitors, the processing time for a first loan with Baobab is less than a week. For a loan 
renewal, this can take less than a day. Loan officers themselves are under scrutiny; the app gives 
 
 
126 
indications on how portfolio managers perform on a daily basis. This is deemed to motivate them 
to work more and better. Everything is done to reduce uncertainty to a minimum and make sure 
that irregularities and underperformance are being systematically tracked and fixed, often by 
agents’ themselves through self-assessment.  
 
As new products and services are deployed over time, the transformation of money transfer 
points of services into concrete marketsites is reinforced and consolidated. In 2015 for instance, 
Baobab started testing various versions of a new loan product called Taka loans. In a blog post 
written by Baobab Head of financial inclusion research, it was announced that “the Taka loan offers 
clients anywhere from 5,000 to 250,000 CFA francs (8–380 Euro) for 1 month” (Carisch, 2017). 
The scoring model that is deployed is based on Baobab’s existing customer base. Clients are 
classified into different loan eligibility categories, depending on their loan repayment and savings 
history. Clients know this very well. I encountered several cases of RR moving money, including 
remittances, around (i.e. cashing money in and out with a fee) with the sole purpose of becoming 
eligible to loans. Importantly, clients are strongly encouraged to pay back early – e.g. within fifteen 
days – in order to get better interest rates or bigger amounts in the future (Carish, 2017). For those 
who pay on time, a second loan of the same amount is available immediately whereas late clients 
become ineligible for another loan in the near future. My evidence suggests that these financial 
incentives, or nudges, have to be understood as in-built features of the product and constitute what 
makes it profitable: 
 
We use of inventiveness so that it exceeds 24% to be profitable by encouraging clients to pay back 
earlier (…) When clients pay back early, they get better scores (…) There are incentives to push the 
customer to pay back early and when that is the case it’s much more profitable for us because it 
increases the annual percentage rate. (Baobab Senegal, Country Director) 
 
While information is difficult to obtain, it is my understanding that during the pilot phases of the 
Taka loan product that began in 2015, a 6% upfront fee incurred. Clients then “chose” when to 
repay the loan amount up until one month. If repaid after 30 days, the Annual Percentage Rate 
(APR) (i.e. the true cost of the loan) amounts to 73%. However, if the loans get repaid after for 
instance 14 days, the APR increases to 156%. If repaid after 5 days, the APR rises to 438%. 
Importantly, these nano-loans can only be cashed-out and repaid through BCs (and not at a 
traditional branch) or via a soon-to-be-launched enhanced network of dedicated agents – or 
‘young local entrepreneurs’ as Baobab call them – whose task will be to open bank accounts and 
distribute these nano-loans (Figure 4.7).  
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Figure 4. 7 - Baobab dedicated agent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Baobab website) 
 
BCs and dedicated agents are trained on the ways in which the loan works and are encouraged to 
let clients know whether they are eligible for a nano-loan whenever they visit. If they are, BCs can 
send them a text – a market device that can be considered as a nudge itself as I will show in the 
next section – with the loan offer. Whereas the original targeted population for these nano-loans 
is Baobab’s existing customer base, Baobab was at the time of writing seeking to form partnerships 
with MNOs in order to expand its market by tapping into people’s telecommunications data. In 
Ghana, these partnerships exist already; understanding how MM ecosystems are constituted and 
sustained and how they are partly dependent on and contribute to the marketisation of 
remittances is the focus of the next section.  
 
4.3.2.2. MNO-led branchless banking through retail agents in Ghana 
Branchless banking also has become a centre of attention for a significant number of financial and 
non-financial commercial institutions in Ghana. As I indicated earlier, while bank-led branchless 
banking is on the rise in the country and could deserve an entire section, I choose here to focus on 
the nonbank-led branchless banking model, and more specifically on the relatively recent 
phenomenon of MNO-led branchless banking, or MM. MM has been considered by the international 
development community as an increasingly important tool for poverty alleviation through the 
incorporation of the poor into formal (digital) finance (see for instance the UNCDF- and AusAid-
funded programme “Mobile Money for the Poor”). The main difference with the bank- or MFI-led 
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model is that customers do not necessarily have a bank account nor deal directly with a financial 
institution but rather exchange cash for value stored in a mobile phone-based virtual account, i.e. 
“e-money”. E-money can either be sent to others, used to make purchases, or stored in the e-
money account for future use (see Figure 4.8). Customers can also convert it back to cash at any 
MM agent’s location, e.g. airtime vendors, grocery shops or petrol stations. 
 
Figure 4. 8 - Advertisement promoting MTN’s mobile-based savings product in partnership with 
Fidelity Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Fidelity Bank Ghana) 
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In Ghana, as in many other countries (Nelms and Rea, 2017), MM services started as a domestic 
person-to-person money transfer product. According to an employee from one of the major MNOs, 
the most common transactions in the Greater Accra region are cash-ins (money deposits) 
whereas, in other regions, cash-out transactions dominate. In effect, the peer-to-peer function of 
MM services has now almost totally replaced former remittance routes that were historically 
traversed by bus and taxi drivers as well as friends and family members. While the one-
directionality flows should not to be exaggerated as research shows that money flows from rural 
to urban areas as well as around dense social networks in reciprocal ways (Kusimba et al, 2015), 
urban-to-rural domestic remittances have nonetheless constituted one of the main entry points 
for MM take-up and remain a crucial element that shapes the Ghanaian MM ecosystem.  
 
MM adoption has been relatively slow in Ghana; up until 2012/2013, MM had not widely 
“permeated the social life” of Ghanaians and was mostly used to send and receive money 
internally (Dzokoto and Appiah, 2014:41). According to various MM market actors I interviewed, 
the decisive factor in take-up is the development of the MM ecosystem and the multiplication of 
situations in which e-money can be used. Today in Ghana, MM services include not only cash-ins, 
cash-outs and transfers but also airtime bill payments, merchant payments and, more recently, 
international remittances. Even more recently, MMOs have started to form partnerships with 
financial institutions to offer additional financial services such as savings accounts, insurance, 
credit and even equity products. Crucially, it is argued that the amount and regularities of 
payments MM users receive – which inevitably include domestic and, to a lesser extent, 
international remittances – can be leveraged for further financial inclusion:  
 
Based on the volumes you are receiving and the frequency, that can also become a basis for 
enabling the customer to access small loans. When building a loan product, you are using the 
customers’ transactions details which gives you a fair idea of who this customer is and his risk 
profile. So, yes, remittance is a segment that we are seeking to leverage and drive financial 
inclusion. (Airtel Money Ghana, Head) 
 
Before going further, it is important to note that adoption rates for these recently-developed 
financial products are still relatively low. At the time of fieldwork, the leading MMO in Ghana was 
still testing its mobile-based credit product whereas insurance products, such as the two 
remittance-linked mobile-based insurance products had just been launched by both Vodafone 
and MTN (Figure 4.9). The main goal of this section is then to account for what enabled such 
products to be thought of as valuable and profitable in the first place, designed and 
commercialised. These remittance-linked digital financial products and services constitute that 
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latest stage of the formation and consolidation of the MM ecosystem in Ghana. My evidence 
suggests that the marketisation of mobile remittances requires the establishment, active 
commitment and maintenance of particular agencies. It shows how these agencies are in turn 
distributed across a heterogeneous assemblage of human and nonhuman elements, ranging from 
narratives and regulations to algorithms, technical and material devices. 
 
 
Figure 4. 9 - Advertisement promoting MTN’s remittance-linked insurance product in 
partnership with Ayo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: MTN Ghana) 
 
MM only started to grow in Ghana when a new e-money guideline came into effect in 2015, 
allowing non-bank entities (MNOs) to issue electronic money alongside regulated financial 
institutions. Here, I consider regulations as crucial market settings through which markets are 
given form; they contribute to producing new realities. At the origin of the new guideline was the 
view that the previous regulatory environment was hampering investment in a potential MM 
ecosystem as clear financial incentives for both banks and non-banks were lacking. For instance, 
based on what is called a bank-led ‘many-to-many’ model, the regulation was preventing 
exclusive partnerships, meaning that any investments in a new product would automatically 
benefit all the other competitors. While the Bank of Ghana was very pro-active in the domain, the 
changes were facilitated by a range of actors that are part of what Gabor and Brooks (2017) call 
the “fintech-philanthropy-development complex”, a new alliance of developing countries, 
international financial organisations, philanthropic investment firms and fintech companies that 
have embraced digital financial inclusion as a new development paradigm. By accepting the Maya 
Declaration in 201242, the Bank of Ghana had to commit to regulatory changes in branchless 
                                                     
42 The Maya Declaration constitutes a shared commitment to financially include the 2.5 billion unbanked and set up 
national financial inclusion strategies in collaboration with private sector actors (Gabor and Brooks, 2017). 
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banking with the aim to financially include at least 70% of the Ghanaian population by 2017. 
Particularly active within this organisational assemblage have been the Better than Cash 
Alliance43 and World Bank-housed CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor). When asked 
about how the 2015 guidelines came into being, a consultant for CGAP said that the organisation 
played a key role: 
 
CGAP pretty much ran that thing. There was a bunch of banking guidelines - it says the banks are 
going to do this business (…) But it became clear that Mobile Money Operators were the ones 
driving the space and so, they raise that issue. Bank of Ghana was engaged and CGAP helped with 
essentially regularising the operations by creating the new e-money guideline. 
 
An additional hurdle to take-up that was identified by many organisations of the complex and the 
MNOs I interviewed was the compliance to Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures and Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations. The latter 
require MNOs to receive sufficient proof of identity from customers before registering them as 
MM users. When the threshold with regard to what constitutes proof of identity is too high or 
when customers lack IDs, financial inclusion efforts are thwarted. Supported by the momentum 
that the new guideline brought about, MNOs in Ghana started to figure out ways of engaging 
potential subscribers. One of the strategies was to knock on people’s doors to sign them up. In 
effect, the rationale behind this is that people generally have their ID with them at home. People 
were also encouraged to come along to activation locations with their ID. MTN ran small drama 
sketch about the benefits of the service as part of their so-called Direct Consumer Contact 
approach. The General Manager of MTN Mobile Money told me that these efforts of “education, 
incentivisation and awareness creation” were considered essential to overcoming KYC 
requirements. Furthermore, and as a response to a malfunctioning decentralised ID system – 
there were nine separate databases across various government and public entities – and the 
difficulty for financial institutions to pinpoint with precision the address of prospective 
customers, a national biometric identification programme coupled with a new national address 
system based on GPS coordinates was introduced by the government in 2018.  It is hoped that the 
schemes, by facilitating the monitoring and tracking of persons and the assets and properties they 
own, will reduce information asymmetry, hence increasing the capacity of financial institutions 
to ensure the integrity of KYC and AML reporting. It is also expected that, by leveraging digital ID, 
people will be in a position to activate accounts remotely through electronic KYC, or “e-KYC” 
(Amoah et al, 2017). In fact, MNOs such as Airtel Money and MTN already offer savings accounts 
                                                     
43 While the governance structure of the Better than Cash Alliance is relatively opaque, the main aim of this collective 
is rather explicit: “to accelerate the transition from cash to digital payments globally through excellence in advocacy, 
knowledge and services to members” (See Mader, 2016b:71). 
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in partnership with banking institutions. On the electronic platforms, subscribers can now open 
accounts with the existing KYC that they have on their mobile account without necessarily having 
to go to a bank’s branch. Once an account is opened, customers can transfer money from their MM 
wallets to their interest-bearing bank accounts and from their bank accounts to their MM wallets 
by way of USSD short codes. In industry terms, these transactions are called ‘push and pull’ 
transactions.  
 
Importantly, alongside the 2015 e-money guideline, a regulatory framework for MM agents – the 
Agent Guidelines – was established with the objective of promoting financial inclusion. The 
guideline emphasises the key tenets that underpin any contract between an agent and the 
“principal”, i.e. the e-money issuer. Through these contracts, new relationships of obligations, 
rights and monitoring but also of mutual reliance were established. Grocery stores, multiservice 
boutiques and airtime vendors were turned into MM agents, an essential element of the 
ecosystem. Not only do agents receive a new legal status by entering into this contractual 
relationship, they also are encouraged to transform their daily practices and behaviours. One of 
the new “permissible activities” of agents is the active “marketing of credit, savings and insurance 
products offered and underwritten by duly licensed financial institutions” (Bank of Ghana, 
2015:8). Like BCs for Baobab in Senegal, MM agents become financial institutions’ new front 
officers. The situation is, however, complicated by the presence of intermediaries, or “master 
agents”, who manage agents on behalf of the principal. The role of the principal is therefore to 
align the interests of agents and master agents with theirs in the long term in order to develop 
and sustain the MM ecosystem. This can be done through sanctions and penalties as well as 
financial incentives:  
 
We pay merchants for keeping e-money so that we can motivate them to hold e-money, waiting for 
the customer to buy. (MTN Mobile Money, General Manager) 
 
A complex range of commissions have been set up in order to sign up agents and master agents 
and ensure they fulfil their duties, that is making sure cash is available at all time for customers. 
Financial incentives are, however, far from being sufficient when more structural problems are 
at play. While MM in the southern parts of the country is now fairly developed and tends to work 
quite smoothly, the same cannot be said about the North of the country. Structurally 
underdeveloped since the colonial period, the Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions are 
zones of domestic emigration (Ouma, 2015b:3). As a result, MM agents have much bigger liquidity 
issues in these regions because the demand for cash is disproportionally larger than any other 
types of transactions, e.g. cash-ins. Problems of connectivity and infrastructure are also deemed 
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to hamper the development of the ecosystem in the North. Beyond that, operating and sustaining 
a MM ecosystem in the North proves more difficult due to a different rainfall pattern than in the 
South. While southern Ghana experiences two rainy seasons a year, there is only one rainy season 
in northern Ghana. In regions where a large part of the population in rural areas work in 
agriculture, this means that smallholder farmers receive their main bulk of income once a year 
after the harvest. For MM agents, this results in a significant amount of cash floating around and 
a heavy spike in demand during one time of the year, whereas the number and volume of 
transactions flatten out during the rest of the year. Unsustainable demand paired with stable and 
high operational costs make it difficult for MNOs to sustain a viable agent network across the 
country. This calls attention to the unruliness of nature that often defies investment plans. Here, 
meteorological materialities shape the process of remittance marketisation. In fact, market 
makers have to find ways to circumvent these constraining natural properties. As a response to 
these two different modal rainfall patterns and the difficulties they cause in terms of agent 
network management, new transactions have to be “found”:  
 
It's not that easy to operate a mobile money service so that's why the mobile money guys are 
partnering with prepaid electricity people and what not. So, finding transactions that people have 
to do anyway, digitising it, and when it's digitised, people can do it from the mobile money wallet, 
they have a reason to go and do transactions at an agent's point, and sustain agents. It's about 
creating traffic at the agents' points. (CGAP, Consultant, emphasis mine) 
 
In the words of an employee of one of the biggest MNOs in Ghana, the market in the North remains 
to be “conquered” (see Mitchell, 2007 in Section 2.4.1.). Nonetheless, MM adoption in Ghana has 
now reached a certain level of threshold that allows the service to keep growing: 
 
When it comes to mobile money, once you’ve hit a certain threshold, the human factor, the 
individual interactions and the numbers tend to influence the growth. Because a certain number 
of people are now using it and whoever has an account is likely to convince another person to also 
open a wallet. (MTN Mobile Money, General Manager) 
 
By actively contributing to the formation of the material, regulatory, informational and human 
infrastructures of the MM ecosystem, MNOs have made possible the centralisation and 
incorporation of vast amounts of geographically dispersed cash into formal financial circuits. In 
the words of the General Manager of MTN Mobile Money, MM has allowed to “mop up cash from 
the system”: 
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Through our engagement, the banks now have access to 300+ million dollars that they can use 
because it is the float that is available. 
 
Originally providing the option of sending and receiving money domestically, the above elements 
of the socio-technical market arrangements have played a decisive role in “objectifying” person-
to-person transfers, including domestic remittances. The acquisition of calculative agencies 
specific to the MM market has opened the door for banks and other non-banking financial 
institutions to imagine the electronic equivalent of cash circulating through MM’ electronic trails 
as a new source of value. Once it became clear that MNOs in Ghana were going to hit that threshold 
and that MM take up would materialise, banks started to collaborate with e-money issuers to 
expand their businesses and move to previously unreachable areas. An MNO employee I 
interviewed considers MM as “an enhancement to banking”, offering complementary services 
rather than being a threat to the traditional banking sector. It is in this context that new financial 
products, such as mobile-based micro-savings accounts, mobile-based remittance-linked 
insurance products as well as nano-loans sprung up.  
 
At the time of writing, numerous mobile-based financial products were being either designed, 
tested and launched by all four major MNOs in the country. As in Senegal, these products and 
services are the fruits of the collaboration of an assemblage of actors. The provision of such 
services requires additional tools and technologies that contribute to the equipment of calculative 
agencies. By enabling the various institutional actors to have access to more precise information 
about the regularities, qualities and volumes of these monetary e-flows, these market tools and 
technologies classify and cluster senders and receivers of these flows according to credit or 
insurance risks attached to them. In Berndt’s (2015:582) words:  
 
They [market devices] render economic activities calculable, standardise and normalise practices, 
generate trust and see to it that traditional ways of doing things are increasingly regarded as 
dispensable.  
 
To illustrate how this plays out in the context of rendering remitting practices commensurate and 
transparent, I focus on one specific mobile-based product offered by one major MNO in 
partnership with a non-banking financial institution (AfB) and a Fintech company (Jumo). 
QwikLoan is a mobile-based nano-loan product that is available to MTN subscribers. It provides 
them with low-value loans from 50 up to 100 GhC (i.e. £7-14). At the end of 30 days, the loan must 
be repaid in addition to a 6.9% loan facilitation fee. Loans can also be repaid at any time via the 
Qwikloan menu. If repaid after 30 days, the APR of Qwikloan amounts to 83.95%. What is more, 
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if a borrower makes a late repayment, a fee of 12.5% of the remaining balance is applied. Concerns 
about the high costs of such loans, if used regularly, have been raised notably by CGAP which 
commented on a similar nano-loan product in Kenya, M-Shwari44: 
 
If a customer is using an M-Shwari loan to pay for an unexpected emergency (such as an illness), 
the opportunity cost of not borrowing may be very high and the overall price feels affordable, 
especially in nominal terms (you’re talking about small loans) However, if M-Shwari becomes a 
regular way households finance daily expenses, this would be relatively expensive. (Cook and 
McKay, 2015) 
 
Similar to Taka loans, it was clear that the aim of the financial and commercial institutions 
involved in the design and selling of QwickLoan was for such a product to become part of people’s 
everyday lives and not just an emergency loan that one may use occasionally. The advantages that 
have been put forward are that QwikLoan is simple, fast and does not require as much paperwork 
as bank loans. How does QwikLoan work? MTN subscribers who are interested in taking on, for 
instance, a £10 nano-loan will need to access the MTN menu on their phone, click on “Apply for a 
QwikLoan” and launch the request (see Figure 4.10). This is where the hidden work of the Fintech 
company starts. For this particular financial product, MTN and AfB have been collaborating with 
a Fintech called Jumo; a mobile financial services platform that facilitates digital financial services 
such as mobile-based credit and savings in developing countries by way of USSD short codes. 
Jumo is a privately held company that comprises of eight country offices, with its headquarters in 
Cape Town, South Africa. Amongst its 320+ employees are data and intelligence scientists that 
have been recruited, I was told by one ‘JUMOnaut’, from companies like Amazon or Google. 
Whereas the MNO provides the transactional and telecommunication data to Jumo and the 
financial institution provides capital, Jumo brings these two entities together through 
technological tools that contribute to the equipment of calculative agencies engaged in the MM 
ecosystem, i.e. a credit-scoring model using new technology of algorithms. In other words, MTN’s 
data are fed into an algorithm that is used to assign a credit score for each MTN customer.  
  
                                                     
44 For more detailed information about the average costs of digital credit across the continent, see Kaffenberger and 
Chege (2016) 
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Figure 4. 10 - Advertisement promoting MTN’s Qwik Loan in partnership with AfB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: MTN Ghana) 
 
Credit-scoring algorithms harness ‘digital footprints’ generated by the use of mobile phones in 
order to supposedly better understand people’s behaviours and better assess their 
creditworthiness. These credit scores extracted from a behavioral track record can help measure 
the appetite for financial products among so-called ‘emerging customers’. What Jumo does is to 
transform mobile behaviours into financial opportunities for institutions like MNOs and banks. 
The credit-scoring algorithm takes into account 7000+ metrics that comprise of customers' MM 
and telecommunication data, such as phone calls, texts, MM transactions, contact lists. Concretely, 
these metric points include, among many other things, information about 
 how long customers have been on the MM platform; 
 how much money they have received/sent and how frequently; 
 what kind of transactions they do (withdrawing, cashing-in, savings); 
 how much money they have in their wallet, etc. 
Metrics that relate to airtime activities are also accounted for: 
 how often customers recharge/top-up; 
 how long they have been on the network; 
 how often they change sim cards, etc. 
It also combines GPS data, WI-FI network use as well as mobile phone battery levels. In fact, 
seemingly mundane details such as how often customers ‘let’ their phone battery die and how 
long their phone is off for do influence whether or not customers can qualify for loans and the 
amount they can get. 
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As mentioned earlier, a significant fraction of domestic mobile-based person-to-person transfers 
actually represent domestic remittances; many MM users in the northern regions also happen to 
be RR. As a result, encouraging users to transact a certain amount of e-value on a frequent basis 
for a relatively long period in order to become eligible to a financial product arguably is an 
attempt to influence the ways in which RR receive, use and manage their remittances. When 
explaining the ways in which remittances can play an important role in making subscribers 
eligible to a QwikLoan, the Country Director of Jumo made it clear that it is preferable for 
remittances to stay in the e-wallet rather than being cashed-out immediately. What it also clear 
is that subscribers that receive remittances have much better chances to be eligible than those 
who load their account themselves. Receiving frequent amounts of money from other people 
means that one may be more able to pay back, even in times of temporary crisis: 
But it's important to us that you're not constantly in a rush to go and pick up money (…) for 
instance, people that would use mobile money to buy airtime, that's a good behaviour for us 
because the person (…) develops a certain kind of life around mobile money, as opposed to 
somebody who's just like: "ok, send me money and boom it's gone". (…) Also, importantly, we want 
to see that you're not only loading your account, but people are sending money to this account and 
you're sending money outside the account because when this happens, then we know that by 
virtue of these other relationships, there is reasonable stickability on the account, so probably 
that's where the remittances come in. (Jumo, Country Director) 
One commitment device that Jumo uses to encourage potential loan takers to ‘behave well’ is text 
messages. In effect, Jumo frequently sends text messages that not only promote the use of 
financial products but also give financial advice. They act as nudges that constantly remind the 
subscribers to do, think and plan things in particular ways. They contribute to the transformation 
of MM users and remittance receivers into financially responsible subjects that should make 
‘better choices’ in order improve their lives: 
Tomorrow I'm going to send a text message to seven million customers that are active MTN mobile 
money customers. That is bigger than any bank. Just by virtue of one SMS I have sent, I'm going to 
tell people to do something that enhances their financial lives. Just one SMS. That's impossible for 
a bank to reach, even over a year. So, the ease of doing that part of the business - customer 
education - the ease of achieving things like: "Ok, you need to be responsible with your life, you 
need to take responsibility" and then because you're responsible, you're rewarded - so, the ease of 
being able to communicate all of these targeted specific messaging to different segments allow 
those people to at least be influenced much more positively... Because the bigger part of this 
conversation is not that we're just giving them loans, we are (1) educating them about finance, (2) 
we are letting them get a clear idea about how to live their lives - I mean taking responsibility and 
all of that, and in addition to that, (3) we’re building some credit history for them through all the 
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information that we gather on customers. (Jumo, Country Director, emphasis mine) 
While the influence of these text messages on the shaping of financial subjectivities is of course 
not to be exaggerated (see Chapters 5 and 6), it is worth stating that when Jumo sends a text to 
every subscriber of the MNO they work with – that is between seven and eight million –,they 
manage to reach roughly 25% of the Ghanaian population. For subscribers willing to become 
eligible for such financial products, new uncertainties are created, and economic decisions have 
to be made: What is the proportion of the money one receives that should be saved and for how 
long? When and how much should one cash-out? How much of the remittances should be 
prioritised for savings, consumption, but also for loan repayments? Should one ask people to send 
money to one’s MM account – rather than, when possible, hand-to-hand cash transactions – even 
though a fee is incurred? By propelling these new uncertainties that push MM receivers to behave 
in more ‘responsible’ ways, market devices produce new realities and contribute to the coming 
into being of the Homo Economicus. In contrast to the relatively ‘fixed’ marketsites that BCs 
represent in the Senegal case, my empirical analysis indicates that in addition to MM agents, 
mobile phones through which financial transactions are performed and certain nudges operate 
can be considered mobile marketsites that follow users everywhere and at all times: a marketsite 
in the pocket. The formation of remittance markets, including fixed and mobile marketsites, do 
not however come without controversies in the framing; this is what Callon (1998) calls moments 
of overflows. As I will demonstrate in the next section that constitutes the third framing of 
remittances, the production of the Homo economicus rarely is a stable accomplishment. In effect, 
the formatting of agencies among both members of remittance households and remittance agents 
– is not a frictionless process but does take place in the context of competing regimes of value 
(see also Chapters 5 and 6). 
4.3.3. The formatting of remittance market encounters 
In order for pacified goods – here, remittances – to meet the agencies formatted by heterogeneous 
elements that constitute the socio-technical agencement, market encounters must be framed and 
formatted (Çalíşkan and Callon 2010). These encounters represent the third and final major 
framing I am focusing on, part of the remittance marketisation process. In the following sub-
section, I show that the chain between migrants’ money, RR, banking and non-banking financial 
institutions’ products and services and, eventually, investors can be long and involve numerous 
‘mediators’. The latter act as a market assemblage of human intermediaries (agents) and non-
human intermediated devices (technological platforms) that facilitate market encounters (Kear, 
2018). The last sub-section examines the on-going financial engineering undertaken by entities 
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such as Baobab and MTN to organise market encounters between their clients, including 
remittance customers, and global investors. 
 
4.3.3.1. When remittances meet financial and commercial institutions 
For the qualification of remittances to happen, multiple encounters between market agents have 
to take place and different prices have to be agreed upon: between migrants/RR and MFIs’/MNOs’ 
agents; between agents and MNOs/MFIs; between MNOs/MFIs and banks; between MNOs/MFIs 
and MTOs; between banks and merchants and between merchants and super-merchants. As 
Çalíşkan and Callon (2010:16) argue after Stark (2009), “fixing a price is always the outcome of a 
struggle between agencies trying to impose their modes for measuring a good’s value and 
qualities”. An encounter of particular importance is the one between agents and their ‘principal’, 
i.e. MNOs and/or MFIs. As evidenced previously, the deployment and maintenance of a reliable, 
scaled-up, liquid network of agents is crucial for any entity that operate in the (mobile) money 
transfer business. Having agents on board – whether MM agents in the case of MTN Ghana or BCs 
in the case of Baobab Senegal – and making sure they behave like “agent Homo Economicus” is an 
ongoing challenge. Alignments are re-negotiated over time and sources of temporary or 
permanent ruptures are numerous. Crucially, branchless banking must be considered profitable 
to agents. In effect, agents are not only intermediaries – legal agents who simply work as a 
conductive channel on behalf of a principal – but also mediators – social agents whose own ideas 
of what is worthwhile and desirable can shape how the relationship between them and the 
MNO/MFI evolves (Maurer et al, 2013). BCs and MM agents cannot be understood as mere passive 
subjects that are externally managed through a variety of devices and rules. A pricing and 
commission structure that seems fair to agents is, therefore, of utmost importance for the 
ecosystem not only to grow but also to keep agents active and loyal. If mediators do not accept 
the commissions that have been imposed onto them, they could decide to either prioritise the 
activities of other providers or even leave the network altogether. In the former case, the issue 
that arises is the already-mentioned problem of liquidity: if agents decide not to dedicate enough 
cash for cash-in/cash-out transactions, customers cannot transact, and the service become 
unreliable.  
 
Consider the case of this BC I mentioned earlier who used to spend a great deal of effort trying to 
enrol new customers on behalf of Baobab Senegal, i.e. act not as a simple intermediary but a 
mediator using his social embeddedness to create trust in the financial institution. Cash-in/cash-
out transactions at a BC used to be free. However, since June 2016, a fee has been introduced on 
all transactions for users; the amount of the fee depends on the amount one wants to transfer, 
withdraw or deposit. One reason for this change given by Baobab when I interviewed them was 
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that because the launch of their new products had been delayed – including the nano-loan and 
their own money transfer product – they did not enrol as many new customers as expected. Only 
existing customers were dealing with BCs, using Baobab as a free money transfer product 
(account-to-account, account-to-cash or cash-to-account transfers). The network of BCs became 
difficult to manage as a result; many BCs in cash-out areas were lacking liquidity while others had 
too much cash. I was told on two occasions that Baobab had to use trucks to convey cash to areas 
in need. This, in addition to commissions to BCs, proved to be very costly for the MFI, costing 
roughly 600 000 Euro for the year 2015 only. As a result, fees were introduced to discourage the 
use of BCs and Baobab as a free money transfer service. Since the introduction of the transaction 
fees, the number of customers depositing, transferring or withdrawing money with a BC has 
significantly decreased; customers now prefer to go to the closest branch where transactions are 
still free. In one of the boutiques of a BC I visited, there used to be 20+ people a day coming to use 
Baobab services. Now that fees apply, there are only two or three customers per day. As a result, 
a BC I interviewed told me he decided to reduce the amount of cash flow he uses for Baobab 
services, i.e. the money he deposits in his Baobab operation account. Beyond that, he confessed 
that commissions for BCs are not as good as they used to be:  
It is better to concentrate your cash flow on Wari or Joni-Joni services because fees are higher. 
 
What this shows is that while BCs are ‘legal agents’ who are linked with Baobab contractually, 
they also act as ‘free agents’ with agency and all the complexity this brings about for the MFI 
(Maurer et al, 2013). Agencements never come along with fully stable agencies or as complete 
subjects; market encounters can be moments of overflows. Whereas it is likely that Baobab will 
find a way to get BCs back on board once new products are available, overflows can sometimes 
represent real threats to market-making processes.  
 
In May 2018, OM wholesalers and boutique managers in Senegal threatened to go on strike, 
following a dramatic reduction of their commissions on cash-in and cash-out transactions (Figure 
4.11). While OM mediators used to receive 18 CFA franc (24p) for a deposit of 1000 CFA franc 
(£1,3), they now get 7 CFA franc only (9p). The Réseau National des Prestataires de Transfert 
d’Argent (RENAPTA) – the National Network of Money Transfer Service Providers – called for a 
continuous boycott of OM services. During a press conference, the vice-president of RENAPTA, 
Khalilou Ndiaye, declared: 
 
We are in danger. These entrepreneurs, these sons… one wants to bring them to naught. And whose 
fault is it? It is the fault of a multinational, let’s be clear. It is not only Orange, look around you, our 
traders are dying out, our farmers are suffering. And now, even the service sector is being targeted. 
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Where is this going to take us? You know, to make a transaction, we have to dial #145#, right? Well, 
this is going to change. Now, we are going to do #ForgetOrange#. (Kandé, 2018, translation mine) 
 
The General Secretary of RENAPTA went even further and said: 
 
We think it is an economic recolonisation of Africa. It is sucking the lifeblood out of our activities. 
It is taking away what should belong to us. (TIC Mag, 2018, translation mine) 
 
Figure 4. 11 - Demonstration of members of RENAPTA, Senegal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Radio France Internationale) 
 
OM argues that due to upcoming additional services, OM distributors will experience more 
transactions, hence more revenues. This is denied by RENAPTA and other associations, which 
point out that distributors will have to work more to earn less. The latter are blaming OM for 
reducing their commissions now that the number of users has reached a satisfactory threshold 
and that OM services are successful in Senegal: “We suggested many things to OM. We encouraged 
customers to sign up to OM. But, with their success, they changed” (Xalismasn, 2018). 
Confrontations and power struggles over price fixing do not only take place within nascent MM 
ecosystems such as the one in Senegal. A soon-to-be-bank MFI I interviewed in Ghana complained 
about the fact they were not earning commissions from MTN when serving MTN-registered 
merchants. Despite acting as one of MTN super-agents, i.e. supporting MTN with liquidity 
management by accepting e-money and giving cash in return to MTN merchants, the organisation 
does not get commissions, as is the rule. This led them to refuse serving MTN merchants: 
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We are also doing business. We cannot give all our cash to a merchant when our own customers 
are there. We told them that: it is either you pay us a commission for serving other merchants, or 
we do not serve them at all. (MFI, Senior Employee)  
 
The above examples demonstrate that market-making processes are not straightforward and can 
trigger moments of overflows, as shown by the often limited power of market devices, such as 
contracts between agents and financial entities. Chapters 5 and 6 further examine the ways in 
which members of remittance households themselves do not readily accept these processes of 
behavioural engineering.  
 
4.3.3.2. When remittances meet global investors  
The above analysis has explored the construction of remittance-linked income streams through 
material, technological, discursive, political and behavioural engineering, which in turn 
contributes to the marketisation of remittances. As I have demonstrated, remittance-linked 
incomes can take the form of incomes from money transfer fees, remittance-backed insurance 
payments, remittance-linked utilities payments and loan repayments. Particular efforts have 
been made to render these income streams stable and continuous. For instance, when a nano-
loan payment is due, money that is in and/or sent to the wallet is deducted automatically until 
the loan is fully repaid (see Chapter 6 for more details on this). I now turn to the ways in which 
these income streams can be converted into sources of financial profit and remittance customers 
into investable assets for private investors. For this, I draw upon Aitken’s (2013, 2015) work on 
financial valuation and intermediation as two main techniques of conversion. 
 
Aitken (2015:8) refers to the rearticulation of microfinance into a profitable asset stream as 
processes of ‘conversion’, i.e. “the transformation of particular kinds of social objects and 
relations (even particular kinds of human bodies) into objects capable of generating financialised 
income streams”. Aitken (2015) draws upon the work of Leyshon and Thrift (2007) who argue 
that financialised capitalism is dependent on the systematic and never-ending pursuit of new 
asset streams, usually through a process of aggregation. In other words, “the bedrock of financial 
capitalism is not the spectacular system of speculation but something more mundane”, i.e. the 
construction of forms of stable incomes (such as rental income from halls of residence or monthly 
payments of loans and utilities), which then allows speculation to take place (ibid:2007:98). 
According to Aitken (2013:475), the “poorest of the poor” are converted into asset streams 
through various distinct processes, including financial valuation and financial intermediation.45 
                                                     
45 Aitken (2013) refers to a third technique, namely securitisation, which, in contrast to Microfinance Investment 
Vehicles (MIVs), is used as an instrument of conversion not to attract capital but to allow for its dispersal; a technique 
 
 
143 
Techniques of valuation allow financial assets to turn into calculable and verifiable objects of 
investments. The significance of microcredit ratings agencies nowadays illustrates the necessity 
to transform microfinance investments into metrics that are globally recognised by financial 
institutions. Techniques of intermediation consist of facilitating and expanding the ways in which 
capital can reach MFIs. The rise of specialised financial vehicles, namely Microfinance Investment 
Vehicles (MIVs), over the last ten years is of particular importance as it has enabled the tight 
connection between private investors and investment opportunities in microfinance in the form 
of loans and equity, which have helped fund loans to millions of micro-borrowers.  
 
One set of techniques through which the conversion of Baobab’s clients, including remittance 
customers, into investable assets has been made possible is financial valuation. In March 2016, 
Baobab was given a rating of triple B by the West African Rating Agency (WARA). To explain this 
rating, WARA notably mentioned the capacity of Baobab to measure its portfolio’s credit risk with 
great effectiveness. In the absence of reliable sources of information regarding the quality of 
micro-borrowers’ loans, Baobab was able to differentiate itself from its competitors by deploying 
a constant presence of credit and other managers on the ground in order to “monitor in vivo the 
behaviours of each and every single element of its portfolio” (Hassoune and Ayigan, 2016:12, 
translation mine). In the context of rendering bodies and things amenable to financial valuation 
and responding to the return-risk trade-off, “pressure is put on investments further downstream 
in the ‘financial value chain’” (Ouma, 2016a:85), hence creating a “cascade” of financialised 
governmentality (Mader, 2015:101). These types of ratings, it is argued, allow investors to assess 
investment risk and draw useful comparisons to other investment possibilities (Aitken, 2013). In 
fact, in September 2016, Baobab Senegal carried out a successful local currency bond issue of 5 
million Euro on the regional stock exchange in order to tap into local institutional investors. It 
was the first ever MFI to do this in West Africa.  
 
In a similar vein, MTN Ghana completed an Initial Public Offer (IPO) in 2018, becoming the first 
telecoms provider in Ghana to list on the Ghana Stock Exchange. Offering a particular technique 
of valuation, IPOs “facilitate collective judgement and immediate valuation” through a direct 
transfer of ownership (Aitken, 2013:483). While MTN Ghana’s IPO initially aimed to sell a 35% 
stake of its operations after the offer, it ended up raising 1,15 billion GhC (£170 million), only 
                                                     
which disaggregates and disperses risk widely. A financial innovation, securitisation consists of converting non-
marketable assets into a financial package to be bought and sold to a diffused range of investors in the international 
capital markets. This allows the transformation of microloans into assets global investors can easily have access to. 
During my fieldwork, I did not come across instances of financial entities undertaking securitisation of microloan 
repayments. Relatedly, it is my understanding that neither the Ghanaian nor the Senegalese States are currently 
undertaking remittance securitisation.  
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representing a third of the total offer amount. This amount was nonetheless the highest to be 
raised in an IPO on the Ghana Stock Exchange. Interestingly, the IPO was the first in the world to 
use mobile financial services – MTN Mobile Money – as a medium to subscribe to share (Figure 
4.12). 
 
Figure 4. 12 - Tweet from MTN Ghana promoting MTN shares  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: MTN twitter account) 
 
However, while retail investors – Ghanaians in the vast majority – represented 99,6% of the 
number of investors, they only raised roughly 10% of the money. In contrast, institutional 
investors, most of which were international, raised 90% (BusinessGhana, 2018). The number of 
securities sold accounted for 12.5% of MTN’s Ghanaian unit, lowering MTN Group’s overall stake 
to 85%, with the rest held by minority stakeholders (Dwazu, 2018). Despite the fact that MTN’s 
share price has declined since listing on the Ghana Stock Exchange (Sabutey, 2019), what these 
IPOs showed is that Baobab Senegal and MTN Ghana are seen as increasingly viable entities for 
investment. In fact, MTN Ghana’s full year results ending 31 December 2018 showed that it 
generated 4.2 billion GhC revenue (£620 million), representing an 23% increase from 2017. The 
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improvement in revenue was notably attributable to strength growth in digital revenues, driven 
mainly by mobile financial services. In fact, while total revenue increased by 23% between 2017 
and 2018, revenues from mobile financial services increased by 60%, now accounting for 17% of 
total revenue. The company made a net profit of 755 million GhC (£111 million), of which mobile 
financial services accounted for 36%. This represented a nearly 5% increase on 2017’s profit of 
715 million GhC and a 28% increase on 2016’s profit of 542 million GhC. Dividend payout rose 
from 470 million GhC in 2017 to 1.3 billion GhC (£190 million). This 36% increase was notably 
due to the payout of a ‘special dividend’ of 1.1 billion GhC (£162 millions) paid to pre-initial public 
offering (IPO) shareholders. Main pre-IPO shareholders include the South African government 
through the largest asset management company in Africa, namely the state-owned Public 
Investment Corporation, as well as the Mitaki family through their Lebanon-based investment 
holding group and a wide range of foreign-based fund management companies. 
 
Another key mechanism through which Baobab Group was able to allow foreign capital to reach 
its different MFIs, including Baobab Senegal, relates to practices of financial intermediation. 
Figure 4.13 provides a detailed analysis of who Baobab investors and intermediaries are and the 
different investment structures that have been put in place to facilitate how investors can reach 
Baobab’s different entities.  
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Figure 4. 13 - Baobab’s investors, intermediaries and investment structures (adapted from Ouma, 2016a:87)  
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Baobab group, as in most cases with Greenfield MFIs, started as a partnership between a sponsor 
(Planet Finance) and a core group of International Financial Institutions (e.g. IFC, European 
Investment Bank), private investors (e.g. AXA Group, APIS Growth 2 LD), and specialised MIVs 
(e.g. Nordic Microfinance Initiative Fund III K/S) as primary investors. So far as Baobab group is 
concerned, its main shareholders are AXA Group (34,27%), the investment fund APIS Growth 
(22,78%), Danish wealth management fund Maj Invest Managed Funds (17,73%), the European 
Investment Bank (12,11%), Nordic Microfinance Initiative Fund (11,83%) and other minority 
shareholders. As for Baobab Senegal, Baobab Holding has a majority stake of 51.2%, while the rest 
is being shared between the IFC (15,4%), the Senegalese insurance company SONAM (10,7%) and 
several foreign-based asset management companies, such as Triple Jump (10%) and Nordic 
Microfinance Initiative (10%). The group of investors has somewhat expanded over time with 
investment companies and other MIVs managed by investment companies such as Triodos and 
ResponsAbility Social Investments providing debt funding to Baobab. According to Aitken (2013), 
the role of MIVs is key in facilitating flows of global capital into microfinance networks, linking 
global investors in the Global North to microfinance customers in the Global South. They notably 
allow investors to access micro-borrowers as an increasingly mainstream financial asset. MIVs 
are conceived in portfolio management terms as an important source of diversification. They are 
deemed remote from global macroeconomic trends on the global markets, as clients of MFIs are 
part of the informal economy which is considered to be less sensitive to macroeconomic cycles. 
The very location of micro-borrowers at or beyond the edges of the global economy is itself 
converted into an investable asset, a source of value.  
 
In 2018, the consolidated net income of Baobab Group was almost 18 million Euro (£15,5 million), 
constituting the highest in the Group’s history (Baobab Group, 2019). In 2017, the consolidated 
net income of Baobab Group was 9,5 million Euro (£8,5 million), representing a 180% increase 
compared to its result in 2016 (Baobab Group, 2018). In turn, dividend payout rose from 658 000 
Euro in 2016 to 1.1 million Euro in 2017 (£980 000), representing a 67% increase. Most crucially, 
in Senegal, the net income of the MFI was 5 million Euro (£4.4 million), representing a 63% 
increase compared to 2016. The return on equity (RoE)46 has constantly risen from 9% in 2013 
to 16% in 2015 and to 28% in 2017 (Ghazi and Hassoune, 2018). To put this in perspective, it is 
crucial to note that while Waterfield (2012) suggests that, so far as MFIs are concerned, a RoE in 
excess of 25% should ring serious alarm bells, Sinclair (2012) argues that the alarm bells should 
be ringing far earlier and uses 20% as a threshold. In this context, Baobab’s plan to commercialise 
financial products such as Taka loans with an APR that can easily exceed 100/150% (see Section 
                                                     
46 The return on equity is the standard profitability indicator in commercial banking and most relevant for commercial 
investors and institutions.  
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4.3.2.1.) despite the fact that the MFI is highly profitable will deserve particular scrutiny in the 
future. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Rather than treating the financialisation of remittances as taken for granted, this chapter has 
presented a theoretically-informed empirical analysis of the extensive financial, material, 
technological, legal, discursive and behavioural engineering that is necessary for remittance 
markets to realise in countries such as Senegal and Ghana (RQ1). Drawing upon Berndt and 
Boeckler’s (2009, 2012) geographies of marketisation approach, I have shown that the coming 
into being of remittance markets rely upon the practical accomplishment of three key market 
framings. First, remittances have to be politically and discursively pacified in order to conceal the 
extent to which this market-led global agenda has built upon them to further accentuate processes 
of capital accumulation. Second, turning remittances into financial resources that can be leveraged 
for further financial inclusion depend primarily on the capacity to get migrants and members of 
remittance households to channel and use remittances through global financial circuits. In other 
words, the incorporation and circulation of remittances within financial circuits is rendered 
possible through the formatting of specific market agencies among various actors, including 
remitters, recipients and a wide range of agents that mediate these flows (e.g. BCs and MM agents). 
In Senegal, the social, physical and digital embeddedness of Baobab’s BCs act as nudges, which 
encourage members of remittance households and BCs to behave in certain ways rather than 
others. These nudges are, in turn, supported by a particular socio-technical agencement of human 
beings and material, technological, discursive and textual market devices (e.g. Randomised 
Controlled Trials). Similarly, in Ghana, a wide range of market devices and settings (e.g. 
regulations and contracts) have played a decisive role in turning e-money, including remittances, 
circulating through MM’s electronic trails as a new source of value. Third, the construction of 
remittance markets is dependent upon the formatting of market encounters. My findings show 
that a wide range of human and non-human elements contribute to facilitate numerous 
encounters, between members of remittance households, agents, merchants and commercial and 
financial institutions. However, these encounters are prone to moments of ‘overflows’, which 
threaten processes of market-making. Importantly, extensive financial engineering has been 
undertaken by major financial and commercial actors in both countries in order to organise 
market encounters between their clients, including remittance customers, and national and global 
investors. Based on the on-going efforts to construct continuous and stable incomes – of which 
remittance-linked and remittance-backed incomes constitute an important part – recent 
techniques of financial valuation and intermediation have started to facilitate the conversion of 
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these income streams into sources of financial profit and remittance customers into investable 
assets for private investors.  
 
Processes of remittance marketisation I have outlined in this chapter may very well provide a 
crucial entry point for remittance-linked financialising projects in the future. However, remittance-
linked (digital) financial products and services are still in a stage of infancy in both countries. 
Moreover, the extent to which remittance flows (RQ2) can be incorporated into mainstream 
financial circuits remains rather limited (Chapter 5) and processes of market subjectivation of 
members of remittance households (RQ3) constitute practical accomplishments that are always 
uncertain, negotiated and even resisted (Chapter 6). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Everyday lived experiences of receiving remittances 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Mamina lives in her husband’s house with her six children in Toubatoul, near Thiès, Senegal. Outside 
the house lies her stall where she sells foodstuff, mostly for breakfast. Mamina has always worked. 
When she was younger, she went to Dakar to work as a housekeeper for two families during the day 
and selling doughnuts in the evening to be able to send some money back to her family at the end of 
each month. When she got married, her husband asked her to stop working as a cleaner in Dakar 
and come back to Toubatoul. This is when Mamina started selling tea, sugar, and bread amongst 
other things on a table by the house. Mamina’s husband left to Russia when they already had three 
children and Mamina was pregnant with twins. At that time, Mamina was living with her stepfamily 
with whom she had a difficult relationship. For a while, she did not receive any support from her 
husband; she sometimes even struggled to put food on the table. After she gave birth to the twins, she 
had to start begging for food. She left her stepfamily’s house in 1987 and moved to a one-room house 
surrounded by a fence made out of straw that her husband bought. She upgraded her business by 
investing in a stall after receiving 50 000 CFA franc from one of the two tontines47 she was part of. 
She says that a migrant’s wife must work because “the money migrants send is carefully calculated 
in advance and only caters for the needs of the house and the children, not the wives”. 
 
Mamina finds it very hard to be a wife of a ‘modou-modou’ (emigrant). Everyone thinks she is “living 
the life”, she says. This is however far from being the case. Even now, when Mamina’s husband comes 
back to visit once a year, and sometimes without money, it is Mamina who, with the money she has 
been saving, takes care of (‘se débrouille’) all the solicitations from friends and relatives by discreetly 
giving money to her husband. She does this to save her husband’s honour and consolidate family 
relationships. Mamina’s husband now lives in Spain. He sends 90 000 CFA franc (£125) every month, 
always the same amount. Her husband thinks it is enough but Mamina argues otherwise. She says 
that he knows nothing about what she has to do to cater for her children’s and her own needs. “He 
does not worry about this”, she says, “he only sends his 90 000 CFA franc”. Mamina manages shortfall 
as well as emergencies by herself. She saves in a tontine with the profit she makes from her stall. 
When she receives the whole amount, she invests in cattle, puts some money aside to cover the 
contributions to her tontine for the month and caters for her own needs. If there is money left, she 
                                                     
47 Tontines constitute a type of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs).  
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puts it into her bank account. She can then make a small profit by selling the cattle, which allows her 
to put more money in her bank account and plan for any emergencies. These financial tools are all 
intertwined with one another, but each play a distinctive role. Crucially, Mamina is adamant that the 
money she saves comes from her activity, her tontine as well as her investments in cattle. The 
remittances she receives are earmarked for foodstuff and daily expenses for the children only. When 
her husband is late sending remittances, Mamina has to use part of her money to cover the needs of 
the house. She then reimburses herself when she receives the remittances. While she finds the use of 
a bank account very helpful, she is however quite reluctant to take out loans. She says that she opened 
this account to avoid taking out loans, whether from the bank or a relative, a friend or a retailer. The 
only times she takes out a loan from the tontine is to help one of her friends who is not part of it. 
Because of all the things she went through, she says she is very cautious with the ways in which she 
manages and spends her money. “Life is not only about the present day. One must always plan for the 
future and anticipate what may happen”. At the end of our third interview, on the way back to the 
bus station, Mamina told Fatou (the research assistant I worked with in Senegal) and I that she had 
just found out that her husband had got married for a second time. Mamina was devastated by this 
news. Even though the financial situation of her household had just started to improve, she told us 
that her husband’s second marriage indicated that he was not interested in investing in the well-
being of his children. She believes this will have a financial impact on the household as her husband 
will now have to remit to his new wife too. 
 
 
This brief vignette illustrates the diverse and complex socio-economic and financial practices, 
arrangements and strategies of individual household members that receive remittances from 
domestic, regional and/or international migrants. It also sheds light on the active role that 
members of remittance households like Mamina play in the production and reproduction of life. 
Far from simply constituting a sum of money, Mamina’s story reflects that remittances are social 
practices that are embedded in specific economic, social and cultural contexts which, in turn, 
influence the ways in which remittances can be used. The above account is not atypical and echoes 
the lived experiences of many participants I interviewed. It seems, however, at odds with 
assumptions underpinning recent interventions that aim to leverage remittances for financial 
inclusion. In fact, according to proponents of the remittances-financial nexus, two of the main 
barriers to remittance recipients’ financial inclusion are their “lack of financial capabilities to 
manage money as disposable income increases with remittances” on the one hand, and their “poor 
knowledge of regulated financial options” on the other (IFAD and World Bank, 2015:27). Having 
focused so far on the ways in which remittance markets are being built concretely in Senegal and 
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Ghana, I investigate in this chapter the extent to which remittance flows can be incorporated into 
global financial circuits (RQ2).  
 
This chapter focuses on the relatively neglected labour that is required to transform, or 
“depollute”, remittances in order to produce the ‘house’ and reproduce kin, kith and community 
relationships (Carsten, 1989, in Abbots, 2014:145). In order to challenge the portrayal of passive 
and idle recipients lacking financial skills and waiting for remittances to arrive and be ‘consumed’, 
I propose a new conceptualisation of the ‘remittance household’ as an active site of productive, 
reproductive and emotional labour that is underpinned by variegated remitter-receiver-recipient 
configurations and multi-directionality of support. Rather than looking at how/whether 
remittances can work for development finance (Julca, 2013), ‘Africa’ (Gupta et al, 2007) and 
financial inclusion (Todoroki et al, 2014), I focus on the laboring activities needed to care for 
remittances, i.e. the labour that allows remittances to work for the household. 
 
This chapter also investigates the ways in which decisions are made and by whom with regard to 
remittance allocation and uses. Rather than operating within a vacuum – as it is often assumed in 
the economistic literature on remittances – remittance households, just like diasporas (Page and 
Mercer, 2012), are embedded in the social, economic, cultural and emotional structures in which 
they operate. Remittance and other related financial practices and behaviours cannot simply be 
‘nudged’, even providing the right behavioral stimuli, information and incentives, but rather rest 
upon relational and collective, albeit sometimes unequal, decision-making process between 
migrant(s), receiver(s), main recipient(s) as well as other people situated down what I call the 
‘remittance distribution chain’. I suggest that the extent to which remittances can be integrated 
into financial circuits and put to use in the manner advocated by proponents of the remittances-
financial inclusion nexus is mediated by a wide range of factors, including gendered power 
dynamics and norms, inter-women hierarchies, kinship relations and household context. The final 
section situates remittance practices within remittance households’ broader financial and money-
management arrangements and strategies. While it is increasingly acknowledged that Remittance 
Recipients (RR) save part of the money they receive (IFAD, 2009; IFAD and World Bank, 2015), 
the fact that they save through so called ‘informal’ mechanisms is seen as problematic and 
unproductive and in need of interventions, i.e. formalisation. Often reduced to the analogy of 
“under the mattress” savings (see for instance the IFAD “Sending Money Home” report, 2017), the 
sophistication of these practices and strategies are either disregarded or encouraged to be 
abandoned for supposedly more advanced, convenient and advantageous financial arrangements 
and services. My evidence suggests, however, that what are deemed ‘basic’, ‘traditional’ saving 
and borrowing mechanisms are in fact socially and financially necessary as well as often more 
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profitable than the financial products and services promoted by proponents of the marketisation 
of remittances. The chapter concludes by shedding light on the importance of differentiating types 
of monies (i.e. remittances and recipients’ own incomes) in order to account for the full diversity 
and complexity of remittance households’ financial practices and arrangements. 
 
The chapter begins by providing a conceptualisation of the ‘remittance household’ that 
emphasises the variegated configurations it may take and the different types of activities taking 
place within it. It then examines the factors that influence the allocation and uses of remittances, 
including debt claims, gendered power dynamics, kinship relations, inter-women hierarchies and 
household context. The final section critically examines members of remittance households’ 
diverse financial and money management practices and strategies. 
 
5.2. Opening up the black box of the remittance household:    
Unwaged work, reproduction and emotional labour  
Remittance-receiving households have long been portrayed as passive and helpless, waiting for 
remittances to resolve their socio-economic problems (Sikder and Ballis, 2013). While these 
representations have been extensively challenged by gender and migration scholarship (de Haas 
and van Rooij, 2010; Kunz, 2011; Menjívar and Agagjanian, 2007), the figure of the dependent, 
feminised recipients in need of development interventions is still commonplace in policy-oriented 
documents promoting the remittances-financial inclusion nexus (Kunz, 2018). Drawing upon 
evidence from my interviews, this section examines the variegated remitter-receiver-recipient 
configurations that underpin practices of remittance sending and receiving. It shows that, far from 
being passive and simply waiting for remittances to be sent, households that receive remittances 
are active sites of unwaged work, reproductive and emotional labour, within which many 
individual members contribute to the ‘production of life’. This in turn challenges the assumed one-
directionality of support from migrants to remittance households and sheds light on the different 
types of work, activities, acts and discourses that support both migrant and non-migrant 
individuals. 
 
In this section, I advance the concept of the ‘remittance household’ (Figure 5.1) as a way to start 
understanding how/whether remittances can be ‘nudged’ towards specific financial purposes and 
circuits (RQ2). Figure 5.1, part A represents an understanding of remittances, with the household 
as the unit of analysis (as is generally the case in the NELM framework). Figure 5.1, part B shows 
Erdal’s (2012) more sophisticated understanding of remittances, with the individual (rather than 
the household) as the main unit of analysis. In fact, Erdal (2012) argues that remittances are not 
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only sent to households, but also to specific individuals. Figure 5.1, part C draws upon and extend 
Erdal’s (2012) conceptualisation, highlighting the variegated remitter-receiver-recipient 
configurations of remittance households and the difference between recipients and receivers (see 
Section 5.2.1) and challenging the unidirectionality of support from migrants to recipients (see 
Section 5.2.2). 
 
Figure 5. 1 - The variegated remitter-receiver-recipient configurations of remittance households 
(adapted from Erdal, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The triangles represent the remitters. The squares represent the receivers. The circles represent the 
recipients, with the orange and blue circles constituting the primary recipients and grey, the secondary 
recipients. The smaller grey circles represent recipients who are either friends, business partners or more 
distant individuals in terms of kinship links. Importantly, arrows go in both directions, with the arrow from 
recipients to senders representing ‘reverse’ remittances. 
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5.2.1. Variegated remitter-receiver-recipient configurations 
The transnational configuration of Mamina’s household in the above vignette may be considered 
a typical arrangement in which one migrant, often male, sends money back home to one 
remittance recipient, often female. On many occasions during my interviews with institutional 
actors, the genders and relationships as well as the number of actors involved in the sending and 
receiving of remittances were taken for granted: the figure of the male migrant – the husband – 
on the one hand, and the female recipient – the wife – on the other. While the complexities and 
variations of the sender-recipient relations have started to be acknowledged in the migration 
literature (see for instance Erdal, 2012), the focus is however more often than not placed on the 
aforementioned stereotypical configuration when it comes to initiatives that aim to leverage the 
use of remittances. In fact, the forms that these initiatives take imply that remittances can be 
leveraged by providing the right incentives – or nudges – to atomised individuals who, in turn, 
will know better how to behave (Chapter 4; see also Page and Mercer, 2012). My evidence 
suggests, however, that understanding who the remittance receivers and recipients are, and 
highlighting the variegated configurations of remittance households that underpin processes of 
remittance sending and receiving, is of crucial importance to appreciating the ways in which 
remittances are actually managed.  
 
My interviews show that remittance flows and practices are grounded in complex social networks 
that link one or multiple migrants to one or multiple receivers and recipients. Remittances are 
often not simply sent to the ‘household’ but may rather be earmarked to specific individuals. As a 
result, rather than using the ‘household’48 as the unit of analysis, my work suggests that we must 
pay attention to individual members of the ‘remittance household’, which is comprised of all 
individuals (i.e. receivers and recipients) in migrant-sending countries that are connected 
through remittances flows sent by remitters. While receivers are individuals that collect 
remittances (at a bank branch or at a Banking Correspondent, for example), recipients are 
individuals that use, i.e. spend, save, redistribute and/or invest, remittances.49 Main recipients are 
in charge of using and redistributing remittances, while secondary recipients benefit from the use 
of remittances (e.g. food, shelter, clothes, etc.). Other recipients may include friends and members 
of the extended family and do not live or eat with the main and secondary recipients. Crucially, 
and drawing upon feminist studies of social relations within and beyond the household (Aggarwal, 
1997; Lo, 2008), I understand the ‘remittance household’ not as a homogeneous unit but rather a 
                                                     
48 The conceptualisation of the household is also contested, as “common residence and a shared cooking pot may act to 
conceal the tacit separation of incomes and expenditures of co-resident families” (Kandiyoti, 1999:504, in Erdal, 
2012:441). 
49 A remittance receiver is often a recipient but this may not always be the case (see Figure 5.1). 
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site within which decisions and tensions are negotiated among individuals, money transfers take 
place, and secrets are sometimes kept (see Section 5.4.4). For instance, it is generally understood 
that, in Senegal, only the husband must give a regular contribution in cash or in kind to his wife or 
wives in order to deal with the basic needs of the household members (Dromain, 1990). My 
interviews show that the other income-earning members can dispose of their incomes as they 
wish although they may also contribute to cater for the needs of the household. It was frequent 
for members of the same household to ignore one another’s levels of income. Furthermore, 
because the husband’s contribution is regarded as the minimum amount required for the 
maintenance of the household (see above vignette), it is often fully spent. As such, it is often 
perceived that households, taken as a unit, do not save. However, the picture becomes slightly 
different when one distinguishes the budget of the household to the incomes of each individual. 
The household budget constitutes only a fraction of the incomes of the head, and an even smaller 
fraction of the incomes of all household members taken together. As a result, while the savings of 
a household may appear to be almost non-existent, this does not necessarily mean that the 
husband, the wife or wives as well as other household members do not save on an individual basis. 
In other words, it can be argued that a household budget, to which remittances are mostly directed 
to, cannot by definition be saved. As far as the practice of saving is concerned, the individual, 
rather than the household, seems to be a more relevant unit (ibid; Erdal, 2012). 
 
Many participants explained that the remittances they received had to be redistributed amongst 
other relatives living in the same house, members of the household and the extended family as 
well as friends and/or other people such as shopkeepers and construction workers. One 
participant told me he was receiving remittances from at least 7 different migrants, including his 
mother in the US, his cousin in Canada, his uncles in the US and Japan, his brother-in-law in Italy 
and two friends of his in neighbouring countries. While the money was sometimes for him, it was 
more often than not directed to specific projects such as construction work but also to other family 
members. It was also to cover school fees for another household. In this situation, his role as a 
receiver was that of an intermediary. Several reasons can explain why senders use intermediaries. 
First, the recipient may not have the capacity and/or knowledge to withdraw the money due, for 
instance, to a lack of tech-savviness or old age. Second, the use of an intermediary has disciplinary 
and controlling effects on how remittances are spent. Male shopkeepers, friends or brothers often 
receive remittances on behalf of migrants’ households. Third, the money is to be given to someone 
the sender owes money to and the intermediary acts as a witness that debts are now settled. 
Fourth, it is less expensive and more practical for a migrant to send remittances in bulk and let 
the receiver do the redistribution work. The emergence of Mobile Money (MM) has made it more 
convenient for recipients that need to distribute remittances to people they are geographically 
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distant to. What the above shows is that remittances do not only flow from one sender to a 
recipient but rather constitute a chain involving numerous individuals. 
 
For many participants, this meant that the amount migrants sent needed to be carefully calculated 
and distributed, sometimes to the penny, as Rashida (farmer, Kumbungu near Tamale, husband, 
Sunyani in Ghana50) explained: 
 
For the house, he sends 80 GhC on every market day. After withdrawing the money, I will give 20 
GhC to his mother, 15 or 20 GhC to his two stepmothers, the second wife of his father. After, I will 
give 10 GhC to one of his younger siblings and keep 20 GhC as my pocket money. 
 
One sender could often reach more than twenty people down the ‘remittance chain’ in the 
remittance-receiving country:  
 
We are many (…) the number of people that are given food and sweets during the fasting season 
could be more than twenty. (Idrissu, farmer and mason, Savelugu near Tamale, cousins, UK and 
Spain) 
 
Furthermore, it was frequent for a migrant to send remittances to more than one person on a 
regular basis when money could not be easily redistributed to other recipients. For instance, male 
remittance senders in Senegal often sent money to their wife or wives as well as their parents to 
whom they are symbolically but also materially indebted (Baumann and Fall, 2015). Furthermore, 
many male remitters sent ‘chop money’ to their wife or wives while sending money to be invested 
in a construction project to their male relatives (a brother or the father, for example) (Teye et al, 
2017b). In contrast, the same participant could often receive remittances from multiple senders. 
This was notably the case when the ‘main’ sender was late or could not send money at a particular 
time. Being able to rely on multiple senders constituted a strategic way for several participants to 
diversify their sources of income. In the next section, I draw further on my interviews to examine 
the remittance household as an active site of unwaged work, reproductive and emotional labour, 
within which individual members are not only supported by, but also support migrants.  
 
5.2.2. Making remittances work for the household  
Members of remittance households in migrant-sending countries are still often perceived as idle 
and unproductive, waiting to ‘eat’ the remittances they receive. For instance, an employee of the 
National Agency for Statistics and Demography of Senegal asserted that “[remittance] households 
                                                     
50 Rashida is a farmer from Kumbungu near Tamale (Ghana) who receives remittances from her husband, located in 
Sunyani (Ghana) 
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are passive” and that “we can only leverage migrants, their savings, their transfers” (emphasis 
mine). In Ghana, an official working for the Bank of Ghana admitted that “it would serve if 
receivers’ consumption behaviours [were] redirected towards savings and investments”. He 
argued however that this could only be done by encouraging migrants, not members of remittance 
households, to “think rationally” and invest, for example, in mortgages: 
 
You always help them to think rationally. The idea is rationality. If you let them know, they may 
change.  
 
Activities such as making sure all members of remittance households are fed and clothed, paying 
fees on time for the children to go to school and/or organising the (re)distribution of remittances 
to the elders as well as members of the extended family and other friends are understood to be 
dependent primarily on wage remittances, i.e. the outcome of ‘productive’ labour. It is almost as 
if migrants’ remittances were able to automatically transform themselves and sustain remittance 
households without any required forms of labour. What follows from this is that remittance 
households come to constitute sites of consumption only, within which individuals’ behaviours 
are defective and remittances are at risk of being wasted. As such, most of the development policy 
attention has been directed towards making sure remittances work for development and financial 
inclusion whereas not much has been said about the kind of labour that is necessary to allow 
remittances to work for remittance households.  
 
While these processes of invisibilisation are underpinned by economistic and gendered 
constructions (see Chapter 2), I find it useful to draw upon the recent work of Gargi Bhattacharyya 
(2018) on racial capitalism to argue that racialised assumptions and constructions are also at play 
here. Bhattacharyya (2018) argues that one significant strand of racial capitalism refers to the 
creation under capitalism of spaces of non-capitalism or almost-capitalism – “wasteland” in 
Sanyal’s (2007) terms. This edge space, Bhattacharyya (2018:9) argues, “represents the need 
within capitalism to designate some spaces and populations as non-productive”. The emergence 
of this parallel non-capitalist space is the direct product of capitalist development rather than its 
initial condition. More precisely, through the operations of racial capitalism – both in its formation 
and its more recent forms – the social reproduction of edge populations is relegated beyond or 
alongside the space of the wage economy. The exclusion from or the temporary access to the 
formal wage economy results in significant challenges faced by individuals, households and 
communities to “remake the means of life” (Bhattacharyya, 2018:43). Additional input is, 
therefore, required to cover what the occasional or non-existent wages cannot. In the language of 
development, this is what has been termed ‘the informal economy’. The ‘informal economy’ comes 
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to constitute all that is not “productive” work but which, nonetheless, enters the money economy 
(Bhattacharyya, 2018). In contrast to spaces of capitalist production in which production is for 
accumulation, Sanyal (2007) argues that what characterises the informal economy – or the ‘needs 
economy’ – is that production is organised to guarantee a certain level of consumption and 
ultimately meet immediate needs. Importantly, these different modes of reproduction – from fully 
waged workers to ‘hybrid’ workers navigating ‘productive’ work and other forms of economic 
activities to those beyond the wage economy – come to be attached to racialised understandings 
of the economy: 
 
The positioning of reproductive activity and of reproductive potential acts as a scale of humanness. 
Some modes serve as models of humanness in the ability to direct resources to making participants 
in the formal economy. Other modes open communities to interventions to enhance economic 
participation, that is to reorient reproductive processes towards the formal economy.  Other modes 
still are admonished for their alleged economic and/or social consequences and presented as 
deficits in the capacities of those pursuing such ways of life (Bhattacharyya, 2018:52). 
 
One way this racialised conception manifests itself within not only the remittances-for-
development agenda but also the remittances-financial inclusion nexus, I argue, is through the 
numerous and varied efforts to make those who stay behind engage in productive activities and/or 
use remittances more productively. Those who are ‘unproductive’ – or ‘underdeveloped’ (Escobar, 
1995) – are considered in need of assistance, of development. In other words, they must be 
enabled to enter ‘paid’ work and become integrated into the ‘real’/‘formal’ economy. The 
construction of this racialised imaginary boundary between the ‘productive’ and the ‘non-
productive’ is essential to processes of remittance marketisation. 
 
Behind this belief lies the assumption that reproductive labour within remittance households is 
limited to serving waged work(ers) rather than serving life: only waged work is regarded as 
productive (Bhattacharyya, 2018:52). This invisibilises and ultimately values differently the 
different forms of work – non-waged work – located outside or alongside ‘productive’ spaces. As 
a result, a fixation on the wage relation – and an understanding of the household as always in 
service to the waged (market) economy – overlooks a huge amount of valuable human activity 
often performed by women and ‘non migrants’, including subsistence work, income-generating 
activities of self-employed entrepreneurs as well as activities that add to the well-being of other 
household members. Rather than a matter of reproducing productive workers that takes place 
within the private spaces of the family, I understand social reproduction as the model of all 
economic activity. As such, economic matters come to be redefined as a wide range of ways in 
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which remittance households organise their efforts to stay alive. Importantly, these forms of work 
depend not only on individual but also collective capacity. While waged work may at times be 
undertaken, it should be not be regarded as the central aspiration but rather as a possible strategy 
in the service of the bigger goal of social reproduction, i.e. all the efforts made to enable life. My 
aim here, drawing upon Bhattacharyya’s (2018) insights, is to shift the analytical lens slightly, in 
order to not only understand wage remittances as a “currency of care” that predominantly focuses 
on migrants (Singh et al, 2010) but also explore the work of members of remittance households 
in home countries that is necessary to care for remittances. In other words, rather than looking at 
what makes remittances work for financial inclusion and development, I am interested in the kind 
of labour that allows remittances to work for remittance households. 
 
My evidence shows that far from constituting spaces of supposedly “non-productive humanity” 
(Bhattacharya, 2018:12), remittance households were rather part of a realm where the general 
production of life took place. It is not only the household labour of social reproduction that is 
ignored and/or not valued by many accounts of members of remittance households but also the 
self-employed, precarious, small-scale, non-waged but income-generating activities that are 
conducted by so many people in the “needs economy” (Sanyal, 2007). However, as the above 
vignette and my other interviews show, social reproduction is dependent upon both monetised 
activities (i.e. wage labour) and non-monetised household, neighbourhood and community 
activities, including cooking, cleaning, childcare, street vending, domestic production and saving 
and credit neighbourhood associations amongst many others. Making the socio-economic and 
financial practices and arrangements of remittance households visible allows us to de-centre the 
analysis from the role of migrants and their wage remittances and look at the ways in which 
members of remittance households secure their own current and future means of life as well as 
that of migrants through unwaged, income-generating activities, reproductive work as well as 
emotional labour here, with the support of the outcomes of often precarious, hyper-exploitative 
waged work there. While it is undeniable that wage remittances play an essential role in the 
production and reproduction of life within remittance households, it is also necessary to shed light 
on the work and labour of members of remittance households that play an equally important 
although often ignored part in this process.  
 
All participants were engaged in a mix of waged but mostly unwaged, paid but also non-paid, 
productive but also reproductive, domestic but also subsistence work. The financial, social and 
emotional toll that arose from sustaining remittance households was shared, sometimes 
unequally, between members of the remittance households and their migrant counterparts. First, 
the vast majority of remittance households interviewed were not solely relying on domestic 
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and/or cross-border remittances to sustain themselves. Rather, remittances became, when 
entering the space of remittance households, intertwined with a diverse, complex and evolving 
set of financial practices and money management strategies and came to represent one source of 
income amongst many others. When asked about the different sources of income of their 
households, many participants highlighted that they could not just rely on remittances: 
 
Every month, it is just not enough to sustain us (…) I work to earn money from my shop so that I 
don’t have to rely solely on him (…) I just add what my son sends me to what I earn to take care of 
the home. I use my own income from the shop to take care of the home (Rosaline, shopkeeper, 
Accra, son, US). 
 
If the remittance is not enough, I don’t see it as a problem, I understand that it’s not good for him 
there. That is why I don’t sit in the house, I am working. We are not sitting in the house, we all have 
our different means of earning income even though it is not much. The ladies, our wives, also have 
their various little businesses that they do to help themselves (Kwasi, mouldmaker, Tamale, 
brother, Accra). 
 
While several participants were wage workers – those who happened to be were all men – the 
vast majority of them were involved in unpaid agricultural and livestock work as well as income-
generating activities, such as street vending and petty trading. Farming work was mainly used for 
subsistence although, in some instances, part of the crops was sold in market places. Cattle and 
crops were also used to build assets that could easily be converted into cash if the need arose. 
Generated incomes and/or assets could then be used to complement or advance remittances to 
cater for the immediate needs of the households. Other possible sources of cash derived from 
recipients’ short- and long-term money management strategies. These took the form of gift 
exchange practices and participation in alternative financial institutions (see Section 5.4 and 
Chapter 6), as well as money transfers from people who were not principal remitters. 
 
Second, my evidence suggests that remittances were not simply consumed, spent or ‘eaten’. They 
also required significant amount of labour and time to ‘work’ the way migrants wanted them to. 
They could be source of tensions and represented at times a financial, social and psychological 
burden that members of remittance households had no choice but to carry. For someone like 
Idrissu (farmer and mason, Savelugu near Tamale, cousins, UK and Spain), remittances were a 
headache due to the constant requests he received from people who expected him to be in a 
position to support them. Remittances even ended up constituting an obstacle to his economic 
advancement: 
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I can say that I personally don’t see anything helpful with what they remit to us. I am talking about 
my own personal view on what they send to us. It is just that I cannot stop receiving the remittance 
because of humanity sake. I don’t actually have the interest of receiving such remittances. Why am 
I saying this? The white man is of the view that ‘’you don’t give a fish to a man but rather teach him 
how to fish by himself”. Even though it helps us in a way, it [also] blocks my chances a lot more that 
it opens my chances. How do you think people around here will look at you when they get to know 
that you have someone abroad who sends you remittances? They always feel that you have no 
financial problems, and they look at you as a rich man (…) Someone can just put pressure on you 
to give him/her something for the reason that you have someone abroad and therefore are able to 
help him/her. It makes you spend money on certain issues by force whereas what you get from the 
remittances is just not enough at all.   
 
It was not only the constant financial requests that Idrissu deplored but also the amount of time 
he had to spend and efforts he had to make to guarantee the satisfaction of his brother abroad. In 
fact, most of the money Idrissu received was neither for him nor his household but had to be 
redistributed to other people or managed for the remitters’ different ‘projects’. Idrissu had to 
oversee various construction projects for which his brother sent remittances. He was also in 
charge of distributing gift remittances to family members, close friends and members of the 
extended family and the community in general: 
 
This thing is really giving me a lot of stress and worries (…) It would not be a problem [to stop 
receiving remittances] because the time I waste in most of his projects is more than the money he 
sends me (…) Even if you ask him personally, he will tell you what I have done for him is not a 
quarter [of what he has done for me]. If you look at the projects and the time it consumed, it has 
affected my work and block most of my chances, but I still honour my pledge to supervise and 
support him in diverse ways. 
 
Construction projects, such as house building, have been a major avenue of investments for 
migrants. Explanations for migrants’ housing investment decisions are manifold and are usually 
understood as a mix of family-related motives, altruism as well as a means of securing and 
strengthening membership rights in their communities, with all these motivations sometimes 
operating together. While these investments, alongside social remittances more broadly, 
contribute to well-researched processes of place making, it is also essential to shed light upon 
remittance recipients’ significant role in holding migrants’ place within the household and the 
community as well as the potentially detrimental effects this may bring about on recipients’ 
economic advancement and well-being. Here, rather than the practice of remittance sending, it is 
remittance receiving that needs to be understood as a practice of ‘care’. 
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Third, it was not rare to come across situations in which migrants were actually the ones being 
financially, socially and/or emotionally supported by members of remittance households. In the 
above statements of Idrissu, the usually assumed directionality of support from migrants to 
remittance households was challenged. One could almost sense that Idrissu felt that his brother 
was indebted to him after everything he had done over the years. A similar logic could be found 
in the above vignette when Mamina (street vendor, Toubatoul near Thiès, husband, Spain) 
admitted that she handed money – her money – out to her husband when he came back from Spain 
so that he could redistribute it in the forms of monetary gifts to people that were expecting 
something. Mamina’s financial support to her husband was intertwined with dynamics of social 
protection but also concerns about preserving and consolidating his status and family 
relationships. Likewise, Niali (shopkeeper, Thiès, husband, Italy), whose husband was arrested 
for street hawking in Italy, told me that when he came home for a few weeks, he did not have any 
money. At that time, Niali had just received her tontine share of 350,000 CFA franc, the equivalent 
of around £470. After calculating how much she needed to cover the expenses of the household 
for three months, she kept a chunk of the money and gave the rest to her husband so that he could 
“régler ses besoins” (meet his needs) and pay for his air ticket back to Italy. Even in situations when 
the migrant had not returned, several participants were requested to lend, and even give out, their 
own money to complete a job or to look after someone. Zakariah (vendor, Tamale, three uncles, 
Spain, UK and Kumasi), for instance, explained to us that his great nephews had been excluded 
from school because their father, Zakariah’s uncle in Spain, could not pay for their school fees. 
Zakariah then assured his uncle that he would handle the situation. It was only after five months 
that Zakariah’s uncle was in a position to take over and started to pay his twins’ school fees. 
Finally, another telling illustration that counteracts the assumed direction of support from 
migrants to remittance households was that of Nafi (petty trader, Thiès, husband, Italy). Nafi told 
me she sometimes had to pretend in front of her stepfamily that recently-acquired furniture and 
appliances for the house were all bought with money remittances sent by her husband. Instead, 
Nafi confessed that it was through her tontine share that she was able to buy a new sofa and a new 
fridge: 
 
You know, marital life is full of secrets that you must keep for yourself. They [members of Nafi’s 
stepfamily] are very pleased to see new things in the house, because they think it was paid by their 
brother. But I don’t say anything. People think that everything you have comes from your husband. 
 
The above accounts were not just anecdotal instances I decided to single out but rather 
constituted telling testaments of the significance of what has been termed ‘reverse remittances’ 
(Mazzucato, 2011; see also Adiku and Anamyoza, 2016; Mobrand, 2012). Reverse remittances 
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have been defined as “a practice where family members and friends in the home country provide 
services, send goods and/or money to their migrant relatives abroad” (Adiku and Anamyoza, 
2016:200). Drawing upon this definition, I propose an understanding of reverse remittances in 
this context as the varied types of work and activities that are required to care for remittances. 
This, in turn, allows for a more complex understanding of remittances and/within remittance 
households (Figure 5.1.) and offers a stark contrast to an imagined idle, passive, unproductive and 
remittance-reliant household. This sheds light on relatively neglected socio-economic dynamics 
and situations, which include amongst other things members of remittance households lending 
money to their migrant counterpart to complete a task (e.g. cover school fees for a child the 
migrant, not the recipient, is looking after) or recipients handing out money to their migrant 
relatives when the latter are temporarily back home. Caring for remittances may also consist of 
acts of remaining silent or lying in order to protect and consolidate migrants’ status and honour, 
as illustrated by Nafi’s (petty trader, Thiès, husband, Italy) example. The next section examines 
the ways in which existing debt claims, gendered power dynamics and norms as well as household 
context and kinship relations influence the allocation and uses of remittances within remittance 
households. 
 
5.3. Remittance allocation and utilisation: Debt, gendered and 
kinship power relations 
At the core of the remittances-financial inclusion nexus is the promotion of savings on the one 
hand (i.e. to encourage migrants and recipients to direct part of the remittances to financial 
accounts), and the cross-selling of additional financial services such as insurance and credit on 
the back of remittances on the other. My evidence shows, however, that for many remittance 
households channelling remittances towards such purposes is just not a possibility. In this section, 
I situate remittance flows within existing relations of debt, gender and kin and show how these 
mediate practices of remittance spending, using, saving, (re)distributing and/or investing. 
Choices about how remittances can be spent and what can be saved and/or invested are not 
individual processes but rest upon relational, collective, albeit sometimes unequal, decision-
making process between migrant(s) and recipient(s) as well as other people situated down the 
‘remittance distribution chain’. 
 
5.3.1. “Remittance is spent before it even gets to you” 
Remittances were often neither sufficient nor regular enough to secure the immediate survival 
and well-being of remittance households. While this may be an obvious statement, debates about 
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the use of remittances are surprisingly not often linked to questions of frequency and amount 
(Teye et al, 2017b). Many participants, despite the lack of information they had on the lives of 
their migrant counterparts in host countries, were fully aware of the precarious living and 
working conditions of the latter. It was in fact frequent for remittance households to experience 
irregularity or a decrease in the amount of remittances they would usually receive. Several 
participants even said that at times remittance flows could stop altogether. This was the case for 
Niali, whose husband in Italy was arrested by the police for selling goods illegally on street corners 
and had all his belongings confiscated. In contrast to the idea that remittances are often ‘wasted’ 
by remittance recipients, many participants highlighted the importance of being extremely 
cautious in the ways in which they manage the money they receive: 
 
Lots of people think that it’s easier to better manage your hard-earned money than money you 
receive from abroad. I think it is the opposite; I can spend my salary however I want to, without 
having to answer to anyone but if someone makes the effort to send me something, I’ll have to 
manage this amount adequately without frustrating the person who’s sent it to you (Diakhou, 
vendor, Thiès, husband US) 
 
Around a third of participants admitted they just did not have enough money to be able to save 
the remittances they received, reflecting the impossibility for many to accumulate assets in a 
context of precarious, irregular and low-income economic activities (see Chapter 2). For instance, 
Linda (hairdresser, Accra, husband, Brazil) stressed that she did not even have enough money to 
cover basic needs and thus wondered how it could be possible to save in these conditions. 
Similarly, Idrissu (farmer and mason, Savelugu near Tamale, cousins, UK and Spain) 
acknowledged that he was “unable to save money because [he] doesn’t earn much”. He added: 
 
Before your savings can be of benefit to you, it should last for at least a year. But if our income is 
not even enough for your basic needs, how can you think of saving part of it for future use? 
 
To the question whether MM had created new opportunities for him to save, Abdul Aziz (farmer, 
Savelugu near Accra, three sons, Accra) responded that opportunities only depended on what he 
had and the amount he could deposit. What mattered were not the financial tools or products that 
were available to save and leverage remittances, but simply the amount of money available, i.e. 
disposable income. Relatedly, and in contrast to the assumption that remittances are first sent and 
then spent, many participants said that the money they were expecting to receive had already 
been spent in anticipation. As a result, keeping a certain amount of remittance money in a bank 
account was not really an option, as Kwame (NGO worker, Accra, mother, Germany) pointed out: 
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Previously I’d try to save the remittances (…) But after school and marriage and all those 
responsibilities… We have a saying in our local language: ‘Remittance is spent in advance before it 
even gets to you’. That’s what happens basically, you can’t save this amount. 
 
Once received, remittances often did not even enter the remittance household but rather served 
to repay debts, as Hajia (petty trader, Kumbungu near Tamale, husband, Accra) indicated:  
 
I sometimes buy something on credit awaiting [my husband’s] money. So, by the time he sends me 
money, I would have already bought something on credit, which I would pay by using that money. 
 
These debts were owed to friends, family members, alternative institutions, or even to 
‘boutiquiers’ (shopkeepers51). In other words, remittances, before they were sent – and possibly 
even received as wages in host countries – were already embedded in diverse circuits of debts 
and debt claims, which made it difficult for many remittance households to even save a small part 
of it. 
 
5.3.2. Remittance use: Gender, inter-women hierarchies and kinship links 
Adding to previous feminist studies of the household (Agarwal, 1997; Lo, 2008), my evidence 
confirms that remittance households should not be conceptualised as a single, undifferentiated 
economic unit, as is too often implied in the policy literature on remittances and financial 
inclusion. Rather, remittance households are sites of entrenched power dynamics, gendered and 
inter-women hierarchies, which in turn permeate remitting behaviours as well as processes of 
decision-making over the use of remittances. On several occasions, participants in Ghana said they 
were in charge of decisions with regard to remittance allocation. For instance, Ibrahim (barber, 
Savelugu near Tamale, two sisters, Accra and Libya) explained he was able to decide himself how 
to use the money his sisters sent him. Farida (student, Tamale, husband, Wa) stated that her 
husband’s role was “to send” and hers was “to decide on what to do with it”. Interestingly, how 
decisions were made and by whom could evolve over time as several recipients I interviewed used 
to be remittance senders a few years back and vice versa. In other cases, decisions were made 
collectively, either between the migrant and one or multiple household members or between 
recipients themselves without necessarily the involvement of the migrant. Having said that, and 
while it was far from always being the case, migrants did generally maintain a great influence on 
who the money should be given to (redistribution) and how it should be spent (usage). This was 
particularly the case when remitters were mothers sending money to their sons and when 
                                                     
51 It is common practice to buy on credit from shopkeepers and reimburse the debt at the end of the month when 
remittances are received. 
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husbands were sending money to their spouses, as illustrated by the cases of Linda (hairdresser, 
Accra, husband, Brazil) and Vera (street vendor, Accra, husband, US): 
 
My husband determines what I use the money for (…) [He] is quite stern and difficult but I would 
have invested into my hair business (…) but he likes to see that I have used the money exactly as 
he requested. Thus, you hardly are able to save up for other projects of expenses. 
 
My money is just for the business and my husband’s money is for the upkeep of the home and school 
fees. He decides… he tells me what to do with the money. 
 
Disagreements could, however, happen as a result of migrants’ choices and decisions could be 
unmade at the point of remittance reception, as Idrissu (farmer and mason, Savelugu near Tamale, 
cousins, UK and Spain) explained: 
 
Sometimes, he [Idrissu’s cousin] can send you money and asks that you should give a particular 
amount to someone in the family. And the old lady [Idrissu’s grandmother] would also sit down 
and make changes. She can tell you that this particular person is not supposed to be given this. 
 
Relatedly, the supposedly increased women’s financial independence and decision-making power 
as a result of the absence of their migrant husbands was oftentimes constrained by the presence 
of other male figures – a father or a brother, for instance – within the household or the community, 
especially when recipient women lived with their husband’s extended family members (see also 
Teye et al, 2017b). Similar dynamics were identified in Senegal where processes of earmarking 
were also common and permeated by gendered power dynamics (see aforementioned vignette). 
When remitters were men sending money directly to their wives, instruction were generally given 
on how the money should be spent. What this meant was that remittances, even if sent to a bank, 
microfinance or MM account, could not be easily kept and saved but rather had to be withdrawn 
immediately, regardless of the willingness of the receiver to save. As Safiétou (petty trader, Thiès, 
husband, Ziguinchor, Senegal) clarified: “Remittances are just for the household expenditures”. 
These processes of earmarking money ultimately had an effect on the extent to which remittances 
could be put to use as encouraged by proponents of remittance marketisation, as Yaye (retired 
trader, Thiès, husband and son, Dakar and France) explained: “I cannot save the money he sends 
because it is calculated in advance”.  
 
While it is important to note that several participants receiving remittances from their husbands 
reported that they alone made decisions on how to use remittances for the upkeep of the 
household, I did not come across cases in which participants were in charge of their husbands’ 
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major investment projects such as house construction. These decisions were still made by migrant 
men and male members of the receiving household or male friends. Mamina (street vendor, 
Toubatoul near Thiès, husband, Spain), for instance, received remittances from her husband for 
the upkeep of the household but it was Abdoulaye, the local shopkeeper and an old friend of 
Mamina, who received the remittances that were dedicated to the construction of the house: 
 
He [Mamina’s husband] sends me remittances for the household and he also sends money to 
Abdoulaye to pay off his debts. For the construction, he sends the money directly to Abdoulaye. 
Sometimes, when Abdoulaye tells him he does not have time to collect the money, my husband 
sends the money for the construction to me and I then hand out the cash to Abdoulaye. 
 
Here, Mamina, despite the fact that she had to spend time collecting remittances for the 
construction, did not have control over it. The money was handed out almost immediately to 
Abdoulaye, a man her husband felt he could trust to handle his investment-related affairs. 
Migrants also retained control over the everyday use of remittances by sending money directly to 
the local shopkeeper at the end of the month to settle the debt of their household. As such, several 
women I interviewed did not receive cash but bought foodstuff on credit instead. Gorgui 
(shopkeeper, Thienaba, two brothers, Spain and Italy) mentioned that as a shopkeeper he was 
receiving remittances from at least five different migrants: 
 
They [migrants] do their monthly calculations and then send the money to me so that I can manage 
their households. 
 
Another common situation I encountered in Senegal was recipient men receiving remittances 
from their brothers and then redistributing part of the amount to the migrant’s wife, often to cover 
recurrent household expenditures, i.e. school fees for the children or daily food expenses. 
Similarly, it was frequent for male relatives to receive a large amount and the migrant’s wife a 
much smaller sum in order to cover recurrent needs. As Issa (shopkeeper, Thienaba, three 
brothers, Gabon) who lived with his wife, his children as well as two of his stepsisters explained: 
 
I receive remittances from my two brothers. I manage the everyday spending of one of my brother’s 
wife. Every month, he sends me money to settle his wife’s debt. That is 41 000 CFA franc, the 
equivalent of his wife’s everyday spending over a month. It only covers food [i.e. when it is her turn 
to cook for the household as well as breakfast] 
 
Remittance households were also sites of inter-women dynamics, within which the allocation and 
utilisation of remittances could be a source of tense negotiations, misunderstandings and, 
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sometimes, overt conflicts. In fact, even when the decision-making power was vested in women 
within the remittance household, it did not necessarily mean that decisions were made on a level 
playing field amongst the different household members. For instance, Safiétou (petty trader, 
Thiès, husband, Ziguinchor, Senegal) lived with her “co-épouse” (i.e. the second wife of her 
husband) and had control over the use of remittances: 
 
I decide everything because my husband gave me this responsibility. As soon as I receive the 
remittances, I tell my co-wife that we have to buy this and that. Upon mutual agreement, I manage 
all the household expenses. 
 
If not between two ‘co-wives’, tensions and negotiations also took place between migrants’ wives 
and their stepfamily, as Mamina’s (street vendor, Toubatoul near Thiès, husband, Spain) situation 
demonstrated: 
 
Beforehand, my husband would send me everything. But then rumours started that I was managing 
remittances on behalf of my stepfamily, especially my stepmother, did not like it. So, he stopped 
sending me the money for the stepfamily and he now only sends the remittances for my household. 
My stepfamily did not want me to know how much my husband was sending to them. Ultimately, I 
did not want to be involved. Now, I just manage the remittances for my household.  
 
As such, women’s social position within remittance households influenced the extent to which 
they could negotiate and control the allocation and utilisation of remittances. This position was 
also fragile and unstable as the above vignette demonstrated. In effect, the decision of Mamina’s 
husband to marry a second woman triggered a “fear of relegation” (Lo, 2008:423), which 
translated into worries about the future financial stability of her household. 
 
The significance of kinship networks has long been analysed in relation to remittances, 
understood as social practices (Erdal, 2012). Mazzucato and colleagues (2006) have shown the 
important role that remittances play in maintaining kinship ties through, for instance, funeral 
expenditures. My evidence suggests that relations of kinship between remitters and recipients are 
also crucial to account for when trying to understand the extent to which members of remittance 
households have control over the uses of the money they receive. Sawdiatou (shopkeeper, Thiès, 
daughter, Dakar), a long-time divorced shopkeeper who received remittances from her daughter, 
was adamant that she had total autonomy over her remittances. When asked whether she 
differentiated remittances from other types of incomes, Sawdiatou responded a bit bemused: “It 
is the same thing, I cannot separate this money. All of it is mine, so I cannot separate”. In contrast, 
Kwasi (mouldmaker, Tamale, brother, Accra), who lived with his two wives and children as well 
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as his brother’s wives and children, received remittances from his brother in Accra on a regular 
basis both for the upkeep of the house and for a construction project. When asked whether he was 
sometimes able to save part of the money he received from his brother, Kwasi’s answer was as 
follows: 
 
What happens is that before he sends me money for something, we will have to get a cost of that 
particular thing he is sending the money for. And once I receive the money I will go straight and use 
it for that purpose. I don’t think there will be any reason for taking part of it for savings. What if 
you take part of it and the remaining amount is not enough to complete the task he asks you to 
perform? So, if he sends money for some purpose, you have no reason for using part of it to save 
(…) We will make sure it is done as expected so that he will be very happy when he comes home to 
see it. We all want to always have peace and trust for each other. 
 
As such, even with regard to remittances sent to brothers and other male recipients, control over 
the use of remittances often still remained in the hands of migrants. This could be done in a direct 
manner, as Kwasi’s statement showed, as well as in more covert ways. For instance, Mustapha 
(trader and teacher, Accra, mother, friends and relatives, US), who received remittances from 
family members and friends from different countries across the world, confided in me that several 
of his friends abroad asked him to make sure their family members were using remittances as 
expected: 
 
Yes, I do help them [with their construction projects]. They normally send the money to a family 
member to do that, but then since I have knowledge of their lands and the activities going on, they 
at times tell me to go and spy on them. Just to make sure that they are using the money they sent 
for the right things. To check whether they are misusing the remittance sent or not. So, after the 
spying, I inform them on everything that I see. 
 
Overall, this section has examined the allocation and use of remittances within remittance 
households. The vast majority of members of remittance households are very rarely in a position 
to invest part of the remittances they received in financial accounts, and even less so to use 
remittances for loan repayments or as collateral. While proponents of financial inclusion generally 
evoke a lack of access to such financial products and services, my evidence rather suggests that 
power relations and hierarchies as well as processes of earmarking between migrants, receivers 
and recipients as well as amongst members of remittance households mediate the ways and 
extent to which remittances can be incorporated into financial circuits and put to use for financial 
purposes advocated by proponents of the remittances-financial inclusion nexus. The next section 
continues investigating the extent to which remittances can be leveraged as a means to enhance 
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financial inclusion (RQ2) by situating these within broader financial and money-management 
arrangements, practices and strategies of remittance households. 
 
5.4. When remittances enter the remittance household  
Decisions not to save or invest within so-called ‘formal’ financial circuits have usually been 
portrayed in development policy discourses and documents as “behavioural anomalies” that 
supposedly reflect poor people’s “loss aversion and impatience” and their “traditional” and 
“backward” lifestyles (Berndt, 2015:578). In a similar vein, international financial institutions and 
other organisations involved in the remittances-financial inclusion nexus often refer to the limited 
knowledge about and/or the lack of experience and availability of financial products and services 
to explain some of the barriers to access or use of financial services (Figure 5.1). Lack of access to 
these services, it is argued, reduces recipients’ choices. As a result, they are “only able to save 
informally” and must turn to “relatives or local lenders for borrowing, typically with severe 
limitations in terms of amounts, availability and costs” (IFAD and World Bank, 2015:12, emphasis 
mine).  
 
Figure 5. 2 - Financial services demanded by remittance recipients and barriers to access  
 
(Source: IFAD and World Bank, 2015:27) 
 
Moreover, alternative ways of saving are, more often than not, reduced to a derogatory notion of 
saving “under the mattress” (IFAD and World Bank, 2015:12). Even when the continuing 
prevalence of savings and credit associations is acknowledged, it remains, according to a report 
on digital financial services commissioned by the IFC and the MasterCard Foundation, a “barrier” 
to (digital) financial inclusion that needs to be overcome (Koblanck, et al, 2017:17). These same 
organisations are usually at pains to explain why such practices persist and cannot easily be 
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replaced by new financial products, as the following statement from the same report 
demonstrates: 
 
It may be that people simply like to meet together to conduct financial services for social reasons. 
Or maybe some feel pride in being able to show off their cash to their social networks (ibid:35, 
emphasis mine). 
 
In order to bridge this ‘financial capability gap’ (Mader, 2016a) and allow remittance recipients 
to improve their money management skills, interventions such as financial literacy programmes 
are deemed necessary to ‘properly’ understand, appreciate and use new available services (Figure 
5.2). Increasing the use of financial products and services offered by banks and Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) would enable remittances to be “used to the maximum benefits of both 
remittances recipients (interest earnings) and their communities (reinvestment through loans)” 
(IFAD, 2009:12). What is at play here is the discursive and political construction of an imaginary 
boundary between what constitutes the ‘market’ and its ‘deviant’ other, as a mean for the latter to 
be integrated into the former (see Chapter 2). 
 
Figure 5. 3 - Interventions to remove barriers and improve remittance recipients’ financial 
capabilities 
 
(Source: IFAD and World Bank, 2015:27) 
 
My research shows, however, that these aforementioned assumptions about so-called ‘informal’ 
investment, saving and credit practices and arrangements contribute to the persistent 
misrepresentations of RR money management and financial strategies and undermine their 
diversity and complexities. In effect, a detailed empirical exploration of what happens to 
remittances when they enter the remittance household suggests that these arrangements and 
practices play a central role in protecting and sustaining remittance households and anticipating 
what the future may hold. They are even often considered more advantageous, convenient and 
profitable than what banks, MFIs and MNOs can offer. Drawing upon evidence from my 
interviews, I also challenge the assumption that resources, including remittances, within 
household are necessarily pooled (see also Erdal, 2012) and show that when members of 
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remittance households did not, or could not, direct remittances towards investment and saving, 
they often channelled their own incomes instead. 
 
5.4.1. Remittances and alternative circuits of saving, borrowing and investment 
My evidence demonstrates that, when possible, members of remittance households saved and/or 
invested a fraction of the remittances they received. The problem for proponents of the 
marketisation of remittances is that that these were in most cases channelled through so-called 
‘informal’ financial institutions and circuits and were, therefore, deemed ‘unproductive’. Only on 
very rare occasions did I encounter clear-cut examples of participants regularly saving 
remittances in financial accounts. One exception was Gouya (trader, Thiès, husband, France) who 
put aside every month between 10,000 and 12,000 CFA franc (£13-16) of the remittance she 
received in her bank account in case her son falls ill: “I withdraw little by little, it’s for my son, his 
food and his health”. So far as MM was concerned, several participants in Ghana said they started 
using MM services in order to receive domestic remittances. This was notably the case of Farida 
(student, Tamale, husband, Wa): 
 
[My husband] used to find it difficult to send me money, especially when he is sending me small 
amounts like 50 GhC. He feels lazy and uncomfortable going to the bank. Because of this, he asked 
me to go and register to MM. 
 
This, however, rarely led participants to use their mobile wallets as a tool for long-term remittance 
savings or as a substitute for already-existing alternative money management and financial 
institutions and strategies. In effect, many participants saved part of the money they received by 
contributing to Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs52), Accumulating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ASCRAs53) and/or handing money out to susu collectors (savings mobilisers). 
For instance, Kankou (shopkeeper, Thiès, husband, France) affirmed that she systematically took 
aside a portion of the money she received in order to be able to contribute to her tontine: 
 
Every time my husband sends me money, I take 10 000 CFA franc to contribute to the tontine. 
 
This was also the case for participants in Ghana like Aisha (farmer, Mbanayili, Tamale, two 
daughters, Accra) who pointed out that she sometimes used part of the money to make 
contributions to her susu. These contributions allowed participants to finance their contributions 
                                                     
52 ROSCAs are called tontine in French, natt or tegg in Wolof, susu group in Akan, adashi in Dagbani.  
53 In contrast to ROSCAs where savings are pooled and then instantly redistributed to members in rotation, the savings 
that are pooled in ASCRAs are not immediately returned – at least, not for the first few months - but are “allowed to 
accumulate, to make loans” (Bouman, 1995:375).   
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to family ceremonies, such as naming ceremonies, weddings and funerals but also to start or 
consolidate their economic activities and buy furniture and household stuff. This division between 
ROSCAs for ceremonies and ROSCAs for economic activities can however be quite blurry on the 
ground. Here, I draw heuristic boundaries for the sake of the analysis: while the practice of 
drawing upon ROSCAs funds to participate in ceremonies will be explored in further detail in 
Chapter 6, the focus in this section is mainly on the use of ROSCAs to fund income-generating 
activities and cover various other needs (e.g. clothes, education, household stuff, and so on). 
 
My interviews show that remittance recipients’ saving practices were underpinned by tensions 
between their own economic and social desires on the one hand, and household and community 
obligations and constraints on the other (see also Guérin, 2006). In both countries, family and 
community obligations can take the form of community taxes, housing members of the extended 
family, making donations to religious leaders and/or participating in kin and kith’s life-event 
ceremonies, such as naming ceremonies, marriages and funerals (Buggenhagen, 2011). While 
fulfilling these duties brings social and economic protection and stability in the long term (e.g. 
inheritances and land claims), they also potentially intensify short-term uncertainties in terms 
both of acute needs and of a wide range of solicitations by members of the nuclear and extended 
family, and the community.  
 
While handling these tensions had an effect on everyone, the impact on women was particularly 
evident due to their domestic obligations and their limited and uncertain access to economic 
rights (Guérin, 2006; Berry 1995). These tensions between personal aspirations and community 
demands notably manifested themselves through the different forms of savings that women 
undertook, especially through variegated forms of ROSCAs and ASCRAs. While MM and financial 
accounts were considered to be useful for ‘emergency savings’, I found that tontine and susu were 
not used as a last resort but largely favoured as instruments of “future-making” (Green et al, 
2012:1641). Yaye (retired trader, Thiès, husband and son, Dakar and France) in fact explained 
that: 
 
The tontines, it’s by force. We are obliged to contribute whether we want it or not. And once we 
have contributed, we cannot have access to this sum of money anymore, unless it is your turn to 
get the pot. Whereas with the bank, you can collect your money. I live just nearby the CMS branch, 
so if I keep my money there, I can collect it whenever I want to. 
 
Echoing previous studies on alternative ways of saving (Green et al, 2012; Guérin, 2006; Kane, 
2001, 2010), my evidence suggests that one of the main reasons why participants saved through 
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ROSCAs was because they constituted a way to enforce compulsory saving. In other words, 
ROSCAs played a disciplinary role for women, requiring them “to save and use them as an 
incentive to earn income” (Guérin, 2006:559). Many participants, especially women, were 
adamant that this form of compulsory saving enabled them to stop ‘le gaspillage’ (waste). This 
was for instance the case of Alimatou (shopkeeper, Thiès, brother, Italy): 
 
Before the tontine, I was spending my money frivolously. But my tontine enabled me to save my 
money. Every time I have a little bit of money, I put it in the tontine. 
 
However, more than just avoiding wasting money, many women emphasised the fact that regular 
daily or weekly payments were a way for them to think about and plan for the future rather than 
just focusing on the present. In Ghana, many participants like Dawuda (street vendor, Tamale, 
brothers, Accra) made daily payments to susu collectors. She explained that at the end of the cycle 
“the amount can be used to increase the stock in your store”. Similarly, Afua (trader, Tamale, 
husband, Italy) was part of two mutual aid associations; one adakabila and one adashi. While the 
adakabila generally allows women to save in the long-term and have access to credit, the adashi 
helps them invest in their trading businesses but also to contribute to the adakabila: 
 
The adashi that we do is something that is helping us in our everyday business and to make 
contributions to the adakabila. When you take the money from the adakabila at the end of the cycle 
of the contribution, this is not for the adashi but to, for instance, buy cereals to keep for future sales 
when prices increase. The adashi is something that will help you make more savings for the 
adakabila; you’re making your savings for the adakabila with the help of the adashi. 
 
Here, short-term saving practices enabled Afua (farmer, Mbanayili, Tamale, two daughters, Accra) 
to promote her economic activity as well as build up longer-term savings. In turn, it was with the 
money she contributed to the adakabila for six to twelve months that she was able, amongst other 
things, to accumulate cereals or rice stocks that could then be sold at a better price at a later stage. 
These three imbricated forms of savings/investments attached to various time frames also 
allowed Afua to manage her debts. In fact, she was able to take out loans from the adakabila and 
the adashi when a need arose. To be able to repay her loans, Afua said that she needed to receive 
her share from the adashi first. In other words, the debts she incurred from one association had 
to temporally match a form of savings she had made with another group: 
 
What happens is that with the two contributions, whenever one of these is going to be difficult [to 
pay], it is the other one that will help you (…) Whenever it is becoming difficult for me to raise 
money to repay the adakabila loan, I wait until I receive the adashi savings. If I’m not close to taking 
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money from the adashi, I won’t borrow money from the adakabila. I normally take the contribution 
from the adashi and invest it in my business. The little profit that I get is what I will use to contribute 
to the adakabila and the remaining amount will be used to take care of our basic needs in the house. 
But when it comes to a time that I am short of money to make the adashi contribution as well as 
invest in my business, I will then take a loan from the adakabila. That is how I manage these.  
 
For Afua (farmer, Mbanayili, Tamale, two daughters, Accra), ‘juggling’ saving and borrowing 
practices constituted ways of not only anticipating needs, including cash needs, but also taking 
advantage of different sources of financial supplies for accumulation strategies (see also Guérin 
et al 2013). In fact, Afua was able accumulate and keep her cereal stocks even when she was short 
of cash by taking out loans from one of the alternative financial associations she was involved in. 
Similarly, for Mahama (trader, Tamale, daughter, Accra) being part of four associations (i.e. one 
susu, one adashi, one ceremony association and one group with which she took out loans from a 
rural bank) was a way to meet her different needs when needed: 
 
If you are in this group and you need money to do something and it is not available in this group, 
then it will be ready in another group and you can take it to solve your problem. It is helpful to be 
part of four groups because of the different purposes. 
 
It was not only ROSCAs and ASCRAs that were often prioritised over the use of financial accounts 
and other mainstream financial products and services. Many participants said that part of 
remittances they received was directly invested in farming products, trading and other income-
generating activities as well as land, housing and other type of assets. This was the case of Aisha 
(farmer, Mbanayili, Tamale, two daughters, Accra):  
 
If it is the farming season, she [one of her daughters] can send me 200 GhC and I will give some to 
her father, my husband, so he uses it to plough and buy fertilisers (…) When the money is enough 
for me to do my shea butter business, I use it for that particular purpose. But when it’s not enough, 
I use it to buy cooking ingredients. 
 
As such, when the amount allowed it, Aisha and her household managed to invest part of the 
remittances into their farming and trading activities. When the two daughters did not have 
enough money to allow for such investments, Aisha told us that she borrowed and then waited for 
her daughters to send money in order to pay back her debts.54 Furthermore, remittances were 
often used to complement an amount of money that was eventually used to invest in an economic 
                                                     
54 While Aisha could use remittances to invest without having to pay back her daughters, this was not possible for 
everyone. In fact, some participants mentioned that they could use the remittances they were sent to invest in their 
business but then had to reimburse the amount at a later stage at the migrant’s request. 
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activity. When Ama (street vendor, Thiès, husband, Mali) received her tontine share, she did not 
have enough to start her henhouse project. Her husband subsequently sent her another 100,000 
CFA franc to complete the amount.55 
 
In Senegal, the concept of denc (savings) covers a wide range of practices (Baumann and Fall, 
2015). While these diverse saving strategies have long been accounted for (Berry, 1995; Shipton, 
1995), they are nonetheless important to highlight. In contrast to the reductive notion of saving 
cash “under the mattress”, many participants said they saved a portion of the remittances they 
received by buying cattle, jewels, grains and/or building houses in multiple stages over a long 
period of time. All these saving practices were almost always deemed better than saving in cash 
at home according to participants. Abibatou’s (farmer, Thiès, son, Joual, Senegal) and Gorgui’s 
(shopkeeper, Thienaba, two brothers, Spain and Italy) saving practices were quite telling in that 
sense: 
 
You know very well that a farmer does not keep his money [in cash] on them since every time they 
have some, they buy cattle, which they can to sell in case of an emergency or an unexpected need 
(…) I sell them [sheep, chicken, goats] every time I have needs to meet [e.g. new school year] or 
when I have a ceremony like the Tabaski. You take a sheep for the meal – it is in any case to satisfy 
a need that we sell. 
 
I don’t save my money because every time I have money, I invest it in a sector (…) I build houses 
that I rent, I also raise cattle. That is how I save. 
 
Similarly, while the purchase of jewels by women is often associated with conspicuous 
consumption or waste (Kane, 2001), several participants implied that this particular means of 
saving allowed them to store value, which could easily be converted back into cash if need be.  
 
What the above shows is that in both countries, money, including cash remittances, is constantly 
in circulation. As Isaac (farmer, Accra, brother, UK) attested: “I have a bank account but we don’t 
save his money [his brother’s remittances]; it just arrives and is then going for the project. The 
money has to move.” When cash is received and/or at hand, it needs to be either spent or converted 
                                                     
55 It is also important to note that in many instances the consumption/investment dichotomy did not hold in reality (see 
Section 2.2.3 in Chapter 2). Dawuda (street vendor, Tamale, brothers, Accra) for example told me that her brother in 
Accra sent her a fridge once. While this fridge may be accounted for as remittances used for consumption, Dawuda said 
that she used it to sell ‘pure water’ (small bags of purified water), hence for an income-generating purpose. This shows 
that what counts as consumption or investment is not as clear cut as one may think and cannot be easily analysed and 
accounted for through questionnaires. What is required rather is an in-depth grounded exploration of the ways in which 
remittances are spent, saved and/or invested, sometimes all at once. 
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immediately, that is saved/invested in goods and assets but also in the community circuits 
through contributions to diverse credit and savings associations.  
 
Interestingly, my evidence suggests that all these financial and money-management strategies 
were often used to circumvent the financial and non-financial limitations of products and services 
offered by banks and MFIs, including not only proximity and convenience but also costs. Constant 
comparisons were drawn by participants between these and alternative arrangements and the 
financial benefits they derived from these. Participants frequently explained that it was more 
advantageous for them to invest and/or save their money outside banks and MFIs’ financial 
circuits. In fact, for many, saving in an account or a mobile wallet was not financially rewarding, 
especially if people only had access to a current and not a savings account. This was the case of 
Demba (farmer, Thiès, two brothers, UK): 
 
If you put money in the bank account, the money will sleep whereas you can yield a profit by 
investing or increasing your working capital. 
 
Because participants showed rational financial reasoning – the kind of mindset most international 
financial and development organisations are so desperately seeking – ROSCAs and other means 
of saving and investing were prioritised over the use of mainstream financial circuits. In fact, 
Alimatou (shopkeeper, Thiès, brother, Italy) affirmed it was more beneficial for her to save in a 
tontine than in a financial account: 
 
When I save in my tontine, the interest rate is higher than the one at the bank. That is why I don’t 
use formal financial products.56  
 
When asked about the new opportunities offered by MTN and Ecobank to invest in Treasury bills57 
through MM and earn interest rates, Kwame (NGO worker, Accra, mother, Germany) laughed: 
 
Personally, I don’t save because of the interest. I remember a couple of years ago, I bought T-bills 
and at the end of the year, the money, the dividend I got was 50 pesewas [laughs].58 And with that 
same amount of money, if I invest, say if I do petty trading, I’ll do better. So, personally, saving [in a 
                                                     
56 Interest may be charged on loans in certain ROSCAs and is then redistributed among members at the end of a cycle. 
This will be further explored in Chapter 6. 
57 The Ecobank TBILL4ALL is a mobile-money based investment service that allows Ghanaians to purchase and manage 
Government of Ghana Treasury Bills from their mobile phones. Ecobank Ghana currently offers the service on the MTN 
mobile money platform. MTN Mobile money wallet owners can buy Treasury bill with as little as 5 GhC. See:  
https://ecobank.com/gh/personal-banking/products-services/investment-solutions/tbill4all. 
58 50 pesewas are the equivalent of roughly 7 pence. 
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financial account] is just to be on the safer side, nobody can take my money. But as to save to 
increase your financial status, I don’t see this as something feasible. 
 
My evidence demonstrates that, when possible, participants often actively chose to direct part of 
the remittances they received towards alternative circuits and practices of saving, borrowing and 
investing. Rather than constituting a solution of last resort in a context of a lack of access to 
mainstream financial products, they were in fact largely favoured by participants for not only 
insurance but also accumulation strategies. In the next section, I show the importance of 
differentiating remittances and the incomes generated by individual members of remittance 
households to account for the full diversity of their financial and money management practices 
and strategies. This also allows for further investigation of why remittance flows cannot be easily 
directed towards financial channels as advocated by proponents of the remittances-financial 
nexus. 
 
5.4.2. Remittances and individuals’ own incomes  
Even when remittances were not, or could not, be saved or invested (see Section 5.3.), individual 
members of remittance households often invested their own incomes in income-generating 
activities and/or had their own money circulating through different types of financial circuits. 
More specifically, many participants I interviewed – especially recipient women – said they used 
their own incomes to save in ROSCAs and ritual associations but also to pay back MFI loans 
because migrants – mostly men – did not want their remittances to become embedded in these 
financial circuits. ROSCAs and/or ritual associations can still be considered the affairs of women59 
from which some men may feel excluded (see Buggenhagen, 2012). What was particularly striking 
as a direct result of this was how some recipients were hiding the fact they were saving or 
accessing loans – whether formal or informal – from remitters. Vera (street vendor, Accra, 
husband, US) for instance admitted that her husband did not know she saved in multiple susu 
because she said he would send less otherwise. Similarly, Afua (farmer, Mbanayili, Tamale, two 
daughters, Accra) acknowledged that her husband was not aware she was part of two ROSCAs:  
 
If he finds out, he will say that I’ve been getting enough and that is why [thanks to the remittances] 
I’m able to join these groups 
 
In Senegal, participants like Rokhaya (street vendor, Thiès, husband, Mauritania) and Sarratou 
(seamstress, Thiès, husband, Italy) also tried to keep their involvement with tontines to 
themselves. The reasons they gave were as follows: 
                                                     
59 Although an increasing number of tontines and susu groups are now mixed (Kane, 2010). 
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Like many men who often reduce their contribution when women have some revenues, I noticed 
that he was neglecting me. So, I stopped telling him certain things. I don’t tell him about my 
revenues anymore. He reduced the amount he sends because he knows I participate in a tontine 
and he thinks that this is his money that I save in the tontine, and that because I’m able to save, I 
must have enough money. 
 
When I joined a tontine, I did not tell him. But when he found out, he asked me to quit. That is why 
I decided to stop when this tontine ends. 
 
To be able to continue being involved with tontines and/or receiving the same amount of 
remittances, Rokhaya and Sarratou tried to hide – or at least not share – information to their 
husbands about their financial arrangements. Others told me that they had to prove that 
remittances were not used for such purposes.  
 
Again, the distinction between money that covers the needs of the household and income 
generated by different individuals within the remittance household is crucial here (see Section 
5.2.1), as illustrated by Ama’s (street vendor, Thiès, husband, Mali) case: 
 
He [Ama’s husband] thinks that I pay back my loans or that I contribute to the tontine with the 
money he sends me. But that is not the case. I use remittances for the dépense quotidienne [daily 
allowance for the upkeep of the household]. This created some tensions at the beginning. But I 
made him understand that he is supposed to cater for my needs and because he does not, I am 
forced to adopt strategies that help me cater for my needs. 
 
In a similar vein, and going back to my vignette at the beginning of this chapter, Mamina asserted 
that because she was not in charge of either the daily allowances or food, she was able to save 
through the incomes she generated with her petty trading activities. “The money that I save is the 
profit I make through my business, the shares of my tontine and the sale of my cattle”, she asserted. 
In turn, Fadima (housewife, Thiès, husband, Mbour, Senegal), whose husband did not know about 
her bank account at Baobab Senegal, talked about the money she earned as her “little secret”: 
 
The money I earn by selling my chicken, I put it in the account to save a little bit (…) The money is 
mine, I do whatever I want with it. 
 
Interestingly, while the distinction between remittances – as money for the upkeep of the 
household – and incomes of individuals of remittance households can be quite stark, it did not 
necessarily prevent recipients from temporarily diverting a portion of remittances into ROSCAs 
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and ritual associations. I also frequently came across situations where participants used 
remittances for their own financial arrangements and then reimbursed the remittances spent 
with their own income, as illustrated by Ramatoulaye’s (street vendor, Thiès, husband, Mali) case: 
 
When I receive remittances for the daily allowance, it’s when it’s my turn to cook, it’s for meals 
only. I use my own income to contribute (…) Previously though, when I was receiving remittances, 
I would put a portion of it aside for the reimbursement of my loan at the bank. Sometimes, when I 
did not have enough to pay back, I would take a small part of the remittances and as soon as I 
receive my own income, I would reimburse the remittances I took. But I stopped doing this to avoid 
stress. 
 
Overall, this section has shown that remittances play a significant role in alternative investment, 
saving and borrowing arrangements. Rather than constituting a solution of last resort that cannot 
fully harness the productive potential of remittances for development, my interviews have 
demonstrated that these circuits are largely favoured by most participants – including those with 
access to mainstream financial products and services – not only for financial protection but also 
accumulation purposes. Even when remittances cannot be directed to mainstream and alternative 
financial circuits, members of remittance households often channel part of their own income to 
such purposes.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the marketisation of remittances from the perspective of members 
of remittance households. My analysis shows that the extent to which remittances can be nudged 
towards specific financial circuits and arrangements, once in the hands of members of remittance 
households, is limited (RQ2). In other words, despite all the market engineering detailed in 
Chapter 4, the incorporation of remittances into global financial circuits cannot be accomplished 
straightforwardly. Several reasons can be given to explain this.  
 
First, remitter-receiver-recipient configurations are variegated and influence the ways in which 
remittance are used, saved, invested and/or redistributed. Remittance households are not 
homogenous units that receive remittances but rather sites within which remittances are sent by 
one or multiple migrants on the one hand, and used by, and earmarked to, one or multiple 
receivers and recipients on the other. In other words, remittances cannot be leveraged by simply 
providing the right nudges. Second, and in contrast to much of the policy literature on remittances 
and financial inclusion, my analysis demonstrates that remittance households are not simply sites 
of consumption, within which development interventions are needed to harness the productive 
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potential of remittances. Instead, significant labour is required to not only supplement remittance 
income but also make remittances work for migrants and remittance households. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, my evidence suggests that remittances can constitute a financial, social and 
psychological burden for members of remittance households in home countries. This 
understanding of remittances as not only a resource to be leveraged but also a potential cost and 
burden highlights important limits to the remittances-financial inclusion nexus. Third, in contrast 
to proponents of the marketisation of remittances that generally evoke a lack of access to financial 
products and services as one of the main barriers to financial inclusion, my findings demonstrate 
that power relations of debt, gender and kin as well as inter-women hierarchies mediate the ways 
in which remittances can be used and how much can/should be directed towards mainstream 
financial circuits. In fact, remittances are often not sufficient to sustain remittance households 
and, therefore, cannot be saved. Furthermore, migrants – mostly male – often retain a certain 
degree of control over the utilisation of remittances. Whereas tensions sometimes may arise from 
these processes of earmarking, they nonetheless constrained the possibility of using remittances 
in ways advocated by proponents of the marketisation of remittances. Fourth, whereas 
remittances are rarely deployed in mainstream financial circuits and arrangements, they are often 
saved/invested in farming, trading and other income-generating activities as well as in ROSCAs 
and ASCRAs, cattle, land and housing. Rather than constituting an unproductive solution of last 
resort, as often depicted by proponents of the remittances-financial inclusion nexus, these 
alternative circuits of saving, investment and borrowing are largely favoured by participants as 
instruments of financial protection and accumulation. Importantly, even when remittances cannot 
be deployed in these diverse financial circuits, many participants use their own money to save, 
borrow and invest, sometimes without migrants even knowing. The next chapter further explores 
how the marketisation of remittances plays out from the perspective of members of remittance 
households by specifically looking at how the latter have responded, accepted and/or resisted 
processes of financial incorporation and subjectivation (RQ3).  
  
 
 
183 
CHAPTER 6 
 
Contesting the marketisation of remittances:  
Repertoires of reluctance, refusal and dissent 
 
 
Nudging and experimenting are never complete and always prone to failure. They may be readily 
adopted, they may meet outright resistance and there may be instances of what James Scott has 
termed ‘calculated conformity’ (Scott, 1985). These are important questions, however, that can 
only be answered empirically and go beyond the scope of this paper. (Berndt, 2015:584) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines how remittance households have experienced processes of remittance 
marketisation, understood as market subject formation (RQ3). Previous studies have tended to 
analyse the ‘financialisation of remittances’ without paying enough attention to how members of 
remittance households in home countries have reacted to processes of financial incorporation 
(with the exception of Zapata, 2013, 2018). While it is certainly true that the ambiguities and 
fragilities of processes of financial subject formation have been acknowledged (Finlayson, 2009; 
Langley, 2006), the reasons why processes of market subject formation may succeed or fail and 
the ways in which variegated financial practices and subjectivities emerge and persist deserve 
more empirical scrutiny (Kutz, 2018; Lai, 2017). More specifically, I argue that particular 
consideration needs to be applied to the ways in which participants’ financial practices and 
subjectivities interact with, are subsumed by and/or counter various marketising attempts to 
replace and/or absorb them. Doing so can help further understand both the limitations to, and 
strategies of adaptation of, marketising projects that aim to link remittance flows and households 
to global finance. Conceptualising processes of financial subject formation as a practical 
accomplishment that is always contested, uncertain and in the making, this chapter advances the 
understanding of members of remittance households as ‘reluctant’ and ‘dissenting’ subjects of 
remittance marketisation as well as subjects that ‘deny’ marketisation through discourses and 
acts of refusal. They are “quasi-subjects” of remittance marketisation (Berndt and Wirth, 2019:4), 
constantly negotiating dis/entanglement processes at the borders of competing networks and 
regimes of value. This chapter critically draws upon and extend a growing body of work on 
financial inclusion and everyday financialisation in the Global South (Aitken, 2013; Mader, 2015; 
Mawdsley, 2018a; Rankin, 2013; Roy, 2010) by nuancing the often-assumed unrelenting 
advancement of the financial inclusion agenda – and the remittances-financial nexus more 
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specifically – in practice, and its inescapable performative power on remittance recipients’ 
financial everyday lives (see also Bernards, 2019). 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I explore the lived experiences of those 
participants who can be considered financially included. I show that most of them exhibit what I 
call reluctant acceptance, recognising the limited benefits and the potential and actual harm that 
processes of financial incorporation bring while admitting they have no choice but to comply. 
Second, I highlight the ways in which marketisation is denied through individual and collective 
acts of refusals. To do so, I shift my empirical lens onto participants who either stopped building 
or refused to build relations with financial institutions. Third, I examine multifaceted acts of 
dissent in the form of self-organisation. I show the ways in which members of remittance 
households set up alternative financial circuits and practices in order to directly contest the 
seemingly all-encroaching processes of financial(ised) inclusion. Finally, I explore how/whether 
these forms of financial self-organisation can resist the danger of formalisation and co-optation. 
 
6.2. Reluctant subjects of marketisation 
 
Access to financial products and services in general, and loans in particular, did not provoke as 
much interest and enthusiasm as posited by international financial institutions. For participants 
who were actively using financial accounts and taking out bank and/or MFI loans, a sense of 
inevitability was often palpable. I advance the conceptualisation of ‘reluctant’ subjects of 
marketisation to account for those participants who, despite acknowledging the potential harm 
and limited benefit that financial inclusion might bring, recognised having no choice but to take 
out loans and comply with their disciplinary mechanisms. I also show that, in several instances, 
new forms of debt took over participants’ everyday lives, sometimes dispossessing them of their 
capacity to produce “relational value” (Elyachar, 2005:7) through practices of ritualised exchange 
within alternative circuits of debt and debt claims.  
 
6.2.1. Reluctant acceptance 
Despite all the attention and resources spent on financial inclusion over the years, and all the 
people and institutions that have a stake in finding and promoting its benefits, the direct positive 
effects of financial inclusion on household business profits, income or consumption remain rather 
elusive (Duvendack and Mader, 2019). On the ground, while the supposed positive effects of 
financial inclusion were met with scepticism by the vast majority of participants, it is nonetheless 
important to note that some did acknowledge benefitting from some of the financial products and 
services offered by banks and/or MFIs. When asked about savings products and services, 
 
 
185 
participants’ first reactions tended to be rather positive. Financial accounts were often perceived 
as a safe, reliable, and convenient tool to manage their money. However, follow-up questions often 
led participants that initially said they were actively using such accounts to acknowledge that they 
were in fact either not using or barely had any money in these. Many participants were also quick 
to point out the transformative limitations of such services: 
 
Savings help you when you try to sort out emergencies but sometimes you realise that the little you 
save is not even enough when things come up. It just consumes almost all the money you have. Ok, 
that helps… but not as much as you’d want to (…) Looking at my current situation, this is difficult 
because it’s like you cannot really plan because something beyond your control can always come 
up and you have to sort that one out. (Kwame, NGO worker, Accra, mother, Germany) 
 
In the context of a lack of income, expanding the choice people have with regard to financial 
services seemed to have limited purview. Credit products, in turn, were very rarely depicted in a 
positive light. Five main themes emerged based on discussions I had with participants. First, many 
participants complained that the amount offered was generally too small and insufficient for 
investments to yield enough profit and increase their disposable income once loans were paid 
back. Second, the time-span to reimburse microloans was often deemed too short to be beneficial. 
Third, and directly related to the above, participants complained that loans often needed to be 
repaid immediately (often a week only after having received the loan amount), which did not 
allow enough time for any investments to materialise. Fourth, participants were often hard 
pressed not only because of the short maturity of the loans but also because reimbursement for 
many MFIs took place on a weekly rather than monthly basis, as Hafsah (housewife, Tamale, 
husband, US) indicated: 
 
I used to work for such a company [MFI]. I could have 1 billion GhC and distribute it to three groups 
and each person would pay back at the end of the month. It wasn’t like the ways these current 
microfinance institutions do, rushing their clients every week. 
 
Fifth, as I explore this in more detail in the next section, the above complaints were almost 
systematically supplemented by criticisms relating to the general costs of the loans. As Maxwell 
(business owner, Accra, brothers, Malaysia and Germany) admitted: “the loans are good but 
what’s killing the loans is the interest”. 
 
As such, bank and MFI loans were being drawn into a broader repertoire of financial practices. 
They were more often than not considered as an additional source of funding participants could 
use to cover their needs – both for business and non-business activities – and respond to 
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emergencies, including other debts that had to be repaid. In effect, and in accordance with other 
studies (Guérin et al, 2013), while getting into debt with MFIs could be part of a strategy of 
accumulation for some participants, for others, like Issa (shopkeeper, Thienaba, three brothers, 
Gabon), ‘juggling’ debts was a way to manage unexpected expenses and events. This is the reason 
Issa gave me when I asked him about the second loan he took out from Baobab Senegal: 
 
This sum was used to reimburse another debt I owed someone (…) This person was depositing 
money at my shop on a regular basis, between 2000 and 3000 CFA franc and this came to constitute 
a big sum of money in the end. One day, she came to ask for it, but I was having problems to gather 
all the money. 
 
Issa’s situation was quite telling in the sense that it was relatively similar to a well-known practice 
in Senegal but also in other parts of the world that consists of taking on debt from one source to 
settle a debt with another (Wampfler et al., 2013). In Wolof, there is an expression for this: sab 
bukki, sulli bushido (to take a hyena to bury a hyena) (Baumann and Fall, 2015). Sometimes called 
‘bicycling’ (Wampfler et al., 2013), it is important to emphasise that these practices did not 
necessarily constitute an indicator of over-indebtedness. Rather, they represented a skilful way 
for members of remittance households to manage their money in the context of a constant 
shortage of cash and economic instability. What Issa’s situation revealed, however, was the 
importance of honouring one’s debt, even if that meant getting indebted to MFIs such as Baobab. 
However, the payments of these debts, even with the help of the money sent by migrants, was 
nowhere near a straightforward process. Knowing which debts to settle first constituted a 
carefully planned endeavour, as Farida (student, Tamale, husband, Wa) implied: 
 
I really acquire many debts, but I made it such that anytime he [her husband] gives me something 
small, I will manage and pay some debts leaving others. When he gives me again, then I will settle 
a different debt but sometimes it may not even be enough for a particular debt. 
 
Conversely, several participants told me that they used part of their tontine share to pay back MFI 
loans. In other cases, the experiences of being involved in ROSCAs were said to have helped access 
to MFI loans. Furthermore, different financial circuits were used at different stages of the same 
economic activity. For instance, Sawdiatou (shopkeeper, Thiès, daughter, Dakar) and Issa 
(shopkeeper, Thienaba, three brothers, Gabon) said that their tontines were not only helpful but 
necessary to start their businesses, whereas the microloans from Baobab could only be accessed 
once their businesses were consolidated. Importantly, while I spoke to many participants 
navigating and juggling multiple financial circuits, only once did I come across a situation in which 
a participant had deliberately chosen to substitute alternative financial circuits and arrangements 
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for financial products and services offered by banks, MFIs and/or MMOs. In fact, even when loans 
were being used the way financial and development institutions wanted them to be (i.e. invested 
in small-scale businesses), participants found that these merely enabled them to buy enough 
goods, which in turn could be sold at a high enough price as to allow them to pay back their loans 
and have just enough to cover the basic needs of their households. To the question of whether it 
helped her to become more financially comfortable, Sawdiatou (shopkeeper, Thiès, daughter, 
Dakar), who had taken more than sixteen microloans over the years, including six from Baobab, 
responded with the following: 
 
Not really. Maybe the only advantage is that we can have a full amount of money in one go that is 
enough ready cash [to invest in the business]. 
 
Out of the 59 participants I interviewed in both countries, I did not find a single participant 
asserting that loans could or had helped increase their income. While my data is based on 
qualitative interviews and, therefore, partly reflects participants’ bias, it is nonetheless a rather 
telling stylised fact that supports the conclusions of an increasing critical body of literature on the 
non-existent impact of financial inclusion on income (Duvendack et al, 2011; Mader, 2016a; 2018; 
Roodman, 2012) (see Chapter 2). Amongst those that had taken out loans, the main advantage 
that was highlighted had more to do with ‘financial intermediation’ than ‘income generation’ and 
‘poverty alleviation’ (Mader, 2018). As Abdallah, a carpenter in Tamale who receives remittances 
from his brother in Italy, put it:  
 
MM and banking services have changed my life a lot with regards to how I manage my money. 
 
However, what was striking during so many of the discussions I had with participants who, like 
Issa (shopkeeper, Thienaba, three brothers, Gabon), had taken out loans from MFIs was this sense 
of being stuck, or trapped, with these loans: 
 
Taking out these loans did not change anything in terms of my standard of living because I spend 
half or even more than half [of what I earn] on paying back my loan. This does not allow me to cover 
all the expenses of the household (…) Nothing changed because I continue having debts. 
 
Although not necessarily deemed beneficial, loans were nonetheless inevitable. The following two 
statements from Sawdiatou (shopkeeper, Thiès, daughter, Dakar) and Aladji (salaried worker, 
Thiès, brother, Kaolack, Senegal) constitute fairly representative reactions I received when I 
inquired about the reasons behind people’s decisions to take out loans from MFIs: 
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You just do it, it’s independent of your own will, and you’re forced to do it. 
 
Personally, if I really had the choice, I would not have taken any loans (…) I did not want to put up 
with the pressure of the banks because I know how people live when they’re tied to banks. 
 
The vast majority amongst those with loans from MFIs freely admitted that they had no choice but 
to accept the conditions underpinning these loans as well as the consequences these may have on 
their everyday lives. Sawdiatou (shopkeeper, Thiès, daughter, Dakar) and Issa (shopkeeper, 
Thienaba, three brothers, Gabon) were just two among several other participants to mention that 
they constantly thought about their MFI loans and how to repay them. The issue of reimbursement 
led to a huge amount of stress for a significant number of participants: 
 
In December and January, in Senegal, there is no money. Not much is happening. When you owe 
227 000 CFA franc, which is not a small amount, you become preoccupied, you start worrying (…) 
You have to be focused on the loan all the time, it’s stressful (…) I always think about Baobab, I avoid 
postponing repayment. I think about Baobab all the time.  
 
Sometimes, it’s hard to pay, especially when I owe a payment to the bank and an electricity bill or 
the tontine at the same time. It’s hard to manage. I always have this in my mind, I think about the 
payment I have to make, I think about it constantly. 
 
Sawdiatou indicated that from the 1st to the 14th of each month, everything she did and calculated 
was in relation to her loan. She would try not to spend or buy anything until she had saved the 
amount of money corresponding to her monthly repayment due on the 14th. “I tighten my belt”, 
she said. In other words, half of each month of the year was dedicated to serving the MFI loan she 
was tied to. This tight disciplining effect that debt had upon many participant’s economic and non-
economic behaviours was even more evident in the case of Penda (shopkeeper, Thienaba near 
Thiès, husband, Italy and Spain): 
 
I always have this [loan repayment] in mind, I’m not peaceful until I pay back Baobab. I constantly 
think about the repayment. After the due date [on the 10th for her], I feel relieved but when the 
next due date approaches, I only focus on this (…) I am careful of waste, of unnecessary expenses. I 
only buy what is necessary and what can yield profit. I reduce my expenses (…) When you have a 
loan to pay back, you constantly live under stress because you’re telling yourself that the money 
does not belong to you. This pushes you to avoid unnecessary spending, avoid wasting money in 
ceremonies… because the only thing you can think about is the debt. For instance, instead of 
spending an entire day in a ceremony, I only go for some time because I have to open my shop to 
earn income and to pay back my debt. Time is precious for me. 
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Penda’s account of what it meant for her to be indebted to Baobab demonstrates how debt works 
as a disciplinary mechanism that not only impacts her consumption but also produces new 
subjectivities. Feelings of responsibility, even obsession, about debt repayment as well as guilt 
until the debt was repaid started permeating Penda’s everyday life and dictating the activities she 
thought she should or should not do. All her socio-economic activities were geared towards the 
repayment of the loans, reducing her first fifteen days of each month to mere survival. If an activity 
was not deemed ‘productive’ in the sense of being useful for the repayment of the loan, it became 
secondary and sidelined. Crucially, this meant reducing the amount of time she spent in 
ceremonies. Although this may not seem significant, I show in the next section that life-event 
ceremonies, and the social payments that take place within these, enable the production of 
“relational value” (Elyachar, 2005:7) that, in turn, contributes to ensuring the social reproduction 
of remittance households. As Buggenhagen (2011:726, emphasis mine) argues: “by lending one’s 
presence to a family ceremony, one is participating in a virtual exchange of reputation and 
creditworthiness”.  
 
6.2.2. Relational value and accumulation by dispossession 
Mutual aid associations for obtaining credit and managing savings, for example tontines and susu, 
have a long history in West Africa, predating the colonial era and colonial currencies (Falola, 
1995). African economies – and socio-economic relationships and exchanges in particular, 
including traditionally non-monetary asymmetrical social payments such as bride wealth and gift 
exchange practices during family ceremonies – became increasingly monetised during the 
colonial period. This monetisation was accompanied by the preservation, evolution and even 
multiplication of rotating and nonrotating groups for monetary savings and credit (Berry, 1995). 
As Buggenhagen (2012:159) argues: 
 
One could presumably find complex precolonial models of financial management that resemble 
contemporary rotating savings and credit associations. Yet many of these institutions emerge at 
the interface of Atlantic and African economies throughout the colonial period and after, and they 
have always been dynamic.  
 
In effect, increasing financial burdens imposed on the populations by way of taxation pushed 
many people to identify diverse strategies to be able to pay in the colonial currencies. This 
included undertaking migration and wage employment but also, and importantly, savings and 
credit institutions (Berry, 1995). While these associations have expanded and contracted at 
different historical moments (Buggenhagen, 2012), they became even more visible in the 1980s 
due to the increased precariousness resulting from the imposition of Structural Adjustment 
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Programs (ibid). The multiplication of associations revealed the necessity for the vast majority of 
the populations to find other modes of resource allocation.  
 
While Chapter 5 focused on the importance of ROSCAs and ASCRAs in supporting income-
generating activities and covering diverse needs, I pay attention here to their links with life-event 
ceremonies. In Senegal, many women I spoke to usually drew on funds they accumulated from 
ROSCAs attached to different types of associations, including tuur and mbotaye, to be able to 
exchange ndawtal (gifts) in the form of cash or kind, especially cloth, during life-cycle ceremonies. 
Tuur are rotating associations organised by unmarried women living in the same neighbourhood 
while mbotaye are usually formed by married women that contribute to support each member’s 
family ceremonies. Contributing to ROSCAs was seen as essential by the vast majority, as Ama 
(street vendor, Thiès, husband, Mali) and Abibatou (farmer, Thiès, son, Joual, Senegal) indicated:  
 
We are used to do these kinds of things amongst women [participating in tontines]. This allows us 
to get to know each other well, to consolidate our bonds because this allows us to go to every 
ceremony organised by the members of the tontine. 
 
I have been able to cover my ceremony expenses, such as the wedding or the naming ceremony of 
my daughters. Without it [tontine], I would not have been able to have a big enough amount of 
money to cover these expenses. 
 
Rather than simply constituting a short-term response to cope with crises as they are often 
depicted, these complex financial strategies that women developed through these associations, 
and that were made visible during family celebrations, are part of what Jane Guyer (2004) refers 
to as a vast fiscal repertoire of financial management strategies. These repertoires are to be 
understood as practices that create “value over the longue durée of currency instability and global 
volatility” (Buggenhagen, 2012:17). One such practice in Senegal is called lebal-bor, or sowing 
debts (Mottin-Sylla, 1987). During naming ceremonies, relations of credit and debt are constituted 
through asymmetrical gift exchanges. Women attending a naming ceremony proceed to give a 
ndawtal gift to the birth mother who then offers a return gift (njukkul) either immediately or at 
the next ceremony. Usually, the return gift needs to represent double what the birth mother 
received. By returning a gift with an increment, the recipient expects a future replacement: “one 
‘lends debts’ with the aim of recovering credit” (Buggenhagen, 2012:157). These asymmetries 
that are created by women returning the gifts they receive with an increment play an essential 
part in women’s financial repertoires as they constitute obligations that perpetuate relations of 
reciprocity over time. As Guérin (2006:554) argues, “the rhythm of daily life is thus dictated by an 
unlimited exchange of gifts and return favours”. It is through these practices that ‘marginal gains’ 
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are expected to be made (Guyer, 2004). In Senegal, the circuit into which women, but also men, 
enter through their involvement in family ceremonies is called the circuit of kersa60 (honour). Not 
being part of, or cutting oneself off from, these circuits of honour – which also constitute circuits 
of indebtedness – can have disastrous consequences because such ceremonies represent an 
essential component of the social reproduction of these remittance households. They constitute 
the places and moments that make visible the forms of relationship that are vital to participants’ 
futures, as Ama (street vendor, Thiès, husband, Mali) indicated: 
 
He [her husband] tells me that I waste money because I ask him to send me money to attend 
ceremonies. But we cannot not go. He cannot understand that we must give during ceremonies. It’s 
in that sense that he says I waste money.  
 
It is certainly true that some of the women I spoke to said that their husbands abroad often 
complained about their remittances becoming entangled with ROSCAs and ritual associations, 
especially naming ceremonies (see Chapter 5). While this led several participants to either use 
their own income or temporarily divert a portion of remittances into ROSCAs attached to ritual 
associations, many others did use remittances and stressed how important they were for their 
ability in participating in ceremonies.  
 
Ama’s opinion is also revealing of long-standing attempts by the state, customary authorities, the 
Muslim clergy and/or NGOs in both Senegal and Ghana to regulate social payments during life-
event ceremonies such as naming ceremonies, marriages and funerals (Arhin, 1995; 
Buggenhagen, 2011, 2012; Manuh, 1995). Practices of ritualised exchanges have long been 
depicted as wasteful and conspicuous expenditures that hamper economic development. In this 
context, attempts to explain the persistence of these practices by stressing the desire to “show off 
cash” (see Koblanck, et al, 2017:35 in Chapter 5) perpetuates the idea of money being spent 
carelessly when circulating through these circuits of exchange. Instead, many scholars of West 
African popular economies depict these practices and expenditures as a way of not only making 
ends meet but also creating enduring forms of value in the context of economic instability through 
the creation, multiplication and cementing of social ties (Arhin, 1995; Berry, 1989, 1995; 
Buggenhagen, 2011, 2012; Falola, 1995; Shipton, 1995). Going back to the example of naming 
ceremonies in Senegal, what these investments in asymmetrical relations and associational life 
signify is the “desire to translate money into long-term stores of value” (Buggenhagen, 2012:160). 
                                                     
60 A second intertwined circuit of exchange (circuit of spiritual and material blessings) relates to offerings of labour, 
cash, livestock and/or crops from disciples to religious leaders (Buggenhagen, 2009).  
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In effect, what the birth mother – the recipient of the ndawtal gift – does is to “invest value in the 
donor by placing her in the position of debtor” (Buggenhagen, 2011:725). In other words, 
participating in ceremonies can be considered a form of investment of value in others. This is what 
Elyachar (2005) calls relational value in the context of workshops in Cairo, i.e. the value attached 
to the creation, reproduction, mobilisation and extension of relationships, which constitute a 
mode of survival and render possible the negotiation of daily life. For masters working in 
workshops in Cairo, “maintaining the balance between a sphere of short-term exchanges, in which 
the pursuit of individual gain is legitimate, and a ‘cycle of long-term exchanges concerned with the 
reproduction of the social and cosmic order’” guarantees the durability of their economic activities 
(ibid:148). Rather than constituting wasteful expenditures during ceremonies, these practices of 
ritualised exchange in West Africa in fact produce relational value and have therefore the potential 
of being highly ‘productive’ in the future.  
 
Crucially, just like remittance markets (Chapter 4), these relationships are not just ‘out there’, 
ready to be used as a resource. Rather, they are “situationally produced and performed” (Elyachar, 
2005:145; see also Guyer, 2004) and require huge amounts of time, labour and resources to be 
maintained (Berry, 1995). In the context of naming ceremonies in Senegal for instance, producing, 
reproducing, and maintaining these asymmetrical social relations that are essential to people’s 
socio-economic futures require complex strategising and calculation. Here, the forms of 
calculation that relate to these social payments are based on several measurement scales, 
including incremental numerical scales, the nominal scale of qualities (of objects being 
exchanged), and the ordinal ranking (of people) (Guyer, 2004). It is upon these “disjunctures 
between scales, through performative skill at successfully bringing them together” that marginal 
gains are produced (Guyer, 2004:95 in Verran, 2007:174). In fact, Buggenhagen (2012:727) talks 
about “fiscal performances” to describe the distribution of cloth wealth and cash in family 
ceremonies. They demonstrate how women have to carefully plan their transactions, having to 
constantly remember and recall past gifts in order to plan future ones (ibid). As mentioned earlier, 
asymmetries are created by returning gifts with increment. As such, replacement is ensured in the 
future, either to women themselves or to their offspring. What is more, attention is paid not only 
to the quantity but also the qualities of the objects, especially cloth, that are exchanged. Not all 
gifts of cloth have the same values. While some constitute mere payments that do not require 
counter gifts, other more visible, scrutinised and substantial gifts of cloth are recorded in ledgers 
and constitute loans that must be repaid in the future as they are deemed to express “inalienable 
qualities” (Buggenhagen, 2009:200). As a result, women try to convince each other to endow first-
quality strip- and locally-woven cloth rather than machine-made cloth as a way to ensure future 
wealth and lineage continuity (Buggenhagen, 2012). Finally, through these practices, notions of 
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social rank are created and reinscribed. In fact, women’s genealogies are rendered publicly visible 
and honoured by griots during ceremonies in order to assert women’s social status and aid them 
in bestowing their gifts of cloth or cash (ibid). Griots, genealogies, social status, ledgers, cloth 
characteristics constitute an assemblage of material, textual and discursive elements that bring 
about different kinds of “calculative agencies” than the ones evident in the making of remittance 
markets in Chapter 4 (Çalíşkan and Callon, 2010:12). They participate in the formatting of 
agencies that enable the ‘qualification’ of gifts and the production of relational value among those 
attending ceremonies. These social-technical devices intervene to produce asymmetrical 
relationships and generate marginal gains. As Verran (2007:176) argues, drawing on Guyer 
(2004) and Callon and colleagues (2002), “it is in the ‘economy of qualities’ that marginal gains 
are generated”. And while it is essential not to romanticise these alternative circuits and practices 
that can perpetuate inequalities and hierarchies,61 they nonetheless constitute circuits from which 
disentanglement can have disastrous socio-economic consequences. 
 
Whereas creditworthiness during these ceremonies manifested itself by the “bodily display of 
wealth, including clothing, coiffure, and cosmetics” (Buggenhagen, 2012:726), it was calculated 
by MFIs such as Baobab based on savings and borrowing behaviours (e.g. making payments on 
time). Because these two calculative regimes compete against one another, it became increasingly 
difficult for someone like Penda (shopkeeper, Thienaba near Thiès, husband, Italy and Spain), who 
had to start spending less time in ceremonies (Section 6.2.1), to maintain her creditworthiness in 
both circuits simultaneously. The MFI-imposed mode of calculating Penda’s creditworthiness 
slowly dispossessed her of her capacity to produce and maintain relational value in life-cycle 
ceremonies. Penda’s debt thus encroached on the circuits, activities and time dedicated to 
processes of social reproduction and strategies of future-making.  
 
Penda was not the only participant I spoke to who had to compromise her capacity to produce 
relational value in order to be able to pay back their MFI debts. However, it is important to note 
that when life-events negatively impacted participants’ socio-economic conditions, it often led 
them to go back to alternative forms of financial arrangements or even to give up on financial 
products and services offered by MFIs. This was, for instance. the case for Ama (street vendor, 
Thiès, husband, Mali): 
 
I’ve got to contribute to my tontine and the calebasse. I’ve got to pay back my loan from the 
calebasse as well as my loan from FIDES [commercial MFI]. It is really difficult to manage all of this. 
                                                     
61 See for example Guérin (2006) and Buggenhagen (2012). 
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That is why I decided this month [when her loan will be fully repaid] to stop taking loans from 
FIDES. 
 
As time gets increasingly taken up by daily struggles to earn a livelihood, participation in a variety 
of institutions – especially financial institutions like MFIs in this case – decreases. In effect, and as 
mentioned earlier, juggling and prioritising the repayment of one debt over another is often part 
of a carefully planned strategy that consists of always being in a position to honour one’s pledge. 
The hierarchisation of debts and expenses permeates remittance households’ socio-economic 
everyday lives (Baumann and Fall, 2015). This, in turn, allows members of remittance households 
to place and channel their money where it is most needed, which often corresponds, especially for 
women, to the necessity of partaking in asymmetrical exchanges of reciprocity (ibid). While 
Baumann and Fall (2015) emphasise that the contribution to ROSCAs often take priority over the 
reimbursement of an MFI loan, they also stress that both debts have to be paid. What the above 
example of Ama illustrates is that financial spaces cannot be abandoned until loans are fully 
repaid. When some participants started struggling to both contribute to their ROSCAs and 
reimburse their MFI loans, but were nowhere near the end of their loan repayment end date, 
decisions had to be made. As their financial situations became more and more untenable, they had 
no choice but to stop contributing to their ROSCAs in order to be able to continue paying back 
their MFI loans. What this demonstrates is that when participants take out loans from financial 
institutions, there is always a risk that the circulation and social hierarchisation of debts and debt 
claims in other circuits may no longer be possible.  
 
So far, my evidence has suggested that in some instances new forms of financial product and debt 
can take over alternative circuits of debt and debt claims and force members of remittance 
households to sacrifice some of their capacity to produce relational value through indigenous 
ritualised practises of gift exchange. As they struggled to repay MFI loans, several participants had 
to partly disentangle themselves from alternative value-producing circuits of mutual obligations 
and rights. The financial imperatives of MFI debts contributed to producing subjectivities of 
individualised responsibility and guilt.  
 
Having focused on members of remittance households that experienced processes of financial 
incorporation, I now turn to participants that decided to either not use or stop using financial 
products and services offered by MFIs, banks and/or MNOs. By doing so, I show that alongside 
accounts of microfinance ‘victims’ and ever-encroaching processes of financial inclusion lies 
another story in which a significant number of people still have very few, if no, connections with 
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financial institutions. This is a story that gives greater emphasis to acts of refusal, dissent and self-
organisation. 
 
6.3. Denied marketisation: Individual and collective refusals 
 
My interviews demonstrate that remittance marketisation was often denied through individual 
and collective acts of refusal. While it is certainly true that some participants did not have the 
opportunity to access bank and/or MFI products and services, many others were either not 
interested or actively refused to build financial relations with any financial institutions. 
 
Many members of remittance households expressed acute reservations about the financial 
products and services on offer, and microloans in particular. With regard to financial institutions’ 
enrolment practices, my evidence base indicates that remittances rarely constituted a means 
through which members of remittance households got patronised with banks or MFIs. Most of 
them started using formal financial services when advised by a friend or a relative. While 25% of 
participants in Senegal said they had been asked at least once to open an account when collecting 
remittances, only a couple ended up opening an account. One was Alimatou (shopkeeper, Thiès, 
brother, Italy) who visited one of the ACEP branches in Thiès on a regular basis to pick up the 
remittances her brother sent her. However, she admitted that it had been a long time since she 
last put some money in this account. In fact, opening a bank account rarely led participants to 
become active users, and even more seldom to engage with other financial products and services. 
As Alimatou pointed out:  
 
Every time I come to pick up the remittances, they tell me that I can get a loan. But at the moment, 
I don’t need one. 
 
Despite the MFI’s aggressive marketing strategy, Alimatou, like many other participants in 
Senegal, had so far rejected the institution’s call to get indebted. Similarly, in Ghana, numerous 
participants like Rosaline (shopkeeper, Accra, son, US) and Ali (timber trader and farmer, 
Savelugu, Thiès, wife and brother, Accra and Spain) acknowledged that they had the opportunity 
to access financial products and services but refused to do so: 
 
They [loan officers] do come around to offer but I don’t accept because the interest rates are just 
too high. 
 
Officers from ADB [rural bank] come to me every time to ask me why I stopped patronising their 
bank and that I should come back. And that even if I need a loan, they would give me one, but I think 
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that what I have is ok (…) They [banks] are really interested [in my business] and are always ready 
to lend me but because of their charges, I don’t borrow from them. 
 
Unsurprisingly, one of the key reasons for such refusals was linked to the cost of microloans and 
their high interest rates. Many participants in both countries also complained about hidden fees 
and charges attached to loans, bank accounts and debit cards. This was notable in the case of Isaac 
(farmer, Accra, brother, UK) 
 
I applied for an ATM card, but they were deducting my money. Every month they were deducting 
money from my account and I told myself it could not continue and then asked them to close my 
ATM card and they did. 
 
As mentioned earlier, while few participants had tried to take out, or were even yet to hear about, 
mobile-based nano-loans, those who had were already aware of the high costs of these loans (see 
Chapter 4). For instance, Maxwell (business owner, Accra, brothers, Germany and Malaysia) told 
me that the interest rate on QwikLoan was too high and that he was avoiding it as a result.  
 
While some participants were adamant that they would not build any links with financial 
institutions, others refused to maintain or renew the financial relationships they had with them. 
In fact, a recurrent form of refusal that is worth emphasising relates to loan renewals. The 
following two examples provide significant insight into not only the problematic behaviours of 
some financial institutions but also the ‘rational’ responses that customers offered. This is how 
Grace (seamstress, Accra, sister, US), very well aware of the risks these loan offers posed, reacted 
to the constant haggling of MFIs:  
 
They [Advans - MFI] are constantly calling on me to come and access more loans but I have asked 
them to give me some time. I want to be certain of what I need the loans for first (…) Before I go for 
money, I do think it through first very carefully. 
 
It was not only from Advans that Grace received loan offers. In fact, she received loan offers from 
many other financial institutions but was adamant that this did not constitute the solution for her: 
 
I don’t want to borrow from many places or else I will get into trouble with creditors. When  I am 
paying with just one bank, I can manage and pay off my loan. 
 
Similarly, in Senegal, despite aggressive marketing strategies from several MFIs, including Baobab 
(Touré, 2014), my evidence suggests that participants were not just passive loan takers but also 
rejected MFIs’ offers to renew loans. 
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While the above cases reflect refusals expressed on an individual basis, people also organised acts 
of refusal collectively. This is what Aisha (farmer and vendor, Mbanayili, Tamale, daughters, 
Accra) explained to me: 
 
Officers from various banks came to this village three times and never succeeded in convincing us 
because we already told them that they have very high interest rates. So, we don’t take loans or 
save with those formal institutions. The teachers in this village have advised us not to go for loans 
from the banks (…) Even before any organisations can operate in this community, they first have 
to go to the palace and seek for permission. And every time such financial institutions come, the 
chief does not allow them to operate so we don’t even have them here in this village.62 
 
Interestingly, two of the participants who were amongst the most critical of microloans used to 
work for financial institutions. William, a salaried worker in Accra who receives remittances from 
her fiancée based in the US, used to work as a credit analyst for one of the main MFIs in Ghana:  
 
I’m not comfortable with loans. If you’re taking a loan, you must understand the terms, know how 
much you’re paying on top as well as the interests before you take it. If you know the business is 
not safe, don’t try a loan. You can do it the informal way; a friend can give you (money) and might 
not put any interest on it, which is preferable to me. That is why I depend on friends or family, 
compared to institutions… because there is no interest (…) The interest is huge, that’s why I hardly 
advise people to take loans, especially if you’re close to me. I’ve had a lot of experiences, it’s terrible 
sometimes, people are brought to courts… oh, it’s crazy. 
 
What this former credit analyst for a microfinance institution in Ghana urged people to do was to 
prioritise the ‘informal’ over the ‘formal’ sector to obtain loans as he considered formal loans too 
risky and expensive. Prioritising the ‘informal’ over the ‘formal’ was also the suggestion of Kwame 
(NGO worker, Accra, mother, Germany), another former bank employee: 
 
I had financial issues in the past. Now, imagine if I had taken a loan, the bank would have come after 
me. How would the bank be able to understand my situation? People even die because of these 
things. But even though I’m facing financial challenges, if I don’t owe anything to any banks, at least 
I have my peace of mind (…) You see, the thing is that anybody who borrows is a slave to the lender 
because you have to be working, working and working to pay off. So, for me personally, loans… 
                                                     
62 In fact, before we could even meet Aisha, Sugri and I had to go through the village’s main entrance where a number 
of elders were socialising. While I did not partake in the conversation, Sugri spent about fifteen minutes greeting them 
and explaining the reasons of our visit and who we wanted to speak to. It was only after some time that we managed to 
enter the village and look for Aisha.  
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unless…. I don’t think… I would prefer we do informally: you take the money, there is no interest, 
there is no inflation so when I get the money, I can pay you (emphasis mine). 
 
Echoing Kwame’s (NGO worker, Accra, mother, Germany) comparison between being a borrower 
and a slave, when asked why he did not want to use banks and MFIs to borrow, Maxwell (business 
owner, Accra, brothers, Malaysia and Germany) responded that “loans are very expensive, we just 
end up working for them”. Far from merely being a question of affordable loans, Kwame and 
Maxwell were more concerned about the disciplining social power of money and credit over social 
life. Microfinance debt was not seen as a neutral exchange of money between equals but rather as 
constitutive of the inherently unequal relationship between debtors and creditors that underpins 
microfinance as a “poverty industry” (Soederberg, 2014). As Hardt and Negri (2012:12) argue: 
 
In contrast to the myth of equal exchange, then, the debtor-creditor relationship has the virtue of 
unmasking the vast inequalities at the foundation of capitalist society. 
 
In effect, for many participants, the unequal relations of power and domination between rich 
investors and poor borrowers were not concealed but rather took the form, as Kwame (NGO 
worker, Accra, mother, Germany) remarked, of “well-built people” that came to houses to collect 
goods and money by force: 
 
The bankers, you cannot blame them because they’re taking investors’ money and they have to pay 
dividends at the end of the year. So, when they come, when they want you to take loans, they will 
come with a beautiful face but when it’s time to repay, they will send well-built people to come and 
take their money. I don’t think it’s right. 
 
It is important to note that the ability to refuse and/or reject MFI and bank loan offers as well as 
loan renewals was partly dependent upon each individual’s circumstances and social position. 
Issa (shopkeeper, Thienaba, three brothers, Gabon) told me that despite his initial reluctance (see 
previous section), he found it hard to reject Baobab’s loan renewal offer: 
 
When I finished paying back my loan, I did not want to take another one. It’s the guy from Baobab 
who encouraged me to do it. He even called me to tell me. I told him to give me some time to think 
about it and that I would call him back. Sometime later, I called him back to let him know I would 
come on in a few days for my second loan. 
 
As mentioned already, Issa owed a large sum of money to one of his regular clients and used this 
second loan to pay them back. In contrast, for Khoudia, a retired teacher in Thiès who receives 
 
 
199 
remittances from her three daughters in France, it was her relatively small but nonetheless stable 
pension that allowed her to avoid interest-based loans. 
 
I have shown that acts of refusal were frequent among participants. This was not only true for 
people who did not want to have anything to do with financial institutions but also for those who, 
despite having initially joined financial circuits, were reluctant to continue building further links 
despite the ever-recurring offers of bank and MFI credit agents. 
 
6.4. Dissenting subjects of marketisation: Self-organisation as 
resistance? 
 
Sometimes established in direct opposition to so called ‘inclusive’ financial systems, ROSCAs and 
other forms of savings and credit associations can constitute spaces within which decisions are 
made collectively and alternative processes of financial valuation are rendered possible. This 
section explores these multifaceted acts of dissent in the form of self-organisation among 
remittance recipients. 
 
6.4.1. “Not all interests are the same”: Competing practices of valuation 
On several occasions, the setting up of and/or participation in associations for obtaining credit 
and managing savings was expressed in direct resistance to the banking and microfinance 
systems. This was for instance the case of Khoudia (retired teacher, Thiès, three daughters, 
France): 
 
I don’t want to take out loans because of the interest. That is why we set up a tontine. I wanted to 
borrow money without having to pay any interests. That is how I set up the tontine in my school. I 
organised it so that they [her colleagues] could have access to money in a different way, to show 
them how we can solve our problems without the banks that suffocate us. I told them that we can 
undertake projects without taking out a loan from the bank. With the bank, with the interest, you’re 
tired, you don’t live anymore. 
 
Khoudia set up a tontine not because she could not have access to bank of MFI loans but rather to 
find an alternative to a banking system that did not suit either her socio-economic needs or her 
convictions. Similary, Niali (shopkeeper, Thiès, husband, Italy) who refused to open an account 
with an MFI because of the “high interests” and the “negligence” of such institutions contributed 
to initiating an association with forty other women as an alternative:  
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We established this small group. We thought about it and then decided the way it would work. We 
keep this money ourselves because we did not want to leave it at the bank. 
 
Niali explained that with her ASCRA each member could now have access to loans of up to 13 000 
CFA franc. In contrast to ROSCAs where savings are pooled and then instantly redistributed to 
members in rotation, the savings that are pooled in ASCRAs are not immediately returned – at 
least, not for the first few months - but are “allowed to accumulate, to make loans” (Bouman, 
1995:375).  This sum of 13 000 CFA franc had to be repaid over a period of a few months before a 
loan of the same amount could in turn be redistributed to another member. Interest was added to 
the loan so that the fund could grow over time and bigger amounts could be shared by members 
at a later stage of the cycle. Crucially, interest originating from such groups were not valued the 
same way as interest charged by banks or MFIs. As Dawuda (street vendor, Tamale, brothers, 
Accra) pointed out to me: “not all interests are the same”. For instance, I was told by some 
participants in both countries that some of the ROSCAs they were involved in had recently been 
equipped with a non-rotating emergency fund from which members could draw upon if needed. 
What was sometimes called the ‘solidarity’ fund was partly funded by the interest charged on non-
emergency loans, as Ama (street vendor, Thiès, husband, Mali) explained: 
 
If I take out a loan of 5000 CFA franc with FIDES [formal MFI], I have to give 1000 CFA franc [of 
interest] that will not be in my account because it belongs to the bank. However, with the group, 
it’s a consensus, we discuss among ourselves in order to find the right amount that we can add to 
the loans we take out. It’s an amount that is more flexible and more acceptable financially because 
it’s between 200 and 500 CFA franc. It’s even more acceptable because we put it aside for the 
solidarity.  
 
Interest-based loans within alternative financial arrangements were in fact welcomed by 
participants. Because they were subsequently redistributed to all members of the group at the 
end of the cycle, interests were in fact working in favour of all, including the borrowers. Dawuda 
(street vendor, Tamale, brothers, Accra) told me that with her susu, when people took a loan, 10% 
interest was usually charged. Interest was added up and then shared amongst all contributors at 
the end of the period: 
 
I will take it [the interest] because we benefit from each other’s interest.  
 
Interests were accepted because they came out of a collective decision that was agreed by the 
group. Because they worked for the people themselves, Rokhaya (street vendor, Thiès, husband, 
Mauritania) did not even call it interest: 
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When you pay back your 10 000 CFA franc loan, you give 500 CFA franc extra. But we don’t call it 
interest, we call it solidarity. 
 
Interestingly, I was told on numerous occasions that part of the money that was accumulated in 
these solidarity funds was also used for investing in chairs, tarpaulin and kitchen utensils that 
could be rented out in case of events and ceremonies. The earned incomes were then added to the 
fund, ultimately allowing the distribution of larger loans as well as larger shares amongst 
members at the end of the cycle.  Relatedly, what women involved in ASCRA tended to emphasise 
is how useful these regular cash instalments, i.e. the sum of 13 000 CFA franc, were at enabling 
them to either stabilise or consolidate their income-generating activities. 
 
Niali (shopkeeper, Thiès, husband, Italy), Dawuda (street vendor, Tamale, brothers, Accra) or 
Rokhaya’s (street vendor, Thiès, husband, Mauritania) associations and the many others I 
encountered during my fieldwork all took different forms and were organised according to a 
different assemblage of evolving rules, mechanisms and technologies with regards to a wide range 
of aspects, including the number of loans one could obtain during the same cycle, the charging of 
interests on loans, the introduction of a lottery mechanism to decide on the rotation, the addition 
of a non-rotating emergency fund from extra contributions and revenues such as interests and 
fines. Because these associations were non-permanent, they were able to adapt their strategies to 
new circumstances. In fact, Kane (2010) argues that tontines in Senegal are like ‘chameleons’ that 
evolve over time according to changing needs. As such, what was accepted and acceptable during 
one cycle could change over time because of what members thought and decided. While Sofietou’s 
(stallholder, Thiès, husband, Italy) ASCRA was charging interest on loans at the time of our 
interviews, they had collectively decided that they would stop this at the end of their 12-month 
saving cycle. This also meant that tensions and disagreements could arise amongst members 
regarding the rules that were in place and ultimately push some members to leave. For instance, 
rules about fines and late deposits could be considered too strict for some. Rokhaya (street 
vendor, Thiès, husband, Mauritania) told me that the woman who was leading the previous 
association she was involved in was not showing enough flexibility. As a result of these constant 
changes, it was frequent to hear recipients saying that they had given up one association for 
another. Ama (street vendor, Thiès, husband, Mali) for instance preferred the ‘solidarity 
calebashes’63 (calebasse de solidarité) over the standard ROSCA she used to be involved in whereas 
                                                     
63 ‘Solidarity calebashes’ is a locally-based, solidarity-driven approach that aims to reduce inequalities and fight against 
debt and over-indebtedness by providing interest-free loans to the most vulnerable populations. For more information, 
see: http://renolse.org/la-calebasse-de-solidarite/. 
 
 
202 
Rokhaya (street vendor, Thiès, husband, Mauritania) wanted to stop the ‘solidarity calebashes’ 
and join another group. 
 
6.4.2. Alternative savings and credit associations as ‘money commons’ 
It is in this context that I locate Max Haiven’s (2017:632) call for a “decolonial financial literacy” 
that takes seriously the idea that alternative financial circuits and arrangements, including all 
their variants, represent acceptable and sophisticated economic practices with their own set of 
literacies rather than the manifestation of market anomalies in need of formalisation (Berry, 
1995). In her long-standing work that focuses on the building, maintenance and expansion of 
‘commons’ beyond the market and the state, Silvia Federici (2018) refers to these women’s 
savings and credit associations as “money commons” (see also Podlashuc, 2009). For her, these 
associations constitute: 
 
autonomous, self-managed, women-made banking systems that provide cash to individuals or 
groups that have no access to banks, working purely on a basis of trust (2018:108).  
 
For Podlashuc (2009) in turn, they reflect an organic praxis, that is a self-creating, self-reflecting 
instrument that synthetises action and imagination to respond to and overcome problems. What 
ROSCAs do by de-individualising surplus and then collectivising it is to “assert cash as a new form 
of ‘the commons’” (Podlashuc, 2009:381). Podlashuc (2009) argues that the emergence of these 
savings collectives is to be located in the livelihood struggles of the oppressed themselves. This 
echoes Buggenhagen’s (2012) assertion that women’s complex money management strategies in 
West Africa take place in the context of economic instability and currency volatility. While Guyer 
(2004) refers to what these savings and credit associations can achieve as value creation over the 
longue durée, Podlashuc (2009:381) argues that savings collectives have the capacity to 
“transcend the zero-sum of poverty, by providing options for change and a sense of what the 
future could be”. He posits that these practices, more than simply being self-help responses to 
crisis, include “the premise of self-sufficient development” (ibid:389). Indeed, in Podlashuc’s 
empirical case study, these local savings groups also have a national and transnational dimension 
that allow them to be linked to wider network of Federations and, therefore, amass significant 
amount of money that can then be reinvested into the communities through development projects 
such as land acquisitions and collective sanitation blocks. While these experiences arguably offer 
compelling ways to think about already-existing modes of resisting and boycotting the market 
economy from below – Federici (2018) hints at the idea that they may represent an example of 
anti-capitalist money commons – it is also important to point out the multifaceted dangers of 
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formalisation and co-optation that these alternative savings and borrowing financial practices and 
circuits have faced over the years. I now turn to such dangers. 
 
6.5. Towards the absorption of indigenous financial practices? 
Formalisation and co-optation 
 
Working in tandem with initiatives that aim to replace indigenous social practices with new forms 
of debt (Section 6.2), strategies that attempt to draw upon, absorb and/or transform existing 
alternative financial arrangements have recently intensified with the emergence of MM, and 
therefore require particular scrutiny. 
 
With the rise of neoliberal development policies in the 1970s and 1980s, women’s associations 
started to attract the attention of international development organisations. Under the Parti 
Socialiste in Senegal, mbotaye and tuur associations were turned into Groupements de Promotion 
Féminine (GPF) – women’s groups – and were recognised by the state as civil society 
organisations. The latter “organised registration and voting for elections and provided audiences 
for the Parti Socialiste officials” (Buggenhagen, 2012:164). In return, the groups were offered 
access to credit and recommendations from state officials for international donor projects. 
Unsurprisingly, it is through these groups, which were the first to introduce the notion of 
committees in Senegalese women’s collective lives, that the first NGO-led microcredit projects 
were implemented. As Ferguson (2007:74) argues: 
 
Neoliberal motifs of ‘empowerment’ restyle the unemployed as ‘micro-entrepreneurs’, who, 
perhaps with the aid of a little ‘micro-credit’, might use their inventive creativity to power a new 
kind of economic development strategy.  
 
Partly because of these associations’ involvement with NGOs and international donors and 
lenders, new norms of accountability started to permeate women’s exchange relations (Strathern, 
2000). The necessity of balancing accounts that was taught in business management and financial 
literacy classes was increasingly given precedence over the perpetuation of relations of 
asymmetries. This culture of accountability, notably with the introduction of audits and 
organisational and individual performance checks, contributed to the rise of a mindset focused on 
the individuals. Ritual associations organised in GPF became more vertically organised and 
notions of individual responsibility and inadequacy were pushed to the fore and led members of 
these associations to increasingly monitor themselves in the name of financial efficiency 
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(Tostensen et al, 2001). As it happens, while most participants reported that the aforementioned 
practices such as the charging of interests, the establishment of fines for late payments or 
recordkeeping were established by and negotiated between the members themselves, the 
influence of external actors was palpable (see also Datta and Aznar, 2019). 
 
The case of the aforementioned ‘solidarity calebashes’ in Thiès was quite telling in this sense. A 
Solidarity Group (SG) programme supported by the NGO Action de Carême, they encourage 
marginalised populations to specifically avoid high-interest loans from MFIs and banks. Instead, 
they promote solidarity by building upon members’ savings to offer interest-free loans and cover 
basic needs such as education, health and food. The idea that women’s investment decisions have 
to be ‘rationalised’ is also a key component of the programme, which strongly discourages what 
they consider ‘wasteful expenditures’ during ceremonies. One male committee member of one of 
the twelve partner associations told me that the programme allowed one to “change behaviours 
with regard to wasteful spending”. He added that “women work for five or six years and waste 
everything in one day of ceremony”. While the project did not rely upon external financing, one of 
the aims of the SGs was to act collectively to influence local politics and advocate for their own 
interests (see also Mader, 2019). As such, they had to be seen by local authorities as a credible 
stakeholder. I suggest that clamping down on what is still considered conspicuous consumption 
represents one of the ways for local partner organisations to formalise their activities and build 
up their reputation. It was, therefore, not surprising that all participants involved in these SGs 
were also part of other groups and associations that allowed them to contribute more freely to 
ceremonies.  
 
Similarly, several participants mentioned that they had been trained before setting up their 
associations. Although I did not manage to get the names and details of these training 
organisations – most women just could not remember – it is my understanding that quite a few 
participants in Senegal were members of a form of ASCRA that had been first established by the 
international NGO CARE in 1991, namely Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA, or AVEC 
in French). According to Ksoll et al (2016:70), VSLA is: 
 
a type of local financial institution that take many of the elements of ROSCAs and add more 
flexibility in savings and loans, standardise the governance structure and reinforce accountability 
element. (emphasis mine) 
 
VSLA, according to their founders, were not supposed to offer an alternative but rather 
supplement the microfinance sector (Allen and Staehle, 2007). In contrast to the SGs mentioned 
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above, while warning about the dangers of an “ideological enthusiasm for the deepening of 
financial markets”, they nonetheless considered linkages between VSLA and MFIs and banks to be 
“useful and inevitable” (ibid:2). Attempts like these to directly link indigenous social practices and 
arrangements to financial circuits were numerous and seemed to follow a relatively similar logic, 
that of a pendulum that swung back and forth between the ‘indigenisation’ of some of the aspects 
of bank-based or micro- finance and the ‘formalisation’ of indigenous social practices and 
relations. As mentioned already in Chapter 4, the social embeddedness of Banking 
Correspondents (BCs) within their communities plays a significant role in enrolling new clients 
and encouraging actual ones to take out new loans from Baobab. Similarly, many of the susu 
collectors’ participants were involved with, worked for and/or deposited their funds in banks. In 
effect, this service of daily savings collection was now offered by numerous banks and 
microfinance institutions in Ghana (Figure 6.3). This ‘indigenisation’ of finance, i.e. the 
informalisation of the relationship between financial institutions and customers, including the 
debtor-creditor relationship, seemed to increasingly constitute a strategy that aimed to formalise 
and co-opt indigenous financial arrangements and practices. 
 
Figure 6. 1- A susu account as part of a list of financial accounts provided by the MFI Best Point 
in Ghana 
 
(Source: Screenshot from Bestpointgh.com) 
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Crucially, while this role of  “economic translators” (Waters, 2018:403) between local norms, 
values and time-scales and the imperatives of formalisation (e.g. the need for collateral or the 
contractual nature of the monthly payments) had originally been played by local human actors, 
such as credit agents, BCs, local VSLA trainers, members of local NGOs or susu collectors, the 
emergence of MM created new possibilities for financial institutions to have not only human 
actors but also technological devices permeating actual and potential customers’ financial 
everyday lives. When I asked about their enrolment strategies of new customers in general, and 
remittance recipients in particular, a representative of one of the main banks in Ghana responded 
as follows: 
 
Basically, we're relying on mobile money, linking it to a savings account that also has a micro-
insurance component, reaching out to people in rural areas, especially those who come together to 
save in groups. You realise that they come together, they will save as a group of let's say 25 people. 
Then, at the end of the day, they on-lend to each other (…) But what interests us is that they keep 
money in boxes, under their bed, or keep it at home. No interest accrues on it, they have no 
relationship with any financial institutions (...) Currently, we are working on how we can link that 
kind of model into the formal financial services sector. It is like bringing the informal sector to meet 
the formal financial sector. We call it "savings linkages". We are looking at it through technology, 
through domestic money remittances; how best we can link them into our financial… the core 
business that we do. So, at the end of the day, we create wallets individually, then we create group 
wallets too for them (…) So, yes, we are really leveraging on technology to reach out to them, not 
just savings but also looking at giving them some insurance component as a value proposition.  
 
In Ghana, the increasing efforts of financial institutions to recognise and build on these networks 
came hand-in-hand with broader attempts to turn non-market financial relations into data. In fact, 
while these “savings linkages” were deemed necessary to increase bank deposits, they only 
represented the first stage of a broader plan of action. The bank representative continued: 
 
And we are also looking at how best we can also lend to them – because they lend to themselves – 
so that they can use their savings a as a guarantee (…) We are also looking at coming up with a 
retirement package, something you can save towards old age.  
 
Mobile phones, and the wallets attached to them, acted as mediating calculative tools between 
commercial and financial institutions and indigenous financial arrangements. In Tamale, only two 
participants were using some of the functions of MM for their ROSCAs. This was the case for the 
ROSCA of Mahama, a charcoal trader in Tamale who received remittances from her daughter in 
Accra, was involved in: 
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We come together as a group of twenty friends who have been schoolmates since our primary 
school days and we are tribe mates as well. The main reason for forming that group was to support 
members during ceremonies (…) We have a particular person we contribute the money to at the 
end of the month. We all agree to give 50 GhC at the end of the month but whoever is unable to get 
that amount can contribute the lower denominations. We send those monies through mobile 
money and the person in charge takes the records (…) We have a sim registered with mobile money 
and we put it in a phone at the end of every month (…). 
 
However, at the time of field research, nobody was using the loan function (e.g. QwikLoan) yet. 
While Kear (2016:262) argues that what he calls the financialisation of ROSCAs in the US has not 
led to accumulation by dispossession due to the absence of “pre-existing trust networks to be 
‘dispossessed’”, the story is likely to be rather different when products such as mobile-based 
nano-loans are imposed onto existing alternative circuits of exchange in countries such as Senegal 
and Ghana. Relatedly, it has been argued that the “datafication” of ROSCAs in the US may 
encourage users to “play the credit score game” in order to improve their credit score rating (Kear, 
2017:349). However, because of the recent emergence of such financial ‘translators’, i.e. mobile 
wallets, and the even more novel mobile-based credit products in both countries, we are yet to 
see if that is the case (see Chapter 7 for suggestions of future research avenues). A glimpse of such 
impacts can, however, be given through a story that Abdallah (carpenter, Tamale, brother, Italy) 
told me: 
 
Anytime I want to give him [his brother] money to do something for me or just to use it for his own 
personal issues, I will have to call him and ask him whether I should pay it into his mobile money 
wallet or if he will come and collect it himself because he may have a loan to repay. Once money is 
paid into the account, it will be deducted automatically to repay the loan. So, unless he gives me the 
go ahead to pay to his account, I wait for him to come (…) Just some few months ago, his wife was 
admitted at the hospital. I was on my way home from the hospital when he called me and said that 
the hospital asked him to pay for some drugs which was 150 GhC. So, I went and withdrew the 
money from the ATM machine to pay it into his mobile money account and remembered that he 
had been taking loans from MTN mobile money. So, I called him to find out whether I could send 
the money to his mobile wallet. He then he told me that he was on a loan and gave me his wife’s 
mobile wallet account instead. 
 
With mobile-based nano-loans such as QwikLoan, when debtors are late, their capacity to decide 
where to channel the money they have and/or receive in their MM account is dramatically 
curtailed, even in case of emergencies. Money, including money remittances, that sit or are sent to 
their MM account is deducted automatically until the loan is fully repaid. This may have significant 
consequences when an emergency arises, as Abdallah’s account showed. What we are witnessing 
 
 
208 
here is the increasing capacity – automated capacity – of commercial and financial institutions to 
curtail these strategies of financial juggling and practices of hierarchisation of debts, expenditures 
and investments that contribute to the production of remittance household members’ social and 
economic futures. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the ways in which members of remittance households have responded 
to attempts to disentangle them from alternative circuits of exchange (RQ3). In contrast to many 
institutional accounts that portray practices of ritualised exchange within alternative circuits of 
debts and debt claims as ‘traditional’ obstacles that need to be overcome, my evidence suggests 
that they in fact produce relational value that is essential to the social reproduction of remittance 
households. My analysis shows that different (and even competing) regimes of value, devices and 
calculative agencies from the ones prevalent in the making of remittance markets in Chapter 4 are 
at play in the construction and maintenance of these alternative circuits of exchange. It is from 
this understanding of alternative financial circuits and practices that I conceptualise members of 
remittance households as “quasi-subjects” of remittance marketisation. This emphasises the 
fragile and contested nature of such processes of market subject formation. I call reluctant subjects 
of remittance marketisation those participants who, despite their awareness of the limited benefit 
and potential harm of being financially included, felt they had no choice but to be comply with the 
disciplinary powers of mainstream finance. My findings show that, for some of these participants, 
new forms of debts can dispossess them of their ability to produce relational value. In turn, 
subjects that denied marketisation are those who, through discourses and acts of indifference and 
refusal, did not have, or no longer had, any relations with financial institutions. The risk of not 
being able to repay loans (often described as too expensive) and the fear of the consequences that 
such inability to pay back would bring are important factors that explain such decisions. Finally, 
dissenting subjects of marketisation were those who, sometimes in direct opposition to 
mainstream finance, set up and join ROSCAs and other forms of savings and credit associations. 
My evidence suggests that these arrangements represent spaces within which decisions can be 
made collectively and alternative processes of financial valuation are possible.  
 
However, dangers of co-optation and formalisation have intensified in recent years, notably since 
the emergence of new technologies such as MM. Rather than trying to directly replace existing 
financial arrangements with new ones, what these new strategies aim to achieve is to draw upon 
and, ultimately, transform savings and borrowing mechanisms which, up until now, were located 
outside the reach of mainstream finance. What these new strategies and technologies work at is 
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to curtail the productive potential of alternative financial practices and arrangements as 
instruments of “future-making” (Green et al, 2012:1641). 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The relationship between remittances and financial inclusion has attracted heightened levels of 
interest from the international development community as well as commercial and financial 
sectors in recent years. This research has critically examined policies and programmes in Senegal 
and Ghana, which aim, as remittance specialist for the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development Pedro de Vasconcelos argues, to make “remittances count more” by financially 
incorporating remittance flows and households (Johnson, 2019, see Chapter 1). To do so, it has 
focused on the ways in which remittance markets are constructed in practice in both 
countries (RQ1), the extent to which remittance flows can be incorporated into global 
financial circuits (RQ2), and how remittance households experience such processes of 
subject formation (RQ3). The thesis has demonstrated that while proponents of the remittances-
financial inclusion nexus seek to marketise remittances in different ways in both countries, the 
financial incorporation of remittance flows remains limited and processes of market 
subjectivation are uncertain, contested and require constant renegotiations. This chapter 
identifies the key findings of the study and discusses their new contributions to knowledge in 
response to important international theoretical and policy debates. It also suggests three main 
avenues for future research. 
 
7.1. Key findings and contributions 
The literature on financial inclusion and/of remittances fell short of explaining the ways in which 
the incorporation of remittance flows and households into global finance takes place in practice, 
and how members of remittance households in home countries experience such processes of 
market-making. The key theoretical contribution of this thesis relates to the novel application of 
a geographies of remittance marketisation approach to advance our understanding of the 
emergence and expansion of the remittances-financial inclusion nexus in Senegal and Ghana. 
Rather than what has been commonly identified in previous studies as financialisation, I propose 
here that what we are currently witnessing is the marketisation of remittances. Related to this, 
the key empirical contribution of this research is the novel exploration of how such markets are 
created, in two countries and four cities (including secondary cities) in the Global South, which do 
not often constitute sites of research. Finally, my research is significant for policy makers who 
propose and advance a remittances-financial inclusion agenda as it identifies the risks and limits 
 
 
211 
of such marketising projects. In response, I suggest three key pillars upon which such an agenda 
should be built. 
 
7.1.1. Theoretical contributions: A geographies of remittance marketisation 
approach 
Responding to calls to empirically and critically explore the making and effects of markets (Ouma, 
2015b), this study has demonstrated how and why the creation, stabilisation and expansion 
of markets on the back of remittances is contingent, fragile and contested. As argued in this 
thesis, a geographies of remittance marketisation analytical framework enriches critiques of the 
financialisation of development in general, and remittances in particular, by emphasising the 
work that is done and, therefore, can be undone to construct remittances as financial assets upon 
which markets can be expanded. In other words, it enables an investigation of not only the 
extension of “finance’s rules and logics” to remittances, its senders and its recipients (i.e. what 
finance does), but also its practical and intricate activities and operations (i.e. how it does it) 
(Christophers, 2015b:232; Ouma, 2015a). In doing so, I challenge extant research which has 
tended to treat financialisation as explanans (the explanation) rather than explanandum (what is 
to be explained), therefore overlooking the micro-geographical financial practices that underpin 
the construction, maintenance and deepening of finance, including its markets, assets and subjects 
(Ouma, 2016a). Unpacking the micro-practices of finance constitutes as much a technical 
endeavour as it does a political imperative that challenges taken-for-granted financial 
relationships, practices and ideas (Christophers, 2015b:230).  
 
This approach has, therefore, shed new light on the processes through which ‘alternative’ 
remittance circuits and practices are politically and discursively constructed as ‘backward’ and 
‘non-productive’ and, therefore, in need of development interventions (see Chapters 5 and 6). This 
dimension of marketisation refers to the construction of a boundary between the ‘market’ and the 
‘non-market’ in order to legitimise attempts to incorporate the latter into the former. It also 
provides a useful framework to analyse how remittance markets are realised, through the 
practical accomplishment of three key framings: the conversion of remittances into commodities, 
the formatting of calculative agencies and the formatting of remittance market encounters. In 
doing so, a geographies of remittance marketisation approach also allows for the nuancing of the 
progress of the remittances-financial inclusion nexus, and financial inclusion more generally, 
which tends to be overemphasised and generalised by both critiques and advocates of the agenda 
(Bernards, 2019). In fact, a marketisation framework that is sensitive to the aforementioned 
behavioural turn in development – or what Kear (2018:317) calls a “behavioural geography of 
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marketisation” – is well suited to emphasising the uncertain nature of financial subject formation. 
It allows for an exploration of such processes as not inevitable but prone to resistance. 
 
7.1.2. Empirical contributions: The construction and effects of remittance 
markets in Dakar and Thiès, Senegal and Accra and Tamale, Ghana 
In detailing the construction and effects of remittances markets, this study does not just advance 
our understanding of the non-human side of remittance marketisation and the work of market 
devices in rendering remittance markets possible (see Chapter 4). It has also generated new 
insights into its human side by looking at the ways in which remittance recipients’ financial 
practices and subjectivities interact with, are subsumed by and/or counter various 
marketising attempts to replace or absorb them (see Chapters 5 and 6). This is particularly 
significant since remittance recipients have not been the focus of attention or, where addressed, 
have been seen primarily in terms of dependent and passive individuals. Through fine grained 
empirical research drawing upon an original dataset comprising 188 semi-structured and 
ethnographic interviews with institutional and private sectors actors and members of remittance 
households as well as in field observations and document analysis, I have detailed (1) how 
markets are made; (2) the extent to which remittances can be incorporated into mainstream 
finance; and (3) how remittance recipients have responded to processes of market subject 
formation. 
 
How remittance markets come into being (RQ1) 
In the case examined here, the extensive financial, material, technological, discursive, legal and 
behavioural engineering that is necessary for remittance markets to be realised in countries such 
as Senegal and Ghana is closely analysed. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, remittance markets in 
Senegal and Ghana are realised through the practical and, sometimes, partial accomplishment of 
three decisive market framings. First, in order for remittances to constitute a legitimate source of 
development finance, they must be disentangled from realities of indebtedness, separation, 
exploitation, and even loss of life, that often underpin domestic and international migration. 
Remittances are ‘pacified’ through a combination of discursive processes and particular practices 
of ‘discounting’ (Hernandez and Coutin, 2006). Second, remittance markets are realised through 
the formatting of specific market agencies among not only migrants but also members of 
remittance households in home countries. Particular socio-technical agencements of human and 
non-human actors, including technological, textual and material market devices and settings, have 
been deployed in both countries in order to encourage and facilitate the integration and 
circulation of remittance flows through formal financial circuits, as well as to nudge remittance 
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recipients to use new digital financial products and services. Particularly important is the 
increasing emphasis that is put by development, financial and commercial institutions on the role 
of human financial intermediaries. Mobile Money (MM) agents in Ghana and Banking 
Correspondents (BCs) in Senegal are encouraged to behave as “active brokers” between financial 
and commercial institutions and customers (Rodima-Taylor and Maurer, 2019). Their social 
embeddedness acts as a nudge, or commitment device, that encourages remittance recipients to 
behave in certain ways rather than others and which, in turn, is dependent upon, and enhanced 
by, various technological, material and human elements for financial inclusion purposes. The third 
key market framing relates to the formatting of market encounters between members of 
remittance households, agents, financial and commercial institutions. Constant negotiations as 
well as individual and collective forms of contestation over price fixing shows that the making of 
these market encounters can lead to moments of ‘overflow’ and threaten market-making 
processes. More recently, market encounters between recipients in Senegal and Ghana and global 
investors have been formatted through extensive financial engineering, hence opening the door 
for the conversion of remittance-linked and remittance-backed income streams into potential 
sources of profit, and remittance customers into investable assets. On the basis of the new 
evidence base collected, it is clear that while the concrete realisation of remittance markets – 
marketisation – may very well provide a crucial entry point for further financialising 
projects, the financialisation of remittances is yet to materialise. 
 
The financial incorporation of remittance flows (RQ2) 
This thesis has shown that a major reason why remittances cannot easily be linked to financial 
products and services and, ultimately, be turned into just another asset stream is because they do 
not simply constitute a sum of money with mostly positive characteristics (Kunz, 2008). Just as 
Ouma (2015a:226) describes farmland as “a weather-dependent, geographically variegated, 
socioecologically embedded, and potentially political resource” that makes it difficult to 
financialise, remittances are social practices that are embedded in specific economic, social 
and cultural contexts which, in turn, influence the ways in which they can be used, when, 
by whom, and for what (see Chapter 5). This study has shown that choices regarding how 
remittances can, and should, be spent, saved and invested are not made by atomised individuals 
waiting for the right stimuli and incentives but rest upon collective, and sometimes unequal, 
decision-making process between migrant(s), receiver(s) and recipient(s). More specifically, 
remittance flows and practices are part of complex social networks of kith and kin that connect 
not one migrant to ‘a household’ but one or multiple migrants to one or multiple receivers and 
recipients. Remittances are often earmarked for specific individuals and purposes. Gendered 
power dynamics and norms, household context, inter-women hierarchies as well as kinship 
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relations, mediate these processes of earmarking as well as the extent to which remittances can 
be put to use in ways that are advocated by proponents of the remittances-financial inclusion 
nexus. 
 
Policies and programmes that mainly focus on making remittance work for development and 
financial inclusion ignore much of what is taking place within remittance households.64 Depictions 
of members of remittance households as passive, idle individuals in need of intervention to ensure 
that they use remittances more productively are still prevalent, albeit often implicitly. In contrast, 
this thesis has demonstrated the importance of opening up what might be labelled the ‘black box’ 
of the remittance household to account for the limitations of a development project that aims to 
leverage remittance flows for financial inclusion. As shown in Chapter 5, remittance households 
are active sites of unwaged, reproductive and emotional labour, within which members not only 
labour to transform, or “depollute” (Carsten, 1989, in Abbots, 2014:145), remittances but also 
contribute to the production of life more broadly. Remittances are not simply consumed but 
necessitate labour, time and care to ‘work’ for the benefits of migrants. This points to the 
significant role that members of remittance households play in not only holding migrants’ place 
within communities of origin but also mobilising financial resources for the socio-economic 
benefits of the latter. It also reveals the potential disadvantageous effects remittances can have on 
recipients’ everyday lives. Highlighting the importance of multifaceted reverse remittances, 
including the labour that is required to care for remittances, challenges the often-assumed 
unidirectionality of economic, social and emotional support from migrants to recipients in much 
of the policy-oriented and academic literature on remittances, financial inclusion and 
development (Palash and Baby-Collin, 2019). This thesis, therefore, provides a new 
understanding of the relatively neglected inputs of members of remittance households in home 
countries within migration studies by furthering an understanding of remittances not only as a 
resource to be leveraged (for financial inclusion) but also as a potential cost that needs to be 
accounted for more systematically (Mazzucato, 2011).  
 
A further set of limits to the remittances-financial inclusion nexus relates to the fact that the 
remittances received are often neither sufficient nor regular enough to make ends meet, let alone 
to accumulate assets (i.e. savings) or produce income streams (i.e. loan repayments) (see Chapter 
5). This research, therefore, helps to highlight the difficulties faced by marketising projects in 
constructing migrants’ and recipients’ labour and incomes into objects of speculation in the 
                                                     
64 See for instance reports on how remittances can work for ‘development finance’ (Julca, 2013), ‘Africa’ (Gupta et al, 
2007) and ‘financial inclusion’ (Todoroki et al, 2014).  
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context of low-income and irregular economic activities. Rather than contributing to the 
‘inescapable’ deepening of the financialisation of development, what a grounded exploration of 
the remittances-financial inclusion nexus reveals are the fundamental contradictions and limits 
of development projects that attempt to expand the possibilities of financial profits in postcolonial 
economies where everyday incomes have increasingly been rendered fragile and precarious (see 
also Bernards, 2019; Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2017). 
 
Marketising remittances also requires the discursive and political reconfiguration of indigenous 
financial strategies, practices and circuits as ‘backwards’, ‘inefficient’ and, therefore, in need of 
formalisation (see Chapters 2 and 5). However, this thesis has demonstrated that these alternative 
circuits and practices of (remittance) saving, borrowing and investing are generally actively 
chosen. This is often not due to a lack of financial literacy or access to mainstream finance but 
rather because they are deemed practically, socially and economically more advantageous than 
what MFIs, banks and MNOs can offer. My empirical exploration of the ways in which remittances 
are used and channelled shows that, when they have the opportunity, remittance recipients 
largely favour saving/investment in farming, trading and other income-generating activities as 
well as in ROSCAs and ASCRAs, cattle, land, jewels and housing as circuits and instruments of 
financial protection and accumulation. Importantly, when members of remittance households do 
not, or cannot, direct remittances towards investment and asset accumulation, they tend to 
channel their own incomes for such purposes instead.  
 
Market subject formation and remittance recipients (RQ3) 
As demonstrated in this study, attempts to format and align remittance recipients’ agencies to 
specific behaviours deemed economically beneficial by proponents of remittance marketisation 
are always a source of covert and overt contestation. In other words, processes of financial 
subject formation are practical accomplishments that are always ambiguous, uncertain 
and in the making. Members of remittance households constitute “quasi-subjects” of remittance 
marketisation (Berndt and Wirth, 2019) that reluctantly accept, refuse and resist processes of 
financial incorporation. This research, therefore, contributes to a nascent literature that is 
concerned with the rise of a new behaviourism and experimentalism in development by 
investigating how this trend plays out empirically (Berndt, 2015; Berndt and Boeckler, 2016, 
2017; Boeckler and Berndt, 2013). It also furthers our understanding of not only the fundamental 
limits to such marketising projects but also the variegated forms of resistance to processes of 
financial subject formation (Fields, 2018). While it is certainly true that the ambiguities and 
fragilities of processes of financial subject formation have been acknowledged (Langley, 2006), I 
advance that part of the reason why processes of market subject formation may succeed or fail 
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and variegated financial practices and subjectivities – that differ from the neoliberal self-
disciplined subject – emerge and/or endure can be found by looking at what indigenous financial 
institutions, arrangements and practices are, and what they do. First, I have advanced the 
theorisation of remittance recipients as ‘reluctant’ subjects of marketisation to characterise 
participants who, despite being aware of their potential and actual detrimental effects, conceded 
to the disciplinary mechanisms of formal debt products. For some, entanglement in new market 
arrangements forced partial disentanglement from alternative networks and relations. To be sure, 
debts due to financial institutions such as MFIs occasionally took over people’s everyday lives and 
dispossessed them of their capacity to produce alternative forms of value – “relational value” 
(Elyachar, 2005:7) – essential to processes of social reproduction and strategies of future-making. 
Non-market technologies, devices and other textual, discursive and material elements intervene 
in the formatting of specific agencies that enable the ‘qualification’ of gifts and the production of 
relational value among those attending alternative circuits of exchange (e.g. ROSCAs attached to 
life-event ceremonies). These agencies are often at odds with the performance of market 
subjectivities advocated by the remittances-financial inclusion nexus. Second, I have shown how 
and why remittance marketisation is denied through acts of indifference and refusal. Many 
remittance recipients are not interested and even refuse to be entangled in formal financial 
circuits. In contrast to a literature on financial inclusion that tends to mostly focus on the 
predicament of people that have taken out loans and other financial products, my research has 
paid attention to the factors that push people not to participate or quit microfinance. Participants 
often raised concerns about high interest rates and the difficulty of repaying loans. Some provided 
more extensive critiques of the disciplining social power of money and credit over social life. 
Finally, I have demonstrated that resistance to the remittances-financial inclusion nexus, and to 
financial inclusion more generally, does not only consist in not participating (Mader, 2017) but 
also can take the form of collective self-organisation among remittance recipients. Financial 
inclusion is not just covertly subverted but also resisted both individually and collectively, albeit 
not necessarily in the form of an organised social movement (although see CADTM, 2017). From 
this perspective, members of remittance households are dissenting subjects of marketisation that 
constitute and maintain alternative financial spaces in direct opposition to so-called ‘inclusive’ 
financial systems. In these spaces, decisions can be made collectively, and alternative processes 
of valuation are rendered possible.  
 
Careful consideration of the importance of these indigenous financial circuits and arrangements 
in shaping the ways in which people respond to marketising attempts has also enabled this thesis 
to trace the evolution and strategies of adaptation of projects that aim to connect remittances 
flows and households to global finance. With the rise of MM, commercial and financial institutions 
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are increasingly trying to harness, rather than simply replace, existing alternative financial 
arrangements and aim to reproduce their logics and dynamics through the mediation of 
technological devices and platforms. While the impacts of such devices and new financial products 
attached to these are beyond the scope of this study, I have suggested that these new strategies 
may increase the ‘automated’ capacity of financial and commercial institution to curtail people’s 
varied financial management strategies.  
 
7.1.3. Policy significance and implications 
This research has demonstrated how the remittances-financial inclusion nexus aims to expand 
and deepen market rules and logics and advances the rise of behaviourism and experimentalism 
in the name of development. Poverty is conceived of as a cognitive problem and solutions are to 
be found in the transformation of the anomalous and problematic behaviours of the poor. The 
structural constraints that poor people face on an everyday basis are generally absent from these 
debates. Yet, and as the economics editor for the Financial Times puts it, “'I don’t have enough 
money to open a bank account' isn’t a problem that can be solved by putting a bank account on 
the internet” (Greeley, 2019). The micro-geographical practices of market-making and market 
subject formation, therefore, need to be brought into political debate. In the following, I provide a 
set of foundations upon which a radical, transformative and decolonial development agenda on 
remittances and financial inclusion can be built.  
 
First, causes of poverty must be de-individualised and the context within which financial hardship 
occurs needs to be accounted for. Ignoring the root causes of migration only serves to obscure 
broader transnational power forces that shape political and economic development in the Global 
South. Migration must be understood from a “global perspective”, which situates remittance 
“within transnational social fields of uneven power” (Glick Schiller, 2010:23). In Senegal for 
instance, only through a critical examination of the coloniality of the CFA franc and its 
consequences on people’s everyday lives can we start unpacking the genealogies, problematic 
framings and questionable outcomes of particular development interventions such as the 
remittances-financial inclusion nexus. In fact, and as I have argued elsewhere, the colonial 
foundations of the monetary arrangement in the franc zone continue to shape political and 
economic relations between France and many of its former African colonies such as Senegal as 
well the ‘post-colonial’ development policies supposed to improve the everyday lives of the 162+ 
millions of people living in the region (Guermond and Ndongo Sylla, 2018).  
 
Second, if policy makers are serious about harnessing the positive impacts of remittances on 
development, priority must be given to supporting struggles against the restriction of legal, civil, 
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labour and reproduction rights of documented and undocumented migrant workers worldwide. 
Development policies and projects that laud migrant remittances without addressing and 
prioritising questions of migrant justice both in public arenas and on the ground are exploitative 
and further reproduce an unfair, unsustainable and oppressive global political economy (Datta, 
2009; Datta et al, 2007; Ferguson and McNally, 2014). 
 
Finally, already-existing remittance and other related financial practices and circuits in home 
countries must be recognised and valued in their own terms. Financial literacy and behavioural 
programmes and policies are in part produced by multifaceted forms of illiteracy, including “racial 
illiteracy” (Haiven, 2017:353). These are illiteracies not only towards the structures of classism, 
racism and colonialism, as I have noted above, but also towards “the manifold potentials for 
alternative forms of social cooperation and relationality” that projects of marketisation and 
financialisation seek to curtail (ibid:361). The alleged financial illiteracy as well as the lack of 
financial capabilities and productivity of remittance recipients in the Global South are the product 
of economistic, gendered and racialised assumptions about their role and that of remittances in 
the production and reproduction of the household, life and development. While remaining aware 
of the risks of romanticisation and co-optation (see Chapter 6), a decolonial agenda on 
remittances and financial inclusion must acknowledge indigenous circuits of exchange, saving, 
borrowing and investment as socio-economic and financial organic practices that should not be 
nudged and marketised but rather preserved and supported, with remittance recipients playing 
a leading role. As Mann and Guyer (1999:139) have argued, the origins behind the creation of 
formal local credit and cooperative associations in West Africa by French administrators during 
the colonial era was to be found in the alleged lack of initiative and foresight of African farmers 
“to lay aside enough seed and grain to endure a failed harvest”. It does not seem far-fetched to 
argue that the supposed lack of foresight of Africans during the colonial era has now been replaced 
by the image of the “irrational, financially illiterate and ‘excluded’” poor consumers whose 
behaviours need to be nudged in order to improve their well-being (Gabor and Brooks, 2017:431). 
It is, therefore, crucial for scholars to keep challenging such assumptions and deconstructing 
discourses and practices that underpin any development interventions. The remittances-financial 
inclusion nexus is no exception. 
 
7.2. Extending this research: Further avenues for study 
This research has explored empirically how the remittances-financial inclusion is constructed and 
contested in Senegal and Ghana. More critical work on the increasing prevalence of digital 
financial inclusion – beyond payment systems – is needed. More specifically, empirical research 
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on the impacts of digital financial products and services is essential as digital loans and insurance 
are increasingly becoming accessible in many countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, and beyond. 
Concerns have recently been raised with regards to late repayments and defaults in countries such 
as Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya for instance, where 27 percent of adults have taken at least one 
digital loan (Totolo, 2018), a survey conducted by CGAP has revealed that digital loans are driving 
Kenyans into multiple debts (Izaguirre et al, 2018). The World Bank-housed organisation, 
renowned for its relentless promotion of financial inclusion, has even called for a slowdown in 
digital credit’s growth in East Africa (ibid). Further studies also need to examine the ways in which 
digital financial products may shape the financial relations, practices, mechanisms and 
subjectivities at play within indigenous social relations, practices and arrangements. At the heart 
of the matter will be the tensions between the ‘commoning of money’ on the one hand (Federici, 
2018) and the marketisation of indigenous social relations, practices and arrangements for 
further financialising projects on the other. Moreover, analyses that explore the relationship 
between digital financial inclusion and financial surveillance could also prove useful, especially 
between governments, digital platforms, MM agents and consumers. Overall, there is a need for 
more longitudinal qualitative research on migration and financial inclusion which moves beyond 
snapshots. This would allow for an investigation of the ways in which uses of (digital) financial 
products and technology change over time. Given the rich qualitative data provided by in-depth 
and ethnographic interviews, this research could be extended through follow-up interviews with 
the original participants two or three years on from this project to identify the factors that drive 
these changes, and their impacts on people’s everyday lives. 
 
Relatedly, further research is needed to investigate the relationship between digital financial 
inclusion and race/gender, with a particular focus on the Global South. The logics, technologies 
and imaginaries that are at play in the (re)valuation of racialised and gendered lives under the 
guise of digital financial inclusion need to be examined more closely. More specifically, studies 
could look at whether and how new technologies such as credit-scoring algorithms designed by 
Fintechs might contribute to new and continuing forms of racial and gender inequality and 
exploitation. Understanding how telecommunication and MM data is processed, interpreted and 
‘humanised’ for a wide range of uses will require attending to the growing debates on “data 
colonialism” (Couldry and Mejias, 2019) and “decolonial computing” (Ali, 2016). Empirically, for 
instance, future research could unpack the geographies of algorithms: where are they designed? 
By whom? Under which assumptions? For whom? And for what purposes? This could contribute 
uncovering processes of “technological redlining” – the way data is used to profile populations in 
gendered, classed and racialised ways – in the context of digital financial inclusion (Noble, 2018) 
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International comparative analyses are also needed to understand the differentiated ways in 
which the remittances-financial inclusion nexus manifests itself, and the various responses 
from remittance recipients. A Special Issue in Environment and Planning: A on how this nexus 
unfolds in different socio-cultural, political and economic contexts, and to which I am contributing, 
is currently in preparation. Furthermore, while this research has examined how the remittances-
financial inclusion agenda has played out on the ground as a development enterprise, remittances 
are also increasingly used as a tool for financial inclusion in the context of forced migration and 
humanitarian interventions. In Rwanda for instance, online money transfer service providers 
Worldremit and Useremit are now offering mobile-based remittance services to refugees in the 
two longstanding camps of Gihembe and Kiziba (Pistelli, 2018). UNCDF (2018:6), in a report 
entitled ‘Accessible and affordable remittance services for refugees: A toolkit’, promotes the use 
of MM as affordable remittance channels that can “further link remittances received by forcibly 
displaced people and host communities with broader financial services”. As an analytical 
framework, the behavioural geography of remittance marketisation is best suited to explore 
empirically the ways in which remittance-linked financial inclusion is constructed and expanded 
in refugee camps, as well as the limitations and fragilities of such market-led humanitarian 
projects.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Appendix 1 - Interview questions posed to institutional and private sector actors  
Section 1. Organisation details 
Can you tell me what your position is in this organisation? 
How many branches do you have across the country? Where are they? Compared to 5 years 
ago?  
Which part of the country is well serviced? Any reasons why? 
Do you work with other entities in order to expand your network? 
How many active account holders? And borrowers? 
Who do you consider as your main competitors (names)? 
Financing: what are the different ways in which you finance your activities (debt, equity, 
savings mobilisation, interest and non-interest incomes, etc)? 
Section 2. Remittance service activities 
When did you start providing remittance services? Why?  
What are the different remittance products and services offered by your organisation? 
What about mobile banking? 
Remittance business: 
 amount of payments per year over the past 5 years 
 volume of payments per year over the past 5 years 
 for whom? Which one is the main one? 
 
What does your remittance pay-out networks look like?  
How important in terms of revenues are remittance services in relation to your other activities? 
In terms of commissions on transactions, how much goes to the distributors? 
How are the commissions redistributed between the points/kiosks and the intermediaries?  
In this money transfer business, who do you consider are your main competitors? 
What have been your major achievements since the establishment of remittance-related 
operations? 
Section 3. Remittance marketplace and regulations 
What are the key national regulations that shape remittance service provision? 
What are the key measures that you had to undertake? 
What are the most recent measures that you had to undertake? 
Section 4. Financial inclusion and remittances 
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What types of loans do you provide? Individuals/groups? Different methods of 
reimbursement? Interest rates/Effective APR? 
How are remittance recipients perceived by your institution? 
Can you tell me about your strategy to target remittance recipients? And for migrants? Has it 
changed over the past 10 years? Can you tell me why? 
Can you tell me about the strategy/tools you use to track remittance recipients’ financial stories 
with your institution? (how much they receive, how often, from where, etc) 
Do you provide financial education? Who with? How many so far? Why? How successful was 
it? 
According to you, what are the main barriers for remittance recipients to have access to 
financial products and services? 
What kind of things should be done to further extend banking services to RR?  
From the RR perspective, what could be the problems/potential negative effects associated 
with the extension of banking services?  
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Appendix 2 - Members of remittance households interviewed across Thiès, Senegal and Accra and Tamale, Ghana 
 
REMITTANCE 
RECIPIENTS 
 
NUMBER OF 
VISITS 
GENDER 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
SETTING 
REMITTERS’ 
GENDER 
REMITTERS’ 
RELATIONSHIP TO 
RR 
REMITTERS’ 
DESTINATION 
Senegal (N=31) 
 
 
Abibatou 2 F Rural (Notto 
Diobass) 
M Son Joual (Senegal) 
Aladji  1 M Urban (Thiès) M Brother Kaolack (Senegal) 
Ama  2 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband Mali 
Mamina 3 F Rural (Toubatoul) M Husband Spain 
Momar  1 M Urban (Thiès) M 
M 
M 
M 
Brother 
Brother 
Brother 
Uncle 
Italy 
Matam (Senegal) 
Canada 
Italy 
Yaye 2 F Urban (Thiès) M 
M 
F 
M 
Husband 
Son 
Friend (intermediary) 
Cousin (intermediary) 
Dakar (Senegal) 
France 
Spain 
Italy 
Kankou  1 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband France 
Niali  2 F Urban (Thiès) M 
M 
M 
Husband 
Stepbrother 
Brother 
Italy 
Spain 
n/a 
Djaly 1 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband Lingueres (Senegal) 
Sawdiatou  2 F Urban (Thiès) F 
F 
M 
Daughter 
Friend 
Brother 
Dakar 
France 
UK 
Falilou 2 M Peri-urban 
(Tienaba) 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Brother 
Brother 
Brother 
“Boys” 
Dakar 
Keur Massar (Senegal) 
Italy 
Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Gabon 
Sarratou 1 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband Italy 
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Gorgui  2 M Peri-urban 
(Tienaba) 
M 
M 
M 
Brother 
Brother 
Friends/Acquaintances 
Spain 
Italy 
n/a 
Khoudia  2 F Urban (Thiès) F 
F 
F 
M 
Daughter 
Daughter 
Daughter 
Son 
France 
France 
France 
Dakar 
Penda 1 F Peri-urban 
(Tienaba) 
M Husband Italy and Spain 
Rokhaya  2 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband Mauritania 
Boubacar 2 M Peri-urban (Keur 
Saib Ndoye) 
M Brother France 
Demba 2 M Urban (Thiès) M 
M 
Brother 
Brother 
UK 
Alimatou 1 F Urban (Thiès) M Brother (to be given to 
the mother) 
Italy 
Gouya 2 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband France 
Nafi 1 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband Italy 
Mayatta 2 F Rural (Toubatoul) M Husband Italy 
Modou 1 M Peri-urban 
(Tienaba) 
M Brother Spain 
Diakhou 1 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband US 
Moktar 1 M Urban (Thiès) M 
F 
Brother (intermediary) 
Sister (intermediary) 
Lingala (Senegal) 
Dakar 
Ramatoulaye  2 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband Mali 
Sofietou 2 F Rural (Ndiobène) M Husband 
Son 
Italy 
Dakar 
Yandé  1 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband Italy 
Issa  2 M Peri-urban 
(Tienaba) 
M 
M 
M 
Brother 
Brother 
Brother 
Gabon 
Gabon 
Gabon 
Safiétou 2 F Peri-urban (Touba 
Peycouk) 
M 
F 
Husband 
Sister 
Ziguinchor (Senegal) 
Gabon 
Fadima 1 F Urban (Thiès) M Husband Mboro (Senegal) 
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Ghana (N=28) 
Isaac 1 M Urban (Nima) M Brother UK 
Maxwell 1 M Urban (Nima) M 
M 
Brother 
Brother 
Germany 
Malaysia 
Grace 2 F Urban 
(Kokomlemle) 
F Sister US 
Melita 1 F Urban 
(Kokomlemle) 
F Sister 
Sister 
Germany 
Germany 
Mustapha 1 M Urban (Nima) F 
M  
M  
M  
M 
M  
Mother 
Cousin 
Uncle 
Uncle 
Brother-in-law 
Friends 
US 
Canada 
US 
Japan 
Italy 
n/a 
Linda 2 F Urban (Nima) M Husband Brazil 
Osei 1 M Urban 
(Kokomlemle) 
M 
M 
Brother 
Friend 
Italy 
UAE 
Kwame 1 M Urban 
(Kokomlemle) 
F Mother Germany 
Vera 2 F Urban 
(Kokomlemle) 
M Husband US 
William 1 M Urban 
(Kokomlemle) 
F Fiancée US 
Kingsley 1 M Urban (Nima) M 
F 
Brother 
Sister 
UK 
US 
Rosaline 2 F Urban (Nima) M Oldest son US 
Aisha 2 F Rural (Mbaniyili) F 
F 
Daughter 
Daughter 
Accra 
Accra 
Ibrahim 1 M Peri-urban 
(Savelugu) 
F 
F 
Sister 
Sister 
Lybia 
Accra 
Farida 1 F Urban (Tamale) F Husband 
Niece 
Wa (Ghana) 
n/a 
Kwasi 1 M Urban (Tamale) M Brother Accra 
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Ali 2 M Peri-urban 
(Savelugu) 
F 
M 
M 
M 
Wife 
Brother 
Brother 
Friends (to give to their 
families) 
Kumasi (Ghana) 
Spain 
Kumasi 
Abdallah 2 M Urban (Tamale) M Brother Italy 
Hajia  1 F Rural (Kumbungu) M Husband Accra 
Afua  2 F Urban (Tamale) M 
F 
M 
Husband 
Sister 
Brother 
Italy 
Kumasi 
Accra 
Idrissu  2 M Peri-urban 
(Savelugu) 
M 
M 
Cousin (auntie’s child) 
Cousin (auntie’s child) 
Spain 
UK 
Abdul Aziz  2 M Peri-urban 
(Savelugu) 
M 
M 
M 
Son 
Son 
Son 
Accra 
Accra 
Accra 
Nana 2 F Rural (Mbaniyili) M 
F 
M 
Son 
Daughter 
Son 
Accra 
Accra 
Accra 
Zakariah 2 M Urban (Tamale) M 
M 
M 
Uncle 
Uncle 
Uncle 
Spain 
UK 
Kumasi 
Mahama 2 F Urban (Tamale) F Daughter Accra 
Dawuda 2 F Urban (Tamale) M 
M 
Brother 
Brother 
Accra 
Accra 
Hafsah 1 F Urban (Tamale) M Husband US 
Rashida  1 F Rural (Kumbungu) M Husband Sunyani (Ghana) 
 
Total of interviews = 92 
Total number of hours = 135 
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Appendix 3 - Interview questions posed to members of remittance households 
Section 1. Presentation of the household and migration history 
Could you introduce yourself and present your family/household? 
Are any members of your household migrants? 
How did they migrate? Were they supported by anyone? Where are they now? 
Have you ever migrated? If yes, where and for how long?  
Do you know many other people from the neighbourhood who also migrated?  
Section 2. Remittances 
Can you tell us who sends remittances to your household? Who is the money sent to?  
What type of remittances do you receive? For remittances as cash: how much do you receive, 
and how often per month? Does the amount you receive vary?  
What are remittances spent on? Do you use remittances for specific purposes/expenditures? 
Who decides how remittances are spent? How is it decided? 
Would you spend the money differently if you could? 
What does the sender say about how the money is being spent? 
Do you know if the sender sends remittances to other people?  
Without these remittances, how would you cover all the expenses of the household?  
How do you receive remittances and where do you go? Have you always received remittances 
this way?  
Section 3. Income and expenditures 
What are the main sources of income of your household? 
Does anyone work for you? Do you work for someone?  
Looking backwards, would you say that you and your family have had economic stability? Can 
you recall any ‘turning points’? 
How do you manage your budget during the ‘bad times’?  
Do you feel your income is always enough to pay for everything you and your family need? 
Section 4. Financial services and products 
Tell me about the different means/ways you have used to save over the last 5 years?  
Tell me about the different means you have used to borrow over the last 5 years?  
Do you use mobile money? What do you do with mobile money? What do you think of it?  
If the participant does not use any informal or formal financial services: ask why? 
Questions for participants using informal services only: 
 Why are you not using formal financial services? If you could, would you like to 
have access to these services? 
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 If the participant goes to a bank or microfinance institutions to collect remittances: 
ask if the cashier there ever tried to promote and sell the institution’s financial 
products.  
 
Questions for participants using formal services only: why are you not using informal financial 
mechanisms/services? 
Questions for all participants using informal and/or formal financial services: 
 Has any organisation ever tried to encourage you to open a bank account or to 
promote their financial products at the location where you pick up remittances? 
 In which situation do you prefer to use formal financial services over informal 
ones? And why?  
 In which situation do you prefer to use informal financial services over formal 
ones? And why?  
 Do you think that receiving remittances has allowed you to have more/better 
access to formal financial services? 
 
Section 5. Financial practices, arrangements and relationships 
Could you give me your thoughts on what these informal/formal financial services changed for 
you in your daily life?  
Has the use of these informal/formal services made any difference in the ways in which you 
manage the budget of the household?  
How have the ways you save and borrow changed since you started to use informal/formal 
services? 
Links between remittances and financial practices: 
 Has the use of these formal services and products changed how you manage/use 
remittances?  
 Can you tell us whether your relationship with the sender changed since you 
started using formal financial products? 
 
Do you consider yourself as a good money manager? How would you describe a good money 
manager?  
Section 6. Debt relationships 
Do you often have loans to repay?   
What is the interest rate for each of the loans you have taken out? What are the other fees you 
have to pay? 
What is your strategy to repay your loans?  
Do you sometimes have problems repaying your loans?  
What do you think about using these loans? 
What would have happened if you did not have access to those loans?  
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